Nathan Monk

Published	15/03/2016
Type	Article
Author(s)	Paul Senior
Corresponding Authors	Paul Senior, Professor of Probation Studies, Sheffield Hallam University
DOA
DOI

Is this an unlikely scenario, circa 2011? Government hiring a consultant in organisational and personnel management and challenging them to:

• Map out a way of changing the entire organisational matrix of probation. This is your brief:
• Undo the governance arrangements completely and create a bifurcated and multiple ownership model using a range of companies with no experience of running probation services
• As it worked so badly in 2001 when 17 chiefs were retired at a stroke losing the leadership skills of a service at a time when a new national organisation was created, repeat this tragedy as farce in 2014 so aim at, at least, 13 CEOs leaving the Trusts as the new organisations are created thus decimating leadership
• Create new arrangements which will downgrade the skills of its workforce, create confusion over what is required to be a probation practitioner and then squeeze funds to the extent that redundancy, low morale and sickness escalates and the core of probation, its workers, are decimated, set against each other and disillusioned.”

And yet this is just what has unfolded in the most farcical episode in probations’ rich, if turbulent, history of organisational change. The changes initiated by Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) are maybe more disruptive than previous changes but there have been plenty of changes since the steady state of 1970s and 1980s. For most of the last forty years, probation has been a local public service managed via a variety of Probation Committees (magistrates initially as the employers) and then Boards with a changing relationship with its courts, local authorities, the region and the centre. At one time the local authority also contributed to part of its budget, though the extent of local oversight was limited as direction has always come from the centre. This gathered pace when probation was projected ‘centre stage’ in the early 1990s and a more managed service was required. Boards became more diversified to include representatives from business and finance and the occasional academic. However, the funding requirements, controlled by the centre, ensured increasing compliance to central direction, ultimately increasing such control so that a National Probation Service was created in 2001. It was an opportunity for influence and recognition for the distinctive work of the probation service but which ultimately failed. A closer relationship with a more dominant partner, the prison service, a succession of lack lustre national leaderships plus a submissive attitude to the demands of  government saw probation drift from its core ideals to a weak and divided organisational arrangement lacking rationale, connectedness and a sense of direction. The 2001 version of the NPS did not last and another organisational shift brought Probation Trusts, increased local engagement through Local Criminal Justice Boards and Community Safety Partnerships, regional bodies and enhanced working partnerships with the police and with the third sector. As we reached 2012 the Trusts were regarded, by the government’s own measures, as in good health and had become the first public organisation to be awarded the ultimate business kitemark, the British Quality Foundation’s 2011 Gold Medal for Excellence Award.

Now just four years later we have governance models which are predicated on survival and ensuring the new Community Rehabilitation Companies at least break even. Many of the CEOs who started the CRCs before ownership was transferred to a strange band of catering, workfare, cleaning and security companies have now gone or been superseded by senior managers from the owners. There is no continuity between the different providers and less and less organic links with the new National Probation Service despite originally sharing buildings and having a common IT language. Now many models prevail and communication has become difficult.

Leadership is a difficult issue to get right. Too often the balance between management and leadership is blurred. In 2001 there was a strong move to centralise probation policy and practice and make all local areas dance to a new choreography (National Probation Service, 2001). For the new director faced with a brain drain of 17 Chiefs, amongst which were some of its most innovative thinkers and leaders, an administrative model prevailed and the new chiefs were managers working on behalf of a target-driven centre. This did not work well and as successive central leaders failed to resist the prisonisation of probation local leaders began to emerge. The new Trusts arrived with a younger, more female dominated leadership of the 35 Trusts which through its representative organ, the Probation Chiefs Association (PCA), began to drive forward a new agenda. Evidence showed it was performing well and innovating around such issues as Integrated Offender Management (IOM), domestic violence, sex offenders, accredited programmes, desistance agendas, the Offender Engagement Programme, etc. PCA as a fledging organisation, was beginning to assert itself and give a voice, often a female voice, to the views of its leadership in ways which approached the earlier more vocal ACOP in the recent past. Even if you took the ultimate government measure of success, reducing re offending, it was demonstrable on MoJ’s own statistics that being on probation in the Trusts did help reduce reoffending (MoJ Analytical Services, 2013). During the early TR debates, this leadership was visible and articulated its dismay at the dismantling of the successful Trust arrangements. However, the corporate silencing which was imposed by the MoJ quietened that voice to a whisper and it felt that at that moment the leadership lost its power to influence the changes. Indeed many faced with the uncomfortable job of making TR work either resigned or were quietly invited to do so. Once again the leadership was decimated and as the new arrangements emerged, it did so with a much less experienced set of individuals, nervous about their futures whether as a result of their civil servant status in the NPS or the insecurity of their future in the new CRCs. The voice of that new leadership has been largely silent.

Ironically the review of research initiated by the MoJ (MoJ Analytical Services, 2013) which drew on the good practice highlighted above suggested the following four characteristics should be at the centre of the new organisational arrangements:

• Skilled, trained practitioners;
• Well-sequenced, holistic approaches;
• Services and interventions delivered in a joined-up, integrated manner;
• Need for high quality services. (Senior, 2013)

I posed this question rhetorically in a blog concerning these aspirations in 2013:

’High quality services? Where can we possibly find a public service with top quality kite mark awards, reductions of up to 10 per cent in reoffending from community orders, a highly trained and motivated staff group, delivering integrated holistic services in cooperation with voluntary and private providers? Is this why we are seeking new providers? Wait, these criteria are met by an organisation in existence – probation trusts. So it makes sense to rip them in two, give it to providers with aspirations but little track record.’ (Senior, 2013)

If the farce of diminishing the leadership was enough to impact on probation, it is a further tragedy that the organisational changes have wrought an existential crisis at the heart of the probation profession. This is discussed elsewhere in this volume (see Worrall et al.) which interrogates the impact on the occupational culture; here it is sufficient to note the warnings from voices rising above the parapet to reveal a sorry tale of the disestablishment of the Probation ideal. It can be summarised emotionally as confrontational, demoralising and divisive. In practical terms the status of probation officer has been diminished, particularly but not exclusively, in the CRCs; colleagues have been set against each other as they work for different organisations; communications have been made more complex and IT systems have proliferated without positive interconnected outcomes. At the time of writing, redundancies, sometimes as much as 40 per cent, are likely to be implemented! Training arrangements within the CRCs are undermined and practice is often being devolved to PSO equivalents in both NPS through E3 (NPS, 2016) and in the various models of the CRCs. There are, nevertheless, examples of good practice across the country, maybe in spite of rather than because of the arrangements. The future of probation as a profession is threatened by these changes yet skilled, trained practitioners were at the heart of the research evidence quoted above (MoJ Analytical Services, 2013). One voice picked at random from Twitter sums up the crisis:

‘#probation fast becoming a concept, not an institution/public service NPS enforcement and CRCs failed business.’ (@sadSPO, 5th March 2016)

140 characters says it all. The profession is under threat.

So, above are insights into the changes, below are some of the fears and hopes expressed at the conversation in Kendal.

Fears
• Commodification of emotional labour (see Knight et al. in this volume);
• Individualist, oppressive, competitive environments;
• Silos will be created with no common language to ease communication;
• Individual CRCs will be amalgamated for the needs of efficiency thus breaking local links even more;
• Loss of expertise/local community links following abolition of trusts. Where is the link with courts in CRCs?;
• Management becomes procedural not professional;
• Commercial imperatives are prioritised at the expense of best practice;
• The mantra becomes low cost service for maximum profit;
• Workforce no longer expects to stay in probation for life – short term work then move on;
• New managerialism defines training, then practice, of managers.

Hopes
• Freed of National Standards this will release the creative potential of CRCs;
• Mobilising the creativity of people to manage change; historically probation staff are resilient;
• Will become more outward looking, the profession of probation expanding to include not just direct probation staff but all working in community rehabilitation and community justice including third tier organisations;
• Creative new way of managing in the changed structure;
• Strong confident leaders who can communicate the meaning and purpose of probation to the public and politicians;
• Strong occupational cultures regardless of diverse organisational contexts buttressed by an independent voice for the profession, the Probation Institute.

The future of a recognisable probation institution is at risk given the organisational changes, arguably more invasive than previous attempts. Bifurcation of delivery means that integration of services for the individual service user is threatened. The deskilling of qualified Probation staff is a product of where an individual was placed in the reorganisation and not any assessment of their skills and knowledge. This threatens the professional confidence, independence and creative potential of probation staff, an integral part of delivering the always difficult role of probation. The need for effective leadership is compromised by the bifurcated arrangements. Perhaps it is prescient to speculate that when further organisational changes arrive, they may well seek to undo some of the consequences of this farcical and tragic organisational transformation.

References

MoJ Analytical Services (2013) Transforming Rehabilitation: a summary of evidence on reducing reoffending. MoJ.
National Probation Service for England and Wales and the Home Office Communication Directorate (2001) A New Choreography: An Integrated Strategy for the National Probation Service for England and Wales. Strategic Framework 2001 – 2004.
National Probation Service (2016) E3 Blueprint.
Senior, P. (2013) Risky and fundamentally misguided. Blog. Available at: http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/resources/risky-and-fundamentally-misguided#.
Accessed 09/03/2016.

Published	15/03/2016
Type	Article
Author(s)	John Deering
Corresponding Authors	John Deering, Reader in Criminology & Criminal Justice, University of South Wales
DOA
DOI

Quite apart from the organisational and governance impact of Transforming Rehabilitation (TR), which has, of course seen the destruction of the unified public sector probation service, the TR changes have called into question something even more fundamental to probation practice. Who will be probation practitioners in this uncertain future and what will they see as the purpose of that practice? What will be their value base , why will they join; will they see the job as akin to a vocation aimed at providing ‘help’ in the broad sense, or as something altogether more basic, managerial and concerned with law enforcement?

Addressing such questions requires crystal-ball gazing, but there have perhaps been some features of the past 25 years or so that might provide a few pointers. It seems to me that successive governments have, since the 1991 Criminal Justice Act made the probation order ‘punishment in the community’, wished to change the ethos and practices of the service, a process that has fallen into a recognisable trajectory that culminated in TR. Quite apart from governance, the attempt to change practice included the intention to do this via changing practitioners, which began with the abolition of social work training in the mid-1990s by Home Secretary Michael Howard. Howard’s intention was to ‘toughen up’ probation by recruiting largely ex-forces personnel who were not to be professionally trained. This was presumably based on a stereotypical assumption that such recruits would necessarily bring toughness, whatever that meant, to the job. This effort failed, as probation services refused to recruit non-social work trained personnel in the period before the incoming Labour government created the Diploma in Probation Studies (DiPS). The DiPS itself was controversial in some quarters due to its non-social work base, but there is evidence that these new recruits came into the job and training with the same underlying value base as had probably been the case for their social work predecessors (Annison, 2006; Deering, 2010).

Various theoretical and empirical studies have investigated and debated ‘probation values’ in recent decades (e.g. Annison, 2006; Annison et al., 2008; Deering, 2011; Farrow, 2004; Nellis & Gelsthorpe, 2003; Robinson & McNeill, 2004; Williams, 1995) whilst a few others have looked at trainees specifically in terms of their values and why they joined the probation service (Annison, 2006; Deering, 2010). In brief, these values coalesced around a belief in people’s ability to change and the legitimate and potentially effective role of probation practice in facilitating that change. Trainees and experienced practitioners alike shared these values, which were to be operationalised via the professional relationship that was seen to be the basis of good practice. The relationship should be empathic, prosocial, make proper use of legitimate authority, be encouraging and aim to assist with the reduction of an individual’s problems and difficulties, all within a non-judgemental and anti-discriminatory approach which clearly eschewed rational choice theories of crime for more determinist ideas, whilst acknowledging at the individual level a measure of choice. Alongside this, the debate about effectiveness, from ‘Nothing Works’ to ‘What Works’ evolved, to be joined more latterly by desistance which called into question more ‘treatment’ based models of practice and developed a model for probation that was more about the collaborative removal of barriers to desistance (Farrall, 2002; McNeill, 2006; Weaver & McNeill, 2010). However, as removed from each other as desistance and cognitive-behaviourist approaches might be, the professional relationship, its nature and importance has perhaps been the element common to these and indeed any other approach and seems to have remained central to practitioners’ ideas about
professionalism and effectiveness throughout various government-imposed changes.

Although it can be argued that the value base of people recruited to and working within the service has been resilient and retains many elements of what might be called ‘traditional’ (i.e. aligned to social work) values, practice itself has had to adapt to changing priorities represented by the rise of risk, punishment, enforcement and compliance and the rest of the managerialist, late modern paraphernalia. However, it also seems to have been the case that practitioners, based upon their values have adapted to and adapted government changes to the purpose and focus of practice. For example, whilst practitioners accepted government moves towards risk management and  accountability to the courts, it seems likely that they interpreted these moves in ways not completely aligned to that intended by government (Deering, 2011; Mawby & Worrall, 2013). The risk agenda was accepted in the main, but was interpreted about being concerned as much with the risk of re-offending as the risk of harm; whilst the latter was more directly linked to public protection, the former was seen as equally important in that those of lower risk of harm represented the clear majority of probationers and were often at higher risk of reoffending and it is in trying to reduce that risk by engaging with individuals that much or most of probation practice was seen as lying; practitioners did not see their role as simply ‘offender management’. Similarly, the law enforcement and punishment agendas were addressed by practitioners creatively, with a rejection of administrative or ‘knee jerk’ enforcement and breach in preference for a more nuanced approach that took individual needs and degrees of engagement into account (Deering, 2011; Mawby & Worrall, 2013). Practitioners also seem to have rejected managerialism, with its professional emptiness which measured processes not outcomes and seemed lacking in concern for the quality of practice, but rather that targets were simply achieved. Practice and practitioners in 2020?

Into this situation of continuous top-down change and practitioner adaptation came the threat to the integrity of probation as a unified public sector organisation. This was initiated by the creation of the National Offender Management Service and realised by TR. Whilst changes prior to TR had arguably not seen a complete undermining of probation principles and values, at least not at practitioner level, TR threatens their very existence. It seems to me that the abolition of any requirement for a professional qualification for anyone working within the Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) has changed the game in a way that will be difficult to resist. Whilst there would of course be no reason why CRCs could not appoint qualified staff, there is no obvious reason why they might have any interest in doing so, for two reasons at least. Firstly, the expense will prove prohibitive for organisations that have already shown they are intending to cut costs wherever possible (Lawrence, 2016) and, secondly, there is no indication that they are interested in the quality of practice per se, as recent announcements about reducing staff levels in CRCs is linked to the coming of biometric technologies that can allow for a ‘reporting only’ supervision for ‘probationers’, many of whom will be of high risk of reoffending, with considerable personal and social needs (Travis, 2015).

On the other hand, there may be a residual commitment to rehabilitative approaches and it is perhaps here that there might be more hope for the future. Although probation being a public sector enterprise has been of fundamental importance to practitioners to date (Deering & Feilzer, 2015) this may well become less of a factor over time and ‘the job’ will continue to attract to it individuals committed to working empathically and offering ‘help’ in an attempt to promote desistance and rehabilitation. However, it does seem more than likely that such individuals will be working in an environment that may not formally value their professionalism and skills.

Within the National Probation Service (NPS), the situation may be very different. The government has announced new arrangement for professional training (National Probation Service, 2015) and TR commits the NPS to a professional workforce. In such a situation, individuals that hold similar underlying values to those that have gone before will have an organisation prepared to train and qualify them professionally and to require them to work at a level beyond that of the ‘reporting only’ CRCs. However, the NPS’s sole focus on higher risk of harm individuals will perhaps play up the law enforcement, public protection element of the job and this may itself reduce its attractiveness to some potential applicants. In a study conducted online before the split of the service in June 2014, Martina Feilzer from Bangor University and I considered the views of probation staff about the possible impact of TR (Deering & Feilzer, 2015). Unsurprisingly, those who replied to our survey (over 1300 individuals) were unequivocally opposed to the split and particularly the selling off of part of the service. They were pessimistic about the future,both in employment and professional terms and saw the division into the NPS and CRCs as inevitably leading to a two-tier service, with the CRCs, despite supervising some 70% of the previous caseload seen as very much second-class, due to them being deprofessionalised. More surprising was the relatively negative view of the prospects of working in the NPS. Whilst this was seen as positive as it would remain in the public sector, the sole focus on higher risk of harm was seen as narrowing the job professionally and risking burn-out. Moreover, the civil service was seen as likely to be more top-down, rule-driven and less amenable to professional discretion and creativity.

Since the split, the news has been largely negative: staff shortages, stress and high workloads in the NPS and, as mentioned, cuts and job losses in the CRCs. In a study conducted for Napo that primarily looked at employment relations post TR, Kirton and Guillame (2015) have argued that staff feel that TR has de-professionalised the service and that stress levels are high, due to higher workloads, job insecurity, less autonomy and reduced opportunities for training and progression. Many respondents in their study were considering leaving the service, something that was also recorded in our pre-TR survey in 2014 (Deering & Feilzer, 2015).

It seems difficult to be optimistic at this stage about who might be practitioners in 2020. Many existing staff may have left, via retirement or seeking alternative employment. Whilst there will likely be a professional training, if it is limited to the employment needs of the NPS, it will involve a relatively small number of people, leaving the majority of ‘probation supervisees’ within the CRCs potentially supervised by unqualified staff utilising biometric reporting technology. More optimistically, even TR may fail to dissuade the ‘usual suspects’, people wishing to engage in ‘probation work’ for those reasons outlined above, from applying to work within the CRCs as well as the NPS. If this is the case, there remains hope that humanistic, empathic and curious practice can survive, breaking out from the TR confines of managerialism, offender management and punishment.

References

Annison, J. (2006) Career Trajectories of Graduate Trainee Probation Officers. Plymouth: University of Plymouth.
Annison, J., Eadie, T. and Knight, C. (2008) People First: Probation Officer Perspectives on Probation Work, Probation Journal, 55(3): 259-272.
Deering, J. (2010) Attitudes and Beliefs of Trainee Probation Officers – a New Breed?’, Probation Journal, 57(1): 9-26.
Deering, J. (2011) Probation Practice and the New Penology: practitioner reflections. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Deering, J. and Feilzer, M. Y. (2015) Transforming Rehabilitation: is privatisation the end of the probation ideal? Bristol: Policy Press.
Farrall, S. (2002) Rethinking What Works with Offenders. Cullompton: Willan.
Farrow, K. (2004) Still Committed after all These Years? Morale in the Modern-Day Probation Service, Probation Journal, 51(3): 206-220.
Kirton, G. and Guillame, C. (2015) Employment relations and working conditions in probation after Transforming Rehabilitation – with a special focus on gender and union effects. London: Queen Mary, University of London.
Lawrence, I. (2016) More CRC’s join the job cuts stampede. London: Napo.
Mawby, R. C. and Worrall, A. (2013) Doing Probation Work: identity in a criminal justice occupation. London: Routledge.
McNeill, F. (2006) A Desistance Paradigm for Offender Management, Criminology and Criminal Justice, 6(1): 39-62.
National Probation Service (2015) Train to be a probation officer. Online. Available at: http://www.traintobeaprobationofficer.com/the-opportunity/
Nellis, M. and Gelsthorpe, L. (2003) ‘Human Rights and the Probation Values Debate’, in W. Chui and M. Nellis (Eds.) Moving Probation Forward. Harlow: Pearson.
Robinson, G. and McNeill, F. (2004) ‘Purposes Matter: Examining the ‘Ends’ of Probation’, in G. Mair (Ed.) What Matters in Probation. Cullompton: Willan.
Travis, A. (2015) Probation officers face redundancy with plans to replace them by machines. The Guardian.
Weaver, B. and McNeill, F. (2010) ‘Travelling hopefully: desistance theory and probation practice’, in J. Brayford, F. Cowe and J. Deering (Eds.), What else works? Creative work with offenders. Cullompton: Willan.
Williams, B. (1995) Probation Values. London: Venture Press.

Published	15/03/2016
Type	Article
Author(s)	Michael Teague
Corresponding Authors	Michael Teague, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, University of Derby
DOA
DOI

The privatisation of probation provision in England and Wales is now neither tentative nor experimental. Offender-funded probation in America is an inevitable by-product of the introduction of market forces into probation, and a significant growth area. A comparative analysis of the delivery of privatised, offender-funded probation in the USA is employed in order to illuminate one possible future trajectory for probation in England and Wales. The experience of service users in southern US states is considered, as is the evidence indicating that an insufficiently regulated and privatised system is primarily driven by revenue generation rather than rehabilitation. While many US privatised probation companies operate in a principled way, a number of cases involving these companies have culminated in the incarceration of service users who were unable to afford supervision fees. When a privatised company’s survival depends on its ability to raise revenue, this may impact on the quality of intervention and the experience of service users. We are not yet at a point where offender-funded intervention is advocated in England. Nevertheless, there is a need to further reflect upon ethical, fiscal, political and practice issues before we irrevocably commit probation further down its current path.

Introduction
The study of cross-cultural and cross-national criminology and penology has the potential to offer a range of insights into our own system of criminal and community justice (Nelken, 2010; Pakes, 2015). With the advent of globalization, the speed of interchange in penal developments has accelerated (Nelken, 2011). This involves not just the exchange of academic and practice ideas, but also the ability of multi-national global corporations to become active players in criminal and community justice systems around the world. Cavadino and Dignan’s (2005) definitive comparative study of international penal systems analysed the key differences in punitiveness between countries with neoliberal, corporatist or social democratic political systems. They viewed the USA and the UK (along with Australia and New Zealand) as exemplars of neoliberalism, and mounted a persuasive argument that neoliberal countries have the highest incarceration rates, not least because of the impact of their political and economic structures.

An area in comparative criminology which has attracted substantial academic interest is the ‘apparent convergence of penal policy between ‘neoliberal’ Anglophone jurisdictions (which is) exemplified by the adoption of a punitive and politicized approach to crime and punishment’ (Jones & Newburn, 2013:439). Attention has been focused on the way in which crime control policies have been imported to the UK from the USA (Newburn, 2002; Jones & Newburn, 2006, 2013). To achieve insight into how probation may operate in future years in England and Wales, it is worth turning to our neoliberal American counterparts for a comparative vision of probation in different jurisdictions. Some southern US states (for example, Georgia) offer a dystopian vision of how for-profit probation may function without proper regulation. An example of probation delivery from California is also examined.

Garland (2002) argued that the penal welfarist philosophy underpinning our criminal and community system was being supplanted by popular, and populist, punitiveness. His analysis of the culture of control noted the increased focus on risk assessment and public protection, both of which paralleled the embracing of incarceration as the answer to crime control. As the shift to punitivism gained purchase in USA during the 1970s and 1980s, probation’s rehabilitative impetus waned and political support for a more punitive, ‘tougher’ orientation grew. The result of this was as unsurprising as it was inevitable: towards the end of the twentieth century, more weight was accorded to probation’s law enforcement role, while rehabilitation and reintegration were deprioritised.

The American probation system
While it is inherently difficult to measure punitiveness, it is common currency amongst criminologists that, if imprisonment rates are employed as a barometer, America is the most punitive country in the world (for example, Teague, 2008; Pratt, 2009; Travis, Western et al., 2014). Though mass incarceration has been an intrinsic part of the nation’s penal culture for around four decades (Gottschalk, 2006, 2015), the punishment imperative has also firmly expressed itself within probation. Phelps (2013) analyses the upsurge of community supervision as a US criminal justice sanction and considers its relationship to mass incarceration. Her theoretical model locates probation within the wider continuum of punishment, and concludes that the paradoxical impact of probation is that it ‘exerts both a prison alternative and net-widener effect, with the two forces often cancelling one another out’ (2013:72). ‘Net widening’ refers to the potential of community sentences to convey the unintended consequence of widening the overall net of social control and punishment, resulting in those who might otherwise have been dealt with informally being channelled into the justice and penal systems (McMahon, 1990).

As in the UK, the role of the US probation practitioner was originally designed to promote rehabilitation, and provide social support geared to prevent reoffending. However, as Clear and Frost (2014:156) ruefully conclude, the punishment imperative imposed a more nuanced effect, that of ‘distorting the role of the probation or parole officer’. This distortion facilitated a shift in probation’s role, leading them to conclude that probation and parole practitioners in the USA now ‘mostly function as community surveillance workers’ (2014:157). While this may be contested – it has, for example, been argued that the role of contemporary US probation practitioners is less law enforcement-oriented than it was two decades earlier (Hsieh, Hafoka et al., 2015) – there has been a broad shift in correctional ideology away from rehabilitation oriented intervention.

The criminal and community justice system in the United States is not a monolithic or homogenous entity, and attitudes to – and levels of – correctional intervention vary at a local, state, and national level. The decentralised and sometimes fragmented nature of contemporary US probation can mean that large cities, for example, have two or three probation agencies. The first manifestations of what we would now recognise as probation intervention appeared in America in the mid to late 1800s, though it was not a national phenomenon, evident in every state, until 1956 (Petersilia, 1997; Barton-Bellessa & Hanser, 2011). Phillips (2010) offers comparative insight into the origins of probation in England and Wales and the USA, and way in which these origins have influenced the agency’s organisational structure, value base, and professional practice. Teague (2012a) provides a comparative assessment of the contemporary position of probation in both countries within the context of neoliberal political and economic structures. It is evident that probation in both nations has become progressively more concerned with what we might label as ‘managerialism’ (Garland, 2002). The target and audit culture of key performance indicators, efficiency, measurable outcomes and cost-effectiveness (Whitehead, 2007; Ashworth, 2009; Phillips, 2011) which manifested itself in England and Wales was equally evident in America.

There are areas of US practice that will immediately resonate with UK probation workers. For example, American probation practitioners have confronted ‘enormous challenges in their work, including large caseloads, limited resources, offender management difficulties, and criticism of high recidivism rates and the related threat to public safety’ (Hsieh, Hafoka et al., 2015:2). Even so, there is evidence that the role of the probation officer supervising service users in the community has evolved in recent years from that of ‘a condition-driven brokerage and monitoring specialist to a risk-focused direct-service interventionist that uses behavioural change strategies to promote public safety and reduced victimization’ (Robinson, Lowenkamp et al., 2015:3). What this appears to mean in practice is that US probation workers are now required to score and utilize validated risk and needs assessment instruments in order to measure risk factors and needs that, if addressed, may lower the prospect of reoffending. This would also be recognisable to the UK practitioner.

The qualifications to practice as a probation officer in the USA differ according to the specific state in which they train, but a degree in criminal justice, social work, or an associated field is generally required (Clear, Reisig et al., 2016). In addition, some states seek previous practice experience in either criminal justice or a treatment related field. This is not dissimilar to the way in which UK probation officers have been trained. While the UK observer may recognise some of the intervention in the USA, other spheres of practice remain difficult to reconcile with the value base to which many UK practitioners adhere. One example of this is the degree of physical force that is officially sanctioned in some jurisdictions for probation practitioners to use with non-compliant services users (Teague 2011). Another factor which has played a significant role in the development of US probation has been the carrying of firearms by some staff (Phillips, 2010). Some states classify probation officers as peace officers. They are therefore required to engage in training which reflects that status, which may include physical training and firearms proficiency. The seismic changes taking place in probation in England and Wales today notwithstanding, neither the use of physical force on service users nor armed intervention seem likely to ever manifest themselves in UK probation practice.

There were one million people on probation in America in 1980. By 2010 this had risen to more than four million (Clear & Frost, 2014:18). The total probation caseload for England and Wales in September 2015 was 234,229 people (Ministry of Justice, 2016:11). This figure includes those subject to statutory supervision following release from prison. A rough calculation undertaken for this article indicates that if we made people subject to community supervision in England and Wales at the same rate as the USA, we would now have no fewer than 803,858 people on supervision. The reach of probation supervision in America is significantly greater than in the UK. The community supervision population (including both those on probation and those on parole) in the USA reached a peak of 5,119,000 supervisees in 2007. Since then, that total has been gradually falling by average of 1.2% each year. At the end of 2014, for example, approximately 7 in 10 people on correctional supervision were supervised in the community, either on probation (3,864,100 supervisees) or parole (856,900) (Kaeble, Glaze et al., 2016:2). The most common offence for which people are sentenced to probation supervision is a drug offence (Alexander, 2010:102).

Charging for supervision: offender-funded probation
Given that the privatised probation provision in England and Wales is no longer tentative or experimental, it is instructive to examine the delivery of for-profit intervention in America. The US embrace of private sector intervention in criminal and community justice has extended to jail book-in fees at the time of arrest, bail investigation fees, pre-sentence report fees, and probation supervision fees; all must be paid upfront by the offender (Alexander, 2010). While the number of US probation agencies charging service users fees for supervision has risen significantly in recent years, offender-funded probation is not new. The collection of fees from probation supervisees commenced in Michigan, in 1929. By 1990, at least 28 states were charging service users for probation supervision. Some agencies require multiple fees from individual offenders (APPA, 2011).

Two issues arise with the charging of fees. Firstly, whether or not fees are compatible with the philosophy and ethos of probation, and secondly, the more pragmatic fiscal question of whether or not charging impedes the successful conclusion of supervision. The classic argument against supervision fees is that charging creates an incentive for service users with limited financial resources to reoffend, as they must acquire funds to pay the fees. The American Probation and Parole Association state that fees effectively ‘put a price on probation which some offenders may not be able to pay’ (APPA, 2011:1). However, offender-funded supervision is an inevitable by-product of the introduction of market forces into probation. There are privatised companies delivering offender-funded probation services in the states of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Tennessee, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, Washington, Missouri, Michigan, and Montana (Human Rights Watch, 2014); for-profit intervention is a growth area. When the survival of a private company depends on its ability to raise revenue, then this may impact on the nature of intervention (Teague, 2011).

The American justice system distinguishes between felonies and misdemeanours. Felonies, the most serious offences, generally attract lengthy prison sentences of over a year in a state or federal prison. The law restricts the severity of sentences which may be imposed for misdemeanour offences to a maximum of one year behind bars. The changes in probation structure in England and Wales introduced by Transforming Rehabilitation (Ministry of Justice, 2013; McNeill, 2013; Senior, 2013) led to around 70 percent of probation’s core work, relating to supervisees assessed as presenting a low or medium risk, being put out to tender. Interestingly, offender-funded supervision in America is widely used in misdemeanour cases; that is, cases presenting a lower or medium risk. Just as the public sector in England and Wales continue to work with those service users presenting the highest risk, it is notable that offender-funded probation in America appears to be less widely used with those who present the highest risk.

Cases involving private probation companies have previously culminated in the incarceration of service users that could not afford to pay those fees. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) (2016) in Alabama is currently conducting a vigorous campaign for the abolition of what they label as ‘the modern-day debtors’ prisons prevalent in the Deep South’. A key plank of this campaign is the drive to end government use of privatised probation funded from fees paid by service users for their own supervision. These fees are demanded by what the SPLC (2016) labels as ‘private, so-called “probation” companies that use the power of the justice system to extort payments from the poor’. Alexander (2010:155) observes that probation officers in a number of US states demand that offenders must surrender 35 percent of their income towards ‘fines, fees, surcharges and restitution’.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (2015) filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of Kevin Thompson, a young black man from DeKalb County in Georgia. This contested the debt collection techniques employed by a private
to pay his supervision fees to the company, as well as court fees. Thompson’s account is instructive:

‘…the DeKalb County Recorder’s Court ordered me to pay $810 in fines… When I told the judge that I could not afford to pay $810 that day, she put me on “probation” with JCS and told me that I had 30 days to pay. Like other people who couldn’t afford to pay fines on sentencing day, I was on “pay-only” probation… When my 30 days were almost up, I went to see my JCS officer. She charged me with violating probation for failure to pay court fines and JCS fees… I didn’t have the money to pay… I hoped the judge might give me an extension of time to pay or community service because I was trying my best to pay. Instead, the judge immediately asked to hear from the JCS officer next to her, who recommended sentencing me to 10 days in jail if I couldn’t pay my balance that day.’ (Thompson, 2015)

Thomson was not a high risk offender; his original offence involved a traffic ticket. The ACLU argued that the probation company’s debt collection activity was coercive. It is difficult to conclude that this practice promoted any meaningful rehabilitative or reintegrative experience; rather, it appears to be primarily geared to revenue generation and shareholder profit. However, there are no bleeding hearts at JCS, which is reaping the financial benefits of outsourcing probation. According to the chief executive and chief marketing officer discussing an earlier case: ‘We hear a lot of ‘I can’t pay the fee’ It is not our job to figure that out. Only the judge can make that determination’ (Bronner, 2012).

One of the most disquieting results of imposing the role of revenue generator on probation practitioners is that they have become embroiled in a system which appears to reinforce oppression in terms of race. In DeKalb County, for example, African Americans constitute 54 percent of the population. However, almost all of probation service users incarcerated by the courts as a consequence of their inability to pay the high probation supervision fees are African American. This disproportionality can be found in a range of courts in the Deep South. There are echoes here of the post-Civil War era, when former slaves were charged with minor offences, then had weighty financial penalties imposed upon them. Incarceration followed swiftly when they were unable to pay their debts (Alexander, 2010).

The Human Rights Watch (2014) campaigning group has undertaken research in the states of Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama and pinpoints a range of cases that resulted from the outsourcing of probation intervention. In August 2013, the city of Greenwood in Mississippi had over 1,200 people who were subject to fee-driven probation supervision with JCS. The total population of Greenwood is 16,000 residents. In Harpersville, Alabama, a judge publicly stated that a private probation company and its local government partner were operating what he bluntly labelled as a ‘judicially sanctioned extortion racket’ (Human Rights Watch, 2014:47). Local government is attracted to privatised probation because, in most cases, it costs them precisely nothing. The company picks up the responsibility for, and delivery of, supervision, and collects the revenue. This has appeal for cash-strapped local government, trying to fund services in a climate of continuing financial austerity. The Judicial Inquiry Commission, part of Alabama state’s Supreme Court, stated that judges, not privatised probation companies, must decide who is (and is not) capable of paying. This is a critical point when the inability to pay results in incarceration.

In Bearden v. Georgia (1983), the US Supreme Court ruled that probation supervisees may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay a financial penalty, because this would contradict the values of fairness and justice enshrined in the 14th Amendment to the American Constitution. While sentencers are guided to consider the supervisee’s ability to pay before incarceration for non-payment is considered, the reality appears to be that many southern local courts all too readily allow private probation companies to influence their decisions. This is problematic, not least because of the potential conflict of interest that may arise when companies provide monetary bonuses to probation staff which are calculated according to the fees they have collected from supervisees. This may involve setting ‘specific monetary targets for fee collections and (the payment of) bonuses to probation officers…who meet or exceed them’ (Human Rights Watch, 2014:43). In an extreme scenario, the collection of fees in a target-focused organisation may even be viewed as a barometer of both the response of the service user and of the professional success of the individual probation officer.

In August 2013, the state of Georgia had 34 private probation companies registered with the state. Approximately 175,000 people in the state of Georgia are subject to probation supervision for misdemeanour offences. They pay around $125 million each year in fines and surcharges. The rate of people subject to probation supervision in Georgia for misdemeanours is more than four times the national average (Fiftal Alarid, 2015:282), and private providers supervise 80 percent of people on probation. An official state report concluded that ‘some providers’ reporting and payment policies were likely to increase probationer non-compliance’ (Griffin & McGuire, 2014:1). What happens in essence is that people convicted for misdemeanour offences who lack the financial resources to pay hefty fines then find themselves immediately subject to sizeable monthly supervision fees charged by a privatised probation company. This is unequivocally probation for profit, not for reintegration.

The privatisation of probation in Georgia has handed an extraordinary degree of law enforcement power over the lives of poor people to private companies. Focused on the collection of inflated monthly supervision fees aimed at the maximisation of profit, these companies do not prioritise rehabilitation. While monthly reporting is the norm, the role of supervision is marginal, and would hardly be recognisable to UK practitioners. Service users pay prior to meeting their supervising officer, and often, the sole aim of the session is revenue generation. The glaring omission is any attempt to engage with relevant criminogenic issues. Employment, housing, domestic abuse or alcohol or drug use are not at the forefront of the supervisor’s agenda, not least because they are not lucrative areas of endeavour. If the primary goal of service provision is revenue generation, the likelihood is that these needs remain unmet. Probation officers’ salaries and bonuses may be linked to the income they generate from service users, which has led to allegations that staff have resorted to confronting service users with the threat of arrest if they attend for supervision without sufficient funds to pay the supervision fee in full (Southern Center for Human Rights, 2008).

CASC: an alternative model of intervention
The US justice system is not embodied in a monolithic, all-encompassing institution. Reflecting this diverse structure, probation functions within a varied network of federal, state, and local community justice systems. This diversity permits a broad range of approaches to intervention; practice in southern states such as Alabama or Georgia may be dissimilar to practice in, for example, New York or California. How probation operates in different geographical areas may be a function of the jurisdiction in charge of that area. An account of an alternative model of a public/private probation partnership in California offers a demonstration of how such intervention may enhance the experience of service users. California has an extensive history of providing a range of innovative alternatives to imprisonment, and the 2011 Public Safety Realignment Act devolved responsibilities for supervising offenders and parolees assessed as relatively low risk from California State’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the local county level (Owen & Mobley, 2012). Signing the legislation, the state Governor labelled the prison system as ‘a revolving door for lower-level offenders… Cycling these offenders through state prisons wastes money, aggravates crowded conditions, (and) thwarts rehabilitation…’ (Brown, 2011).

Realignment altered California’s probation system, and encouraged counties to develop and implement alternatives to incarceration. The legislation ensured those counties enjoyed a degree of autonomy in planning, designing and allocating community supervision and support services. This led the San Francisco Adult Probation Department (SFAPD) to expand its existing practice model with a range of strategies, including the creation of the Community Assessment and Services Center (CASC). On an academic trip to California in 2015, I spent a day at CASC. It is an innovative one-stop community corrections hub which opened in 2013 in the centre of San Francisco. CASC incorporates principles of restorative justice and utilises an approach rooted in accountability, responsibility and opportunities for long-term change (Still, Adachi et al., 2015). Its model of intervention employs a strong focus on collaborative case management. It serves an average of 600 former prisoners every year, with the declared aim of providing service users with ‘transformative and motivational opportunities that keep them from recycling back through the criminal justice system’ (Adachi, Garcia et al., 2012:20).

On-site probation supervision was provided in a welcoming, inclusive and informal social setting. Supervisees met with their probation officers and were also able to use other CASC services in separate areas of the building. An impressively comprehensive range of services, including education, anger management, employment readiness, parenting, substance misuse and relapse prevention, and gender responsive programmes, was on offer. It was evident that CASC’s work assists service users to develop their resiliency and the self-sufficiency skills needed to complete their community reintegration. As a visitor, I was struck by the enthusiastic and responsive manner with which the practitioners engaged the service users. They radiated a sense of openness and availability for those users. (It should be said that I was also struck by the whole-hearted support for arming probation officers articulated by those same practitioners.)

CASC does not operate an offender-funded model. It is a partnership between SFAPD and Leaders in Community Alternatives, Inc. (LCA), a private company which is one of California’s leading private providers of community-based services. Their services ‘are built on evidence-based and best practice designed to break the cycle of recidivism’ and their approach is ‘holistic… with programs addressing cognitive and behavioral issues, and alcohol and substance abuse’ (Leaders in Community Alternatives, 2015). However, CASC’s public sector partners also included the City’s Department of Public Health and Department of Child Support Services. These agencies attended CASC regularly, in order to assist service users in accessing health, income and other benefits. This highly effective joint operation by the SFAPD and LCA has benefitted service users, and fulfilled a range of needs which may otherwise have remained unmet. There is no doubt that many privatised probation companies in the USA operate in a principled and moral way, and CASC provides an example of the potential of a public sector/private sector partnership. CASC has been in existence for less than three years, and detailed academic research evaluating its effectiveness is awaited.

Conclusion
A comparative analysis of the delivery of privatised, offender-funded probation in the USA has been employed in order to illuminate the possible future trajectory of probation in England and Wales. It can be argued that the political realities in the UK starkly differ from those which prevail in the USA, and that offender-funded probation does not currently feature on any UK political party agenda. However, with no end in sight to the era of acute fiscal tightening, private probation’s perceived capacity to deliver efficiency and effectiveness while simultaneously saving taxpayers’ money will not lose its attraction for neoliberal governmental strategists. We have already noted that policy transfer in criminal and penal justice is a reality, particular in the arena of privatisation. Jones and Newburn (2006:14) observed that the strongest example of policy transfer from the USA to the UK in their research occurred in the area of the ‘commercialization of corrections’. England and Wales currently possess the most privatised prison system in Europe (Teague, 2012b). When the company then known as Group 4 Remand Services Limited opened the UK’s first private prison in 1992, no-one anticipated that 18 percent of the entire prison population of England and Wales (some 15,446 prisoners) would be held in privately managed prisons by 2015 (Prison Reform Trust, 2015:69). This compares to the 8 percent of the US federal and state prison population (124,100 inmates) who were held in privately run prisons in 2014 (Kaeble, Glaze et al., 2016:22). These figures confirm that we currently lock up a significantly higher proportion of inmates in private prisons than the USA, the nation that many view as the standard bearer for privatised justice.

Prisons have been at the forefront of the shift towards privatisation in the field of criminal and penal justice in England and Wales over the last two decades. Our national perspective on the acceptability of privatised imprisonment has undergone a sea change over this period, and there is, at the least, a possibility that our perspective on privatised probation may be similarly susceptible to change. The example of CASC in California indicates that adherence to the reintegrative values of probation and intervention premised on the rehabilitative ideal may be achievable within the framework of a public sector/private sector partnership. CASC’s construction of intervention is a world away from the ‘judicially sanctioned extortion racket’ (Human Rights Watch, 2014:47) that constitutes probation in Harpersville, Alabama. However, the evidence from a number of southern US states indicates that some of the poorest people in America have become a lucrative business opportunity for these companies. Some have argued that the notion of rehabilitation has been effectively jettisoned, lest it impedes shareholder profit (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

There is a pressing need to further reflect upon ethical, fiscal, political and practice issues before we irrevocably commit probation further down its current path in England and Wales. While we are not yet at the point where offender-funded intervention is advocated, much can change over a parliamentary term. From the perspective of the predominant neoliberal ethos, offender-funding is arguably a logical next step in the process of privatising probation. The worst case scenario for England and Wales is that we accelerate, full-tilt, down the American road of privatised intervention, where the justice system functions as a ‘self-sustaining cycle of gathering increasing numbers of poor people, mostly men and mostly black, into its clutches, profoundly damaging their life chances, and returning them to communities bereft of the capacity to absorb them’ (Clear & Frost, 2014:157). This would amount to nothing less than the betrayal of the rehabilitative ideal, and culminate in the deconstruction of over a century of creative and dedicated reintegrative intervention. Rather than proceed any further down the road of offender-funded intervention and outsourcing probation, we could choose to learn from those countries which have chosen not to delegate the delivery of probation to non-state entities, and which promote a transformative agenda of desistance.

References

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Published	15/12/2015
Type	Article
Author(s)	Dr Rachael Steele
Corresponding Authors	Dr Rachael Steele, Lecturer in Criminal Justice, John Moores University
DOA
DOI

This paper examines the results of a study which set out to ascertain applicability of Rational Choice Theories of offending to offenders’ actual experiences. The Rational Choice perspective views the offender as a reasoning individual who weighs up potential costs and benefits of a crime. Though subject to criticism, this approach is influential as part of the dominant ethos of the Criminal Justice system in England and Wales. Despite this, studies examining actual offending experiences rather than a student or non-offending population are relatively rare. Forty six offenders were interviewed, with mixed offending backgrounds. Results suggest that rationality can be seen to vary both within and between individuals and within and between offence types. Suggestions are made as to how an offenders’ motivation can affect their ability to make a decision, and how these motivations can be understood in the context of the offence.

Introduction

The Rational Choice approach to crime is closely aligned with the dominant ethos of the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales (Jones, 2008). The current UK criminal justice system essentially sees an individual as responsible for his or her actions, and applies punishment as a deterrent for engaging in illegal behaviour (Sutherland & Cressey, 1974). The Rational Choice Theoretical approach has at its core an assumption that a decision to offend takes place, and that such a decision is taken by a reasoning and (at least minimally) rational individual, weighing up the costs and benefits of the action. This view of individuals as makers of fully-reasoned decisions has been criticised for lack of realism. Instead, Cornish and Clarke (1987) describe individuals as acting within the limits of their ability, the information available, and time pressures. Cornish and Clarke refer to this as ‘Bounded Rationality’ (1986). This approach recognises that decisions are affected by the individual’s perceptions as well as the circumstances in which they find themselves. Newer iterations of Rational Choice Theory (RCT) place the motivation of the individual as central to decision making, and state that an understanding of the offender’s value hierarchy is necessary to understand their decision making.

This investigation seeks to explore the basic assumptions of this approach, that a decision is always at the heart of an offence, and that individuals weigh up their perceived costs and benefits in order to make such a decision.

Rational Choice theories of offending
Early theories of crime, viewed the individual as having free will, and as being capable of guiding his own destiny (Monachesi, 1955). These assumptions of free will and rationality have remained central to the field of criminology since its beginnings (Taylor et al., 1973), and are direct precursors of the modern Rational Choice Theory.

The application of RCT to criminology has been an influential approach, being particularly popular during the 1980s and 1990s when much work was undertaken to examine how rational decisions are made, and if this could be applied to criminal behaviour in individuals. Early iterations of the approach stated that potential offenders would avoid offending for fear of potential punishment (Akers, 1990). The assumption is that individuals act under free will, and in doing so will seek to avoid costs, and that the rewards of an action or behaviour will be weighed against those costs.

However, this approach has been criticised, in particular the assumption of the ‘normative’ status of the individuals making a decision. Cornish and Clarke (1987) suggest that individuals are unlikely to go through such a deliberate, calculating mental process and ‘intuit’ the values and costs of an action, being unable to process information to the level assumed by this normative model (Cherniak, 1986). Instead, offenders operate under a ‘bounded rationality’ in which offenders are seen as making a weighted decision, but in a more ‘rudimentary and cursory way’ than advocated by the classical economic approach to decision making. It is also recognised that while an individual can make a measured decision based on expected utility of various outcomes, their range of actions may be limited by circumstances.

The central tenet of an RCT of crime that offenders are active, rational beings encourages researchers to find out exactly what an individual’s subjective perceptions of costs and benefits are, and whether through applying this approach, crime can be explained sufficiently well. Furthermore, if a decision is fully understood then logic could theoretically be applied to change similar future decisions. When the theory is applied to real people, and real offenders, it is difficult to assume that decisions are made in this fully informed manner and that any individual could possibly process and be aware of every factor that may affect the outcome.

Studies of Rational Choice and the offending experience
Rational Choice Theory has been applied to various types of offence, ranging from shoplifting to violent offences. In 1992, Corbett and Simon applied RCT to driving offences, finding that offenders viewed the likelihood of receiving a penalty for poor driving as low. A study of shoplifters by Schlueter, O’Neal, Hickey and Seiler (1989) suggests that ‘official’ costs are not considered as a deterrent. Goals were identified as including money, convenience and the ‘challenge’. Schlueter et al. thought it important that non-monetary goals were recognised as motivating the behaviour of the offenders. Carroll and Weaver (1986) also studied shoplifters, finding that they did think about risk, and were well aware of the penalties, but set this aside once focused on their actions.

There have been several studies carried out to investigate how RCT explains burglary, such as Wright and Decker’s 1994 study suggesting that burglars were clear about the benefits, such as monetary gain, drugs, and social standing, but tried not to think about things going wrong. As well as robbery (Feeney, 1986), corporate crime (Paternoster & Simpson, 1993) and ‘car-jacking’ (aggravated car stealing) (Jacobs, Topalli & Wright, 2003), RCT has also been used to try and explain the commission of non-acquisitive offences, though to a lesser extent. For example, Beauregard and LeClerc (2007) applied RCT to the offending process of sex offenders. Results from interview suggested that the participants were rational, although bounded in their rationality, and that decisions were being made at each part of the process leading up to the offence. In a similar way, Topalli (2005) describes how violent offenders can use cues to ‘read’ a situation to their advantage and help them guide events.

Despite the close alignment between current crime management in the UK and the Rational Choice approach (Jones, 2008), the number of studies relating this theory to actual offender experiences is limited. Many studies on the RCT of crime use non-offending populations, and measure intention to offend, rather than examining actual offending, a drawback when applying findings to real world situations. This study therefore aims to investigate the self-report narratives of a range of offending individual’s histories to examine if there is any evidence of decision making, and what factors the individuals themselves sees as pertinent.

Methodology
Given that the aims of this research included obtaining the offender’s perspective on whether a decision making process takes place, it was appropriate to adopt a qualitative methodology. In particular, the interview technique was utilised as the best way to collect the type of data that would inform the research question. This interview was semi structured in style, including areas the researcher wanted to cover, but with enough flexibility to allow the participant to talk tangentially, and to feel free to include whatever information he or she felt was pertinent. A similar approach was used by Zamble and Quinsey (1997) who used this technique to research the criminal recidivism process. Zamble and Quinsey employed a semi-structured interview, in which they asked their participants (recently released Canadian prisoners) about the events leading up to their most recent re-offence. They supplemented this interview with the use of two ‘timelines’ which prompted the participants to recall their thoughts, feelings, and time taken between the first ‘thought’ of an offence occurring, and the actions to the point at which commission of that offence took place. Bennett and Wright (1984) used a similar technique; applying semi-structured interviews to more than one hundred and twenty burglary ‘specialists’ in order to examine what affected their decision to offend.

The interview schedule was designed loosely upon the ideas used by Zamble and Quinsey which is to elicit information from the offender about his or her offending, and the thoughts, circumstances, and feelings that led to that action being taken. Unlike Zamble and Quinsey, who asked the offender to ‘plot’ six milestones from the first passing thought of the offence to the point of apparent inevitability, the approach taken within the current study was not so defined, and allowed the offender to determine their own timelines based on what they saw as influencing factors.

The interview schedule began by asking the participants to describe their most recent, or index, offence (the offence for which they were currently subject to probation). After outlining it, participants were prompted to describe what happened in the period preceding the offence. No timescale was specified, and instead the participant was allowed to describe as long or as short a period as they preferred. Moving forward, participants were asked to describe in detail how they felt, what they then thought, and what circumstances they were in at the stages during and following the period leading up to the offence. Participants were allowed to introduce whatever topics they felt were relevant to this narrative, and in effect, were encouraged to tell a ‘life story’ of their offence. Offenders were led through the events leading up to their offence with emphasis on their own thoughts and feelings, right through the commission of the offence. After describing these events fully, offenders were taken backwards through them again, being prompted to consider what elements had led them to be in their particular position. Participants were also asked to describe their views on what happened next, after the event.

In total, interviews were conducted with 46 participants, each of whom had been convicted of at least one offence. Participants were aged between 18 and 60, with a mean age of 33.9 years. Twelve were female, and the rest male. All were currently subject to some form of supervision, whether as part of a post custody licence or as part of a Community Supervision Order. Offence types ranged from shoplifting to murder.

Findings
Though RCT has been applied to a range of different offences, its economic roots have led to the predominant research focus being into acquisitive crime. However, in order to be a useful applied theory of offender decision making, a theory must explain all offending decisions, those which are violent or emotive as well as the acquisitive. With this in mind, narratives were split into categories based on the nature of the index offence, creating a category of acquisitive crimes, and a category of violent or emotive offences. There was, in general, a difference in the phrases individuals used about their offences. Offenders in the acquisitive category appeared to make decisions about their offending, whereas the individuals in the violent/emotive category did not make such explicit decision statements. Statements such as ‘I planned’ and ‘I thought’ were common within the acquisitive category, but not present within the other category of offenders. Acquisitive offenders’ narratives are marked by their desire to meet a need, and frequently stated that they made a decision, and thought about achieving their desired outcome.

‘I always planned to get lists of what people wanted me to get for them, I knew I wouldn’t be able to get rid of some stuff but there were always some things you knew you could always get rid of like CDs, DVDs. Things like that I would always take.’

Offenders, quite apart from ensuring they get what they need, seem quite good at making things go smoothly by managing others’ perceptions. One enterprising female shoplifter became skilled in avoiding the attentions often focused on a known criminal.

‘When I shoplifted I planned loads. I used to wear uniforms – nurses’ uniforms, hairdressers’ outfits. ‘Cause I’ve got short hair I used to wear wigs – look completely different. I made foil bags, and go on the train – Chester, Warrington, St. Helens. It was like going to work – doing a day’s work. I went there yesterday, so I’ll leave there today. I wore that wig with that uniform last time, so I’ll change.’

It does appear that there is evidence to suggest that some individuals make a decision about their offending to maximise their gain, or ‘maximising their expected utility’ (Carroll & Weaver, 1986). It is interesting to explore the idea of what the individual perceives as the gain, or utility of the offence. Equally, the negative consequences of an offence, as they appear to the offender, are important.

Thinking about consequences
Previous studies have shown great variety of costs or risks that influence decision making, far beyond the official sanctions or punishments. In order to be a useful theory of crime, RCT must recognise the wide range of costs and benefits that may affect an offending decision (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). The offenders’ perception of costs and benefits are what matters, and the importance the offender places on them. This perception is limited by knowledge and circumstances and it is often argued that offenders do not fully understand the consequences of offending, often referred to as ‘bounded rationality'(Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The text suggests however that these individuals in fact do understand these consequences, but simply do not think about them.

‘When you do it you don’t think about the consequences, you just go ahead and do it. Not that you don’t know them, Oh no, you know what can happen, you don’t think about it at the time. You don’t care – it’s not important.’

As consequences are perceived to be more serious, the interviewees are nevertheless just as matter of fact. Another female shoplifter says:

‘Because I shoplift every day, I know I’ll get caught now and again. I’ll only get a couple of weeks in jail. That usually does me good and settles me down a bit.’

It seems that offenders view the likelihood of capture or arrest as low, and reason that even if it does happen, that prison is something they know they can cope with. In fact, some individuals went as far as to say it was a positive outcome for them.

Other costs of offending
Of course, it is not only official outcomes that are a consideration. Many individuals worried about the impact on their family and relationships.

‘I feel bad, not about the nicking stuff, but about lying to my family about where I got stuff. Once, my mum insisted on giving me the money for a pair of trainers for the (kids) I’d pinched, and I said “No, it’s fine” but she insisted and I felt really bad.’

The negative effect on family is a common theme, and can be described in various ways. Another individual describes the long term negative effect his offending has had on his ability to live ‘normally’. Sometimes, these non-official sanctions have only become a concern to the individual months or years after the offence. None of these realisations appeared to be a concern at the time of making a decision to offend; indeed they seem instead to be borne of a long spell of consideration. It may be that these emotional consequences are difficult to imagine when a person has not had direct experience of them previously.

The benefits of offending
Just as important as the offender’s perception of the personal costs or risks of an offence is their view of the benefits or gains. These gains are subjective to that individual, and to their own feelings and views on their circumstances. As stated earlier, the offences within the acquisitive category were marked by the individual’s intentions to meet a need, or get something they want. The simplest expression of what an individual wants out of an offence is described by one male shoplifter:

‘(I needed) basic stuff, clothes, trainers and T shirts. I had nothing. I was at a pretty low point.’

From basic needs such as food and clothes, another common need was money. In addition to the general demands of life, money for drugs was also a common theme. A male shoplifter puts it simply:

‘I needed drugs, so I needed money. It was a complete struggle.’

Aside from money, some interviewees also describe other positive effects of their actions. These range from social reasons, to personal gratification or positive emotion.

‘I was terrified doing a burglary, but once you’ve done it, you get a buzz.’

The ‘buzz’ or excitement experienced through committing an offence was a recurring theme. So far, it certainly appears that the costs, benefits, risks and rewards outlined in the general definition of a rational offender can clearly be evidenced for these acquisitive offence types.

Situational influences and constraints
Although these individuals describe their goals and the planning of offences, their options of how to achieve their goals were limited. If an individual needs drugs, or money, they may have little choice in how to obtain these items, being limited by their own circumstances (Felson, 1986). Many offenders described how they would rather not offend, but felt they had no choice. This is touched on by the offenders who commit offences in order to obtain money for drugs which overcame all other considerations.

‘If it wasn’t for needing the drugs I probably wouldn’t have done it, or if I did it, it would be a one off. Say for instance my son needed something I would go out and get it, but not daily.’

Whether to take drugs or not is not felt by addicted individuals to be a choice, but a given.

Another interviewee, who was afraid of being arrested, nevertheless went on to commit an offence because she was more scared of what would happen to her if she refused. Her violent partner pressured her into shoplifting, and she was too intimidated to refuse.

‘Yeah. I run through things in my head – getting caught and stuff – at first I was terrified I case I got caught, what would happen in court. It got to the stage though, (where I was more worried about) what he would do if I didn’t go back with something.’

As these individuals describe, a decision to offend was made, but only as a last resort. It is clear that choices are being made, but only from the limited range of options that appear to be open at the time. Stated within the terminology of RCT then, their rationality is not only bounded by knowledge, skill and time, but also by the range of options actually viable as an outcome. This range of options will be determined by the needs and situation of the offender and therefore any decisions must be considered in this context.

Other types of offending
Looking at the narratives of violent/emotive offenders, there are fewer references to making a decision, or planning, but instead interviewees speak about acting under a compulsion, or against their better judgement. This group describe things that ‘just happen’ to them and to the individual these events may be perceived as being beyond their control.

When one man was describing how he committed a violent assault, he says:

‘It was too quick. Nothing happens really, just blank and adrenaline, and go for it. It is me or them, so I go in first.’

This seems to be a common experience. Other offenders describe this experience variously as a ‘blank mind’ or as ‘seeing red’. Consider this example:

‘I saw red, and went for her.’

This offender was convicted of serious assault on his partner. The ‘red’ he describes in this case for him was a common theme in violent offence description. Offenders describing this sort of incident frequently referred to something ‘snapping’ or being out of their usual frame of mind. The experience of ‘flipping’ or lashing out is a common one, even if the victim was someone they cared about. While many of the offenders described above talk about an ‘absence’ or ‘blankness’ of thought, other participants described that some thought took place, but that their thinking was not ‘usual’.

‘I was not in my right mind.’

Despite the references to not being in control, or ‘not being myself’, it cannot be assumed that this group of offenders do not identify benefits of their actions, despite the unplanned nature of the offence. A male offender, convicted of a serious assault discusses the feelings around his offence.

‘He made me feel so horrible, to make it go away, I nearly killed him.’

This individual saw his action as a release of unpleasant feelings. Several other individuals describe a feeling of release in committing a violent offence, which they see as stemming from a desire to ‘get away’ from negative feelings. Whereas ‘gain’ is a focus for acquisitive offenders, it appears that relief of feelings or pain is a perceived positive outcome for violent/emotive offenders. This could be described as a desire to become ‘pain-neutral’.

The narratives of violent/emotive offenders may not fit within the RCT decision making model as well as those of acquisitive offenders, but despite the lack of an obvious ‘offence participatory decision’ there is evidence of other choices being made. Offenders describe choices made which alter their circumstances, despite knowing that this may increase the risk of something happening, or making an offence more likely. This awareness of ‘risky choices’ may speak of the actions of a rational, if bounded, actor. One offender describes a set of small choices which resulted in him committing an assault on two men he found in bed with his partner.

‘We (self and partner) were rowing, so I stayed at a friend’s…I got a call from my ex, she said call round I want to see you…I went there, and got in the front and said to her kids “where’s your Mum”? They said “upstairs” and I could see that they were frightened, I said “what’s up?” they said “nothing”. When I walked in they looked terrified.’

‘Could I have done it different? …She chose a night I would be drunk. I would have gone back down and said to the kids “come on with me” and taken them to my mates…but for her to have those kids there and for them to know what she is doing and they know I’m coming they were terrified; one shouted to me “don’t get arrested” as I went upstairs.’

Within this situation, the offender has made a set of choices, each leading him closer to an offence. While not constituting a onetime ‘participatory’ decision, he was self-aware enough to know that what he was doing was a bad idea. Although an individual committing a violent offence may recall ‘snapping’, he may be able to describe how he moved into a set of circumstances that make the offence more likely. Whereas the acquisitive offender seems to make decisions based on whether they will gain, then the violent offenders’ choices lead simply to a situation where the offence is more likely.

Mixed thinking
Despite these differences between offence types, there is evidence to suggest that both of these behaviours, impulsive and rational, exist within the same individual. It is important to consider that many offenders have a mixed history of offence types, and indeed many of the offenders in this sample have experience of both acquisitive and violent/emotive types of offences. For example, one offender specialising in well-planned armed robberies has a parallel record of violent assaults, committed while he was in custody. The same individual is capable of meticulous planning, and spontaneous violence in high security custody.

‘Stake out the office where they keep cash for a few weeks to see when the money is taken. Go and loosen the hinges on the door. Then on the day go to the cashier office and kick the door in.’

‘I (have) spent about 30-odd years in prison. Every time I am in, I am fighting so I was always in solitary confinement. Last time…I broke my jaw, busted my wrist and broke my eardrum. Two years on top (of my sentence) just because I pushed someone and they fell downstairs.’

The contradictions within this case are interesting, more so as the same offender says he prefers prison to Probation supervision. On further examination of his narrative, this individual clearly feels more comfortable in custody than living in the community, preferring a controlled and limited environment. This may also make sense of the violent assaults committed within the prison, as they are likely to earn him more time in custody – which he prefers.

In a similar vein, there are many other individuals who expressed a mixture of rational, planned offences and other, less apparently rational offences. One individual was accused of pushing a victim from a high sea wall, causing his victim serious spinal injuries. The offender describes his lack of recollection of doing this.

‘It was a nice day; me and mates had gone to the…sea front. We got some beer in and seen a group…jumping off the sea wall and rolling in the sand…I remember going to the toilet and coming back and looking over and seeing a lot of people there, but I don’t know whether I’ve done it or not you see so apparently I pushed him off the sea wall but instead of rolling he’s landed on his feet, and jolted his back.’

The individual certainly does not describe any forward planning or rational intent to this offence. However, the offender later reveals that the victim of the assault was his previous landlord, who had recently evicted him, and admits harbouring negative feelings of revenge towards him.

Most of the individuals in the sample had a mixed offending record, having committed both acquisitive type and violent/emotive type crimes to varying extents. It therefore appears that rationality differs within individuals, as well as between offence types. In addition it is also possible to observe a variation in rationality even within the same offending incident. Examining one narrative, it certainly appears that to some extent, rationality (albeit imperfect) appears even within a violent offence.

An individual was prosecuted for a serious assault on his partner. He described leaving the pub one afternoon to look for his partner.

‘I went outside and saw her necking some bloke. I saw red and went for her.’

With this action he has committed what appears an irrational action, but even as this was happening he recalls having a clear thought:

‘I went for her, not him. He ran away fast and besides, he was bigger than me.’

These findings seem to suggest that far from evidence to support rationality being tied to the offence type, it appears that the same offence type can result from very different motivations, such as shoplifting for gain vs. shoplifting under pressure from a partner, or assaults committed deliberately to extend a prison sentence vs. those carried out to release negative emotion.

Discussion
Any theory of offending must fit the experiences of offenders and place the offence within the personal and social context in which it is made. In seeking an holistic model of the ‘offence event’ it may be useful based on this evidence to view both actions taken in seeking both pleasure or benefit enhancement, as well as actions taken based on the motivation to be ‘pain-neutral’ are rational. Understood in this way, it is possible to apply to these findings what Hechter and Kanazawa (1992) refer to as ‘thick’ models of RCT, that is, a model within which the circumstances and perceptions of the individual are taken into account.

This ‘seek gain/release pain’ dichotomy can be understood as two separate goal regulation type processes, that is, the desire to attain a want or need versus the desire to relieve or avoid an undesirable state or situation. Human decision making is complex, so it is possible to conceive that an individual may engage in one or other of these processes at any point in time, and indeed, individual variations found within this study show this to be the case. It is also true that enough variation exists in the motivation of two different individuals to commit the same type of offence, that these motivations cannot be assumed from the offence type. Given that each individual will be operating under different circumstances with different motivations and different levels of stress, then the cognitive status, or decision making landscape of each individual will be unique.

These findings suggest that identifying the goal regulation processes the individual is involved in could assist in understanding the needs, concerns, feelings and circumstances of the offender’s thinking leading up to an offence. The analysis of the costs and benefits to an action will be heavily influenced by the goal regulation process that the individual is operating under, clearly shown by the differences between the extensive planning shown by shoplifters and burglars and the inward focus on negative emotions described by some violent offenders. The inward focus caused by strong emotion, could lead the individual to neglect consideration of long term consequences, instead concentrating on their immediate concern (Bouffard, Bry, Smith & Bry, 2008). This understanding of motivation is particularly important when considering an offender making a series of choices that appear to be putting him or herself under more pressure, a similar finding to that of Beauregard and LeClerc (2007) in their study on sex offenders described above. In many cases these choices are made as the path of least resistance, but result in the offender perceiving that they have no other choice but to ‘lash out’, behave violently, or become aggressive in order to achieve ‘pain neutrality’.

If a decision making approach capable of encompassing these themes could be developed, it would have considerable benefit to the study of offending behaviour, and to those working with offending individuals. It would not only provide a heuristic tool for understanding how individuals make decisions to commit an offence, but could also provide an understanding of how an offender may feel an offence is the best or only choice of action. The primary element of this model would be to identify which offending purpose was currently at play – whether the individual was aiming to achieve an outward goal (that is gaining something) or to minimise or avoid an inward state, that is, to maximise utility or minimise disruption. This understanding has the potential to contribute also to knowledge of how these decisions can become reversed and feed into established knowledge of the desistance process.

References

Beauregard, E. and LeClerc, E. (2007) ‘An application of the Rational Choice approach to the offending process of sex offenders: A closer look at the decision making.’ Sexual Abuse, 19(2), 115-133.
Bouffard, J., Bry, J., Smith, S. and Bry, R. (2008) ‘Beyond the science of sophomores: Does the rational choice explanation of crime generalise from university students to an actual offender sample.’ International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 52(6).
Carroll, J. and Weaver, F. (1986) ‘Shoplifters’ perceptions of crime opportunities: A process tracing study’. In D. Cornish and R. Clarke (eds.) The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. New York: Springer Verlag.
Corbett, C. and Simon, F. (1992) ‘Decisions to break or adhere to the rules of the road, viewed from the rational choice perspective.’ British Journal of Criminology, 32(4)
Cornish, D. and Clarke, R. (1986) The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending New York: Springer-Verlag.
Cornish, D. and Clarke, R. (1987) ‘Understanding crime displacement: An application of rational choice theory.’ Criminology, 25(4), 933-947.
Cornish, D. (1993) ‘Theories of action in criminological: Learning theory and rational choice approaches.’ In R. Clarke and M. Felson (eds.) Routine activity, rational choice: Advances in criminological theory. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
De Haan, W. and Voss, J. (2003) A crying shame – the over rationalised conception of man in the rational choice perspective. Theoretical Criminology, 7, 29-54.
Farrell, G. (2010) ‘Situational crime prevention and its discontents: Rational choice and harm reduction versus ‘cultural criminology”. Social Policy and Administration, 4(1).
Felson, M. (1986) ‘Linking criminal choices, routine activities, informal control and criminal outcomes’. In Cornish, D. & Clarke, R. (Ed.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. New York: Springer Verlag.
Feeney, F. (1986) ‘Robbers as decision makers.’ In Cornish, D. & Clarke, R. (Ed.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. New York: Springer Verlag.
Hechter, M. and Kanazawa, S. (1997) ‘Sociological Rational Choice Theory.’ Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 191-214.
Jacobs, J., Topalli, V. and Wright, R. (2003) ‘Car-jacking, street life and offender motivation.’ British Journal of Criminology, 43, 673-688.
Jones, D. W. (2008) Understanding criminal behaviour: Psychosocial approaches to criminality. Devon: Willan Publishing.
Paternoster, R. and Simpson, S. (1993) ‘A rational choice theory of corporate crime.’ In R. Clarke and M. Felson (eds.) Routine activity, rational choice: Advances in criminological theory. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
Sutherland, E. and Cressey, D. R. (1974) Criminality (7th Ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott.
Schlueter, G., O’Neal, G., Hickey, F. and Seiler, G. (1989) ‘Rational vs. non-rational shoplifting types: The implications for loss prevention strategies.’ International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 33(3), 227-239.
Topalli, V. (2005) ‘Offender decision making: An experimental analysis on how offenders and non-offenders differently perceive social stimuli.’ British Journal of Criminology, 45, 269-295.
Wright, R. and Decker, S. (1994) Burglars on the job: Street life and residential break-ins. Boston: North-eastern University Press.

Published	15/12/2015
Type	Article
Author(s)	Dr Nick Flynn, Ross Little
Corresponding Authors	Dr Nick Flynn and Ross Little, De Montfort University
DOA
DOI

Spending Review and Autumn Statement on prisoner rehabilitation and the prison estate
On 9 November, 2015, the Chancellor George Osborne set out the priorities of the Spending Review and Autumn Statement. Stating that economic security, national security and opportunity are “intrinsically connected” to sound public finances, the Chancellor identified the Prison Service as being a service badly in need of reform. Two areas for improvement were focused upon in particular: rehabilitation, and the prison estate. On rehabilitation, the Statement read that:

When people are in prison, they are in the care of the state. We have their attention 24 hours a day; we dictate what they do and how they do it. It’s a chance to change their lives for the better. Yet, we hardly do anything. We lock them up, then let them out, and all too often they return to a life of crime.

Crucial to the reform of rehabilitation is the modernisation of the prison estate, described by the Chancellor as “soulless”, “bleak”, “squalid” and “overcrowded”. To this end, it was announced that:

We will start to close some of our old and outdated prisons in city centres, and sell the sites for housing. In their place, we will build nine new prisons – all of which are modern, suitable and support rehabilitation. Four will be completed by 2019-20, the rest soon after. These more efficient prisons will save us £80 million in running costs alone… I can confirm the first prison we will sell is Reading prison.

Criticisms of the proposals, as voiced by penal reform organisations, have focused on the need to invest savings from closing prisons in affordable housing for the public (the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies) or effective community sentences (the Prison Reform Trust) rather than new prisons and more prison places.

George Osborne’s speech setting out his priorities for the Spending Review:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/george-osborne-sets-out-his-priorities-for-the-spending-review

Secure Training Centres in the News

Medway Secure Training Centre
A BBC Panorama programme, aired on the night of 11 January 2016, has revealed staff deliberately hurting and mistreating children at the G4S run Medway Secure Training Centre. Undercover footage showed a 14 year old boy being restrained by up to four male officers, and another teenager being restrained by squeezing his windpipe and using a fork to stab him in the leg. The programme also included footage of staff boasting about hurting youngsters; and presented evidence that such actions had deliberately been covered up and records falsified in order to avoid investigation. Following criticism by the shadow justice minister, Andy Slaughter, as well as several penal reform organisations, four employees have since been sacked and a further three suspended. In a statement, Paul Cook, managing director for G4S Children’s Services said he was shocked and appalled by the allegations and that “clearly this type of alleged behaviour has no place in any of our institutions”. However it has subsequently emerged that G4S wrote to the BBC to try to prevent the broadcast of the film arguing that the filming was ‘unauthorised’ and ‘illegal’.

The Panorama film is available to view on BBC iPlayer, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b06ymzly/panorama-teenage-prison-abuse-exposed

Hassockfield Secure Training Centre
On Wednesday 21 October 2015, The Guardian reported that the Ministry of Justice had paid the private security company Serco £1.1m for running the Hassockfield Secure Training Centre for seven weeks while it was empty and had been closed down. The contract for running the Centre was extended until 9 January, 2016, although the Centre was closed on 20 November 2015 and the children transferred or released. Meg Hillier, chair of the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee commented:

This is right out of Yes Minister. Even if some of the cost was for security of an empty building it suggests there was little planning by the MoJ about what to do once the last child had left.

In response, an MoJ spokesperson said: “The closure of Hassockfield Secure Training Centre was concluded efficiently…”

The Guardian article is available at: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/oct/21/moj-paid-serco-11m-for-running-secure-childrens-unit-after-it-closed

Understanding desistance from sexual offending: A thematic review of research findings
Farmer et al. review research findings regarding desistance from sexual offending, about which relatively is known compared to the wider desistance literature. They interviewed 32 individuals, each of whom had at least one conviction for sexual offences against children. The paper explores the “structural and the cognitive changes associated with desistance from sexual offending against children” (p.322) with potentially important implications for policy and practice concerning sex offender risk assessment, treatment and management. The authors’ goal “…was to better understand how they were able to desist from re-offending, exploring both the social context of their post-conviction lives and, in particular, their cognitive framing of this context” (p.323).

The authors outline a number of emerging themes. Desistance for the sexual offenders in their study seemed to be rather different from patterns of desistance observed for non-sexual crime. Overall, they were not a group of people with significant histories of antisocial behaviour. In their narratives, they portrayed their offending and motivation for offending as situational and temporary. Unlike many non-sexual offenders, they did not portray their desistance as a result of ‘growing up’ or becoming more mature; instead, for the most part, desistance was portrayed as a self-initiated or rational choice about the pros and cons of what they were doing. Many said that the shock of their arrest contributed to the choice they made about continuing with their crime.

The research participants tended to speak positively about their experiences of structured rehabilitation programmes, including probation supervision and sex offender treatment programmes, attributing their ability to maintain desistance to this help. They also had optimistic plans for the future. Although employment and relationships were most important, these factors did not seem to be related to their desistance in the way these things are traditionally understood in desistance research. However, the level of neutralisations employed by the participants seemed to be related to shame about their offending and signalled their attachment to the perceived moral values and social goods of society. This is further demonstrated by the fact that, on the whole, apart from their sexual offending, most of the desisting participants seemed to live conventional (non-criminal) lifestyles involving, in particular, work and relationships.

The authors conclude that whilst most current practice has centred on ‘risk’ factors and examining why sex offenders re-offend, this study “inverted the risk paradigm” (p.332) by seeking to draw out why is it that they don’t. The findings tend to reinforce the importance and usefulness of rehabilitative programmes provided by probation and prison including accredited programme work in supporting narratives of change.

To read the article in full:
Farmer, M., McAlinden, A. and Maruna, S. (2015) ‘Understanding desistance from sexual offending: A thematic review of research findings’, Probation Journal, 62, pp.320-335.

Why Probation Matters
Sue Hall in the Howard Journal explains that probation matters because of its role in creating a humane justice system. Hall states that probation’s core values unite the profession and have been sustained through political change. She asserts that the changes brought about by the ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ were politically driven, did not build on probation’s achievements and were not evidence led. The fragmentation of service provision and removal of the requirement of a unifying probation qualification framework pose serious threats to the profession. Hall suggests that The Probation Institute will be important in maintaining professional identity and standards. She also states that they may wish to consider that evidence from international experience demonstrates the negative impact of privatisation if values are secondary to profit.

To read the article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hojo.12135/abstract

HM Inspectorate Probation: Transforming Rehabilitation – Early Implementation
HM Inspectorate of Probation has published a fourth report on the early implementation of the government’s Transforming Rehabilitation programme. The report, Transforming Rehabilitation – Early Implementation 4: an Independent Inspection of the Arrangements for Offender Supervision, relates to findings from inspections undertaken in July and August 2015. Inspectors focused on work undertaken at the point of sentence and allocation by the National Probation Service (NPS), work undertaken by the Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and the NPS to manage offenders, and the interfaces between the two organisations. This included work with those released on licence.

The report contains new recommendations, relative to earlier reports in the series, that the NPS should take action to improve the availability of information provided by other agencies to ensure as much of the Case Allocation System can be completed prior to allocation of the case. It recommends that CRCs should ensure that the first arranged appointment with people on an order takes place at the earliest opportunity, that there is sufficient focus on the achievement of behavioural changes required to reduce the likelihood of reoffending and that in all cases where required there is a sufficient review of the risk of harm assessment and management plan. Both the NPS and CRCs should ensure that in all relevant cases sufficient progress is made to reduce those factors making the offender more likely to reoffend.

Transforming Rehabilitation – Early Implementation 4: an Independent Inspection of the Arrangements for Offender Supervision can be read in full at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/01/TransformingRehabilitation4.pdf

Calls for Better Courts
A report by the Centre for Justice Innovation published in December, calls for greater use of specialist courts, including those focusing on domestic abuse. Based on existing examples of court practice, ‘Better Courts’ offers a vision for how courts can improve their contribution to cutting crime.

The publication argues that courts can be faster, fairer, more authoritative and more people focused. Following analysis of the international evidence base, and a 12-month investigation into innovative practice in the UK, the report highlights case studies of better court innovation and explores the lessons they have for the future reform of the courts of England and Wales. For example, the report identifies examples of courts that are:

• Saving time by diverting low-level anti-social behaviour cases into community-led restorative justice panels;
• Improving victims’ experiences and making more effective decisions by specialising in certain types of issue such as domestic violence or drug addiction;
• Providing at-court support and advice services to help their users access support with issues like mental health, addiction debt or housing;
• Making faster and more effective decisions by taking new approaches to pre-sentence assessments of offenders;
• Expanding and improving their on-going supervision of offenders,
• Delivering swift and certain enforcement of court orders.

To read the Better Courts report in full: http://www.justiceinnovation.org/node/76/

Locked Out – Children’s experiences of visiting a parent in prison
Locked Out, a report published in December 2015 by the children’s charity Barnardo’s, says 17,000 children a month visit a parent in prison. Each week, children make nearly 10,000 visits to public prisons. The report’s authors made four visits to three prisons – HMP Buckley Hall, HMP Erlestoke and HMP Guys Marsh – to observe visits, and heard the views of about 25 children and six mothers both individually and in small groups.

The report notes that the children and parents they spoke with seek relatively small changes to the system to help improve family life. The children wanted to gain more from the relationship that they have with the parent in prison.

Some prisons, for example HMP Parc in South Wales, approach family visits as a valuable resource in the resettlement of offenders. They view visits as a family intervention, rather than a security risk or a privilege that can be sanctioned. Barnardo’s encourages this ethos. As well as improving outcomes for offenders and benefiting the prison, it is more positive for children. Elsewhere, changes to the incentives and earned privileges (IEP) scheme mean that prison visits are being used as a way to enforce discipline.

To read Locked Out in full: https://www.barnardos.org.uk/locked-out-report.pdf

Digging into the data on crime and punishment
In a blog post for the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay argues that community punishments and prison have something in common: neither of them have a significant impact on crime rates.

Using a large dataset on recorded crime in England and Wales over a 20 year period, they found some interesting patterns. First, apart from violence against the person, detection rates have a crime lowering effect for all crime categories; policing activity seems to matter.

However, in general, prison does not do much to reduce crime, though when one considers variations in sentencing length, there is some impact for longer sentences. It fares worst for young people in prison.

The results for non-custodial sentences were found to vary: for juveniles, non-custodial sentences also do not seem to work, but for adults they seem to be effective in reducing violence against the person and sexual offences. The analysis cannot answer questions such as how effective probation is for or how well supervised community punishments are. However, as it currently stands while non-custodial sentences do not have a huge impact on crime, neither does prison. This was found to be particularly true for younger people in conflict with the law.

The results around youth offending are of particular note and suggests we must move beyond debating the effectiveness of post-crime interventions. Bandyopadhyay argues that if being in contact with the criminal justice system increases criminal activity, we need to look at how to prevent youth from coming into such contact in the first place. The broad criminal justice model that criminalises youthful activity must be reconsidered, along with a more positive agenda that can help divert youth from pursing a criminal career.

To read the blog post Digging into the data on crime and punishment in full: http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/resources/digging-data-crime-and-punishment

Annual youth justice statistics collated by the Youth Justice Board
The Youth Justice Board (YJB) published their annual statistics at the end of January. These look at the English and Welsh Youth Justice System (YJS) in 2013/14 in terms of the number of young people in the system, their offences, outcomes and the trends over time.

Latest available arrests data (for the 2012/13 financial year) shows that 10-17 year olds accounted for 126,809 arrests, or 11.8 per cent of the 1.07 million arrests for notifiable offences in England and Wales. The 10-17 year old age group comprises 10.5 per cent of the total population of England and Wales. The number of arrests of young people has fallen by 24 per cent between 2011/12 and 2012/13. This continues the downward trend seen since the peak in arrests in 2006/07.

The YJB’s statistics show similar reductions for the number of first time entrants (FTEs) to the Youth Justice System and to the number of young people sentenced in 2013/14.The number of young people sentenced to immediate custody fell by 21 per cent from 2,815 in 2012/13 to 2,226 in 2013/14. This number has fallen by 65 per cent since 2003/04, when there were 6,288 young people sentenced to immediate custody.

However, despite these reductions, the statistics also show that in the year ending March 2015 there were 1,315 recorded incidents of self-harm in custody. Although this is marginally fewer than the previous year when there were 1,318 cases, the fact that numbers of young people in custody have been falling mean that in 2014/15 there were 7.7 incidents per 100 young people each month in 2014/15 compared with 6.6 in 2013/14. In 2012/13 there were 5.2 incidents of self-harm per 100 young people each month.

In 2014/15 there were a total of 4,837 restraints – the equivalent of 28.2 each month per 100 young people in custody, similar to the previous year. In the year ending March 2015 a total of 106 incidents of restraint resulted in a reported injury requiring medical treatment. There were also five incidents where the injury was so serious that hospital treatment was required.

To access the Youth Justice Board’s Annual Youth Justice Statistics 2013/14 for England and Wales, published 29th January 2015 go to:
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/youth-justice-annual-statistics-2013-to-2014

Inside Out: The role of the voluntary and private sector in providing opportunities for rehabilitation for people on temporary release
Clinks and Prison Reform Trust have jointly produced report on Release On Temporary Licence (ROTL), published in January 2016. The report is based on a survey of voluntary and private sector providers of ROTL placements in the community. It finds that recent changes to the ROTL policy have negatively impacted on the ability of voluntary and private organisations to provide work experience opportunities for people on temporary release. Ministry of Justice statistics reveal a significant fall in the use of ROTL since the review of the policy was announced (by then justice secretary, Chris Grayling) in 2013. Between April and June 2015, there were 83,019 releases on temporary licence from prisons in England and Wales, a decrease of 41% since July – September 2013. This has the potential to be a barrier to effective rehabilitation by reducing employment and resettlement opportunities for people being released from prison.

The report explains that for many people in prison, particularly those who are serving long sentences, the chance to experience ROTL is a key stage in the preparation for their safe release. It enables people to gain training and education, sort out jobs and housing and establish contact with their families, all of which helps them to reduce their risk of reoffending. The report also outlines the relatively very low risk associated with prisoners offending on ROTL: “Less than 1% of releases on temporary licence fail, and, of these, only 6.1% involve an arrestable offence. This is the equivalent of five arrests per 100,000 releases” (p.1).

Other key points listed in the report:

• Respondents are confident that ROTL provides significant benefits both to people in prison and to the organisations that provide placements.
• Almost two-thirds (65%) had seen a decrease in ROTL with some organisations reporting that their ROTL placements had “completely stopped” or become “almost impossible”.
• Four fifths of respondents (79%) said that it now takes longer to get ROTL placements confirmed.
• 68% said that prisoners reported difficulties getting their applications for ROTL approved.
• More than half (51%) said that their experience of contact and liaison with prisons about ROTL placements had got worse.
• 37% said that the changes to ROTL were not explained to them at all with a further 29% saying that the explanation was unclear.
• Voluntary sector organisations were more likely than private companies to have seen a decrease in the number of ROTL placements and were more than twice as likely to report that their experience of contact and liaison with prisons had got worse.

The report concludes with recommendations for the future, as part of the governments’ review of ROTL. The recommendations include reversing the decline in the use of ROTL, reducing unnecessary obstacles and delays, improving communication and co-ordination between prisons and providers of ROTL placements, improve consistency in the application of the ROTL policy by prisons and support providers of ROTL placements more effectively.

The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) has announced its intention to conduct a review of ROTL policy. The Secretary of State for Justice has indicated the scope for changes in the use of ROTL as part of the government’s review of education in prisons, conducted by Dame Sally Coates.

To read Inside Out in full: http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/Inside%20Out%20Clinks%20PRT.pdf

Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism
An analysis of the processes of criminalisation of Black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals

The Centre for Crime and Justice Studies produced a Research Findings publication analysing the processes of criminalisation for black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals, authored by Patrick Williams and Becky Clarke. The report is a collaboration between Black Training and Enterprise Group (BTEG), the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (CCJS) and Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association (JENGbA) and Manchester Metropolitan University.

Joint enterprise is a doctrine of common law that has been developed by the courts in cases where more than one person is to be prosecuted for the same offence. The report states that:

It has emerged as a prosecution tool for the collective punishment of groups where it can be proved that the suspects were ‘in it together’. Controversially, it applies even where the suspects may have played different roles and in many cases, where a suspect was not in the proximity of the offence committed. Intrinsic to the application of the doctrine is the principle of ‘common purpose’ where it is alleged individuals have conspired to commit a crime together. (p.7)

The report highlights three key themes which reflect the dangerous associations that can be formed between the doctrine of ‘joint enterprise’, the construction and racialisation of the ‘gang’, the ‘gang’ discourse and the notion of foresight that is central to joint enterprise prosecutions.

That concludes that:

…responding to serious youth violence through the ‘gang’ construct is deeply flawed and likely to be unsuccessful. The perpetration of violence is not aligned to ‘race’ or ethnicity in ways that are imagined by the current strategies deployed to identify, police and prosecute violent individuals. The findings point to a need to examine and respond to the drivers of violence and harm outside of the contemporary UK ‘gangs’ discourse.

To read Dangerous associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism in full: http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.org.uk/files/Dangerous_associations.pdf

Prime Minister’s speech on prison reform
On 8th February 2016 David Cameron became the first Prime Minister in over 20 years to make a speech focusing on prison reform. After setting out the need for prisons and punishment, the Prime Minister set out his strong belief that “we must offer chances to change” hope for those seeking to change and that “we should help those who’ve made mistakes to find their way back onto the right path”.

Cameron spoke of the failure of the current system with its high levels of re-offending, violence, self-harm and suicide. He stated that the “cycle of re-offending costs up to £13 billion a year” and that the system needs “wholesale reform”. He explained that the government had cut crime in the last five years whilst keeping the prison population largely flat.

He re-stated his commitment to deporting foreign national offenders and said that we need to record prisoners’ nationality earlier in the criminal justice process to aid this. He said that the government will now “legislate to give the police new powers to require foreign nationals to hand over their passports, and make them declare their nationality in court”.

Cameron outlined four general rules for reform:
1. Give much greater autonomy to the professionals who work in our public services, and allow new providers and new ideas to flourish.
2. Hold providers and professionals to account with real transparency over outcomes.
3. Intervene decisively and dramatically to deal with persistent failure, or to fix the underlying problems people may have.
4. Use the latest behavioural insights evidence and harness new technology to deliver better outcomes.

He announced £1.3 billion of government money to knock some “ageing, ineffective” prisons down and build nine new ones, including five during this Parliament.

He also focused on education provision and the (lack of) educational attainment by people in prison:

Over 50% of prisoners have the English and maths skills of a primary school child. Many have learning difficulties. But at the moment, governors have almost no control over who their education provider is, or what is taught. We have only four organisations nationally who provide education in prisons, and the way these services are organised is not producing anything like the results we need.

Other announcement in the speech included:

• Full co-commissioning for governors and NHS England, to allow prison leaders to have more say in the kind of health services their prisoners receive. This will begin in reform prisons and, if successful, will apply nationwide from 2017, underpinned by new legislation in the Prisons Bill.
• In the context of “tackling extremism”, a new prison-based programme for countering the “non-violent extremism” that can lead to terrorism, together with “mandatory de-radicalisation programmes” for the most serious cases.
• ‘Swift and certain’ sentencing to deal with drug offenders.
• A joint working group to examine how to deliver problem-solving courts in England and Wales.
• Expanding the use of alcohol monitoring tags, which enforce drinking bans for those offenders convicted of alcohol-related crimes.
• New pilots for satellite tracking tags later this year (especially for women), rolling out across the country before the end of the Parliament.
• Advocating, a ‘ban the box’ approach to disclosure at application stage for people with criminal records who are applying for jobs. The Civil Service will be ‘banning the box’ for their initial recruitment stages.

The Prime Minister’s rhetoric on wanting “prisons to be places of care, not just punishment”; was generally well received. However, some questioned the ideology behind the words and where it would lead a prison system savaged by financial cuts in recent years. For example, Richard Garside, Director of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, said:

[The] proposed reforms are about the expansion and privatisation of criminal justice, rather than being a serious attempt to address the problems in our criminal justice system, or society more widely. They repeat many old mistakes, while adding some new ones.

The Prime Minister’s speech on prison reform can be read in full at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prison-reform-prime-ministers-speech

Review of the Youth Justice System: Interim report of emerging findings
In September 2015, the Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, ordered a review of the youth justice system. The review is being undertaken by Charlie Taylor and is due to be published this Summer.

Mr Taylor has published an interim report of emerging findings (9 February 2016). The main point is that the youth justice system would be more effective and better able to rehabilitate young people if education was at its heart. Taylor argues that young people in conflict with the law should serve their sentences in secure schools rather than youth prisons. Smaller, local, secure schools would draw on educational and behavioural expertise to rehabilitate children and given the skills they need to thrive on release.

• Since 2006/07 the number of children in custody has declined by 64% to its lowest recorded level to around 1,000.
• The result of this drop is that 12 establishments have been closed, but this has been done in a haphazard way with the result that many young people are now living a very long way from home.
• Of those children who remain in custody, most of whom are “more persistent and troubled” offenders, too many – almost two thirds – reoffend within a year of release.
• Around 40% of young people in under-18 Young Offender Institutions (YOIs) have not been to school since they were aged 14, and nearly nine out of 10 have been excluded from school at some point.
• Children in YOIs are only receiving 17 hours of education every week against an expectation of 30 hours.

The report makes four key recommendations:
1. The youth custodial estate needs to be re-designed so that it can cater for a smaller, but more challenging, group of children in custody.
2. Education should be placed at the centre of youth custody, by drawing on the culture of aspiration and discipline which is evident in the best alternative provision schools.
3. Prisons for children should be replaced with smaller secure schools which help children achieve in vocational subjects as well as English and maths, in a more therapeutic environment.
4. Local areas should have greater say in the way children are managed by devolving responsibility, control and money from Whitehall.

The new ‘secure schools’ should be set up in a similar way to alternative provision free schools in England, and located in the regions that they serve. These schools would be inspected under the education framework and held to the same standards as other alternative provision schools. The report states that “rather than seeking to import education into youth prisons, we should create schools for young offenders in which we overlay the necessary security arrangements” (para. 18, p.6).

The report argues that integrating the youth offending service into the local authority’s wider youth services (like Surrey has) helps promote a more comprehensive response to young people who offend and increases the opportunity to divert young people from the youth justice system and into effective services, while allowing greater flexibility in the length and intensity of support provided.

The review of the youth justice system will next focus on the way young offenders are dealt with in court, the available sentences, how to prevent offending in the first place and how to reintegrate children back into the community following custody.

The interim report of the emerging findings can be read in full at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/498736/youth-justice-review.pdf

The terms of reference for the review of the Youth Justice System can be read at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/461529/youth-justice-review-terms-of-reference.pdf.

Published	15/12/2015
Type	Article
Author(s)	Michelle Lowe, V. J. Willan, Roxanne Khan, Matthew Brooks, Phaedra Robinson, Nicola Graham-Kevan, Rachel Stokes, May Irving, Marta Karwacka, Joanne Bryce
Corresponding Authors	Michelle Lowe, V. J. Willan, Roxanne Khan, Matthew Brooks, Phaedra Robinson, Nicola Graham-Kevan, Rachel Stokes, May Irving, Marta Karwacka & Joanne Bryce, University of Central Lancashire
DOA
DOI

Research suggests that engagement with support services after criminal victimisation is low. With this in mind, this study investigated predictors of engagement with Victim Support, in a sample of victims of violent crime. All violent crimes recorded by Lancashire Constabulary for two postcode areas (PR1 and PR2), who were referred to Victim Support (Preston) between April 2013 and September 2013 (n=869) were assessed, with a follow-up undertaken in 2014. Two percent of victims booked or attended a face-to-face meeting with Victim Support, and just over one fifth engaged over the telephone on at least one occasion across a range of support options at the initial data collection point. Engagement with Victim Support was not significantly related to future victimisation. When revictimisation since the first data collection period was inspected against demographic and crime-related variables, previous victimisation, regardless of the type of crime experienced, was the strongest predictor of being victimised again. This was despite the fact that such victims were more likely to be identified as high risk, and actively engaged with Victim Support at the initial time of victimisation. Suggestions for further research are made in light of the changes generally to victim services in the UK.

Introduction
One of the major developments in United Kingdom criminal justice in the last 40 years has been the shift toward the needs of victims as a primary focus (Burrows, 2014), with an escalation of services funded by central government (Spalek, 2005). Despite such commitments, current research suggests that confidence and engagement with the Criminal Justice System and victim support services generally, is less than satisfactory (Bradford, Jackson & Stanko, 2009). More work is needed to explore factors that disengage victims from reporting crime and receiving support after victimisation.

Victim support services have an important role in the care of crime victims. Victim Support is a large independent charity that has offered services to victims and witnesses of crime, and their families, in England and Wales over the last 40 years. Most victims of violent crime who report a victimisation experience to the police are referred to Victim Support as a formal form of support service (Victim Support, Personal Communication, 2013). Victim Support provide face-to-face and telephone help, including emotional support, advice on personal safety and other practical issues, support throughout the Criminal Justice process and advocacy. According to their website, in 2013, Victim Support was aided by approximately 1,400 staff and 4,300 volunteer workers. It currently operates a dedicated Homicide Service, which supports people bereaved through murder and manslaughter, and more than 100 projects throughout the UK tackling, for example, domestic violence, antisocial behaviour, racial, homophobic and disablement hate crime, and a national telephone support service that operates six days per week. The have also developed partnerships with other organisations, such as those concerned with health, children, women’s rights, racial equality, the police, and local authorities (Spalek, 2005). Bradford (2011) showed that Victim Support engagement increased levels of confidence and perceptions of the effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System by providing victims with a voice and a sense that someone is listening and taking their concerns seriously.

Support from victim services is beneficial to the victim’s recovery after crime (Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; Ringham & Salisbury, 2004). However, in many cases when support is offered to those who may profit from it, many victims do not engage (Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; McCart, Smith & Sawyer, 2010; Sims, Yost & Abbott, 2005). Indeed, in the study by Sims and colleagues, only three percent of the 654 crime victims in their sample used any type of formal support facilities. Sims et al. (2005) reported that those who did not use services listed reasons such as: receiving assistance from friends or family members and thus not feeling a further support facility was needed, not being told about services, or not thinking it was worth the trouble to seek out such services. They concluded that a victim’s decision not to seek assistance could be akin to the reason why so many crime victims never report their experience to the police in the first place, such as feeling ashamed, self-blame, or through fear that they would not be believed. These issues may be particularly relevant after being victimised by crimes that are known to elicit third-party victim-blaming reactions and negative attitudinal evaluations, such as sexual assault (e.g. Davies & Rogers, 2006), crimes involving gay and transgendered victims (e.g. Davies & Hudson, 2011; Laing & Davies, 2011), disabled victims (e.g. Rogers, Titterington & Davies, 2009), domestic violence (e.g. Harris & Cook, 1994) and crimes involving ethnic minorities (e.g. Locke & Richman, 1999). Negative reactions from others can create experiences of secondary victimisation, which are as difficult to cope with as the effects of the victimisation experience itself (e.g. Walker, Archer & Davies, 2005). Engaging with victim support services, especially those that are seen as being aligned to criminal justice services, may be particular difficult if secondary victimisation is feared.

In extension, Zarafonitou (2011) proffered a political viewpoint about victim service disengagement, such that victims may believe that formal support services (such as Victim Support) are government-backed and as such, perceived negatively. This then drives those that feel they do need help after victimisation towards informal support systems, such as online support groups, which tend to be accessed more readily than formal ones (AuCoin & Beauchamp, 2004). Despite informal services being of use to some victims, formal support services like Victim Support, have advantages because they offer a variety of services within one organisation.

It has been acknowledged for many years that criminal victimisation is clustered, with some individuals and crimes committed within certain locations accounting for a disproportionate amount of victimisation (Outlaw, Ruback & Britt, 2002). For example, victims who live in high-density areas that are socially disorganised tend to have higher revictimisation rates; as do those with personal demographics like being male, being of a minority status, having witnessed violence in the past, and having risky routines and lifestyles (c.f. Cohen & Felson, 1979; see Outlaw et al., 2002 for a discussion). Moreover, we know that victimisation experiences early in life can make individuals vulnerable to revictimisation, sometimes of multiple types of crimes, later in life (e.g. Gold, Sinclair & Balge, 1999; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003), creating a cycle of victimisation experiences that is difficult to break.

The costs of revictimisation to the police, victim support services, and to society in general are many, with interventions being difficult, time-consuming and expensive to implement (Outlaw et al., 2002). Costs to the victim are also high. Being repeatedly victimised is a risk factor for complex trauma and increased vulnerability in the long term, which Winkel, Blaauw, Sheridan and Baldry (2003) found frequently not detected, and thus not supported, by victim support services. Such untreated complex trauma has many hidden costs to policing, medical and other services in the future. As early as 1992, Farrell indicated that victim support services tended to respond to crime as single, discrete events, rather than as one experience amongst others that the victim may have reported previously. Although knowledge about revictimisation has increased across services, still, in the UK there is a general pattern of assessing individual victimisation events as stand-alone entities. Investigating the causes of revictimisation to increasing service engagement, in hope of reducing revictimisation in future, is a key target among UK policing services. The current research is timely in this regard. Specifically, the current study investigated predictors of service use at Victim Support, in a sample of UK victims of violent crime within one location (Preston, Lancashire) measured over one six-month time period (April 2013-September 2013) with a 12 month follow up, to investigate further victimisation experiences and offences.

Victimological research has acknowledged that crime victim histories in general are not completely distinct from those of offenders, with some victims also having committing criminal offences, and some offenders having been violently victimised (Schreck, Ousey, Fisher & Wilcox, 2012). Jennings, Piquero and Reingle (2011) reviewed 37 studies that spanned five decades (1958-2011) and found robust victim-offender overlaps in 31 of the studies. Findings were consistent regardless of historical and cross cultural samples, and regardless of the method of assessment or statistical techniques used to generate results. The victim-offender overlap was particularly apparent in domestic violence cases and in mental health populations. Recognising that victims and offenders are often the same individuals, with the same problems and risk factors, can assist service criminal justice providers who work with victims and offenders (Jennings, Higgins, Tewksbury, Gover, & Piquero, 2010). However, it is not yet known how the victim-offender overlap relates to the engagement with victim support service use after violent crime and whether engagement with victim support services (in this instance, Victim Support) can reduce both victimisation and offending in the future. This study investigates this possibility.

Preston, a city in the North West of England was chosen for this study for several reasons. It has a diverse population and relatively high level of social problems (Evans, 2012). In 2010, Preston was measured as the 59th most deprived area in the UK, out of a figure of 326 (Rogers, 2011). It has a higher rate of teenage pregnancy and unemployment than the North West region overall, and a higher violent crime rate than Lancashire generally. Between May 2013 and May 2014, 528 violent crimes were recorded in the city centre alone. This comprised 14.3 percent of all crimes in the area, the second-highest crime-group after anti-social behaviours (UK Crime Statistics, Lancashire Constabulary 2014). Preston’s relatively young and diverse population (Evans, 2012), coupled with the relative deprivation of the area and the consequent need to reduce violent crime and anti-social behaviour make it an ideal location to study crime prevention issues.

In this study, all violent crime cases recorded at Lancashire Constabulary and Victim Support were assessed within the allocated six-month time-period. Due to the potential high number of cases, only two postcodes were included; these were PR1, which covers the whole of Preston city centre and immediate surrounds, and PR2, which is a suburban area including a number of large housing estates. This study addressed two research questions: 1. the impact of engaging with Victim Support in terms of whether this reduces victimisation in the future; 2. the predictive ability of number of previous victimisations and offences, previous crime types, and demographic variables to predict those most likely to (a) fail to effectively engage with available services, and (b) be most vulnerable to future victimisation.

Method
Sample characteristics
Data was collected from the police database held at Lancashire Constabulary between April 2013 and September 2013 (n=1140 total adult violent crime cases). This was then merged with the service data held at Victim Support (n=869; 456 males and 413 females). Police data with no service follow-up or those referred directly to another service, such as a domestic violence service (overall n=271 cases) were excluded from further analyses, due to the large amount of missing data that their inclusion would create. Previous history of victimisation and offending referred to within this study related to events pre-April 1st 2013. Updated data inputting of victimisation and offending events was then conducted for all cases in October 2014. The updated victimisation and offending data referred to events between October 1st 2013 and September 30th 2014.

The mean age of victims at the initial data collection point was 32.4 years (range: 16-90 years). Over a third of victims were aged 16-24 (n=300; 35.3%) at the time of victimisation. The majority of victims were White (n=664; 76.4%), followed by Asian (n=153; 17.6%), Black (n=17; 2.0%), Mixed (n=16; 1.8%) and other ethnicities (n=19; 2.2%). Victims were mostly either British or EU nationals (n=762; 88.1%), with a further 4.2 percent (n=36) as EEA (i.e. European Economic Area) member; and 7.7 percent (n=67) of other non EU or EEA nationalities. In total, 198 different occupations were recorded. For cases where occupational status was known (n=638; 73.5%), the victim was employed or in education in two-thirds of cases (n=421; 48.5%), unemployed in 22.6 percent of cases (n=196) and retired in the remaining cases (n=21; 2.4%). For cases referred to Victim Support, 627 victimisations (72.2%) occurred within PR1 and the remaining 242 victimisations (27.8%) in PR2.

Procedure
The police and Victim Support databases were accessed to identify and collate victim demographics, vulnerability factors, crime characteristics (victim and offending history) and support types for all violent crimes recorded for victims aged 16 and over within the allocated timeframes as described above. A total of 87 variables were identified (43 from police; 44 from Victim Support). A coding manual was produced to ensure that all researchers involved in the project coded variables identically. Following the identification of variables, data were inputted and collated into a single statistical database (SPSS v.22). A final database of 869 cases was produced where sufficient data could be utilised for further analysis and the index victimisation had occurred in either of the two defined postcodes (PR1 or PR2).

Victim demographics and vulnerability factors
The following factors were selected for inclusion in the analysis: victim gender, age, ethnicity, immigration status, known practical and psychological vulnerability factors (such as being physically disabled in the case of the former, and learning difficulties or mental health issues in the latter), risk factors found at the crime scene (e.g. victim intoxication), and location of index incident (PR1 or PR2).

Crime characteristics
Crime-types were measured on 17 levels based on police categorisations. To produce a consistent and concise set of categories suitable for analysis, crime-types were recoded into seven categories for each database: 1) Threat and Physical Assault, Minor, and 2) Major; 3) Harassment and Hate Crimes, Minor, and 4) Major; 5) Sexual Assault, Under 16 and 6) Over 16; and 7) Robbery. Police and Victim Support classifications under this system significantly correlated: r=.86, n=869, p<.001. However, only one victim of sexual assault was recorded during the initial round of data collection (<1%), consequently the sexual offences categories were not included due to insufficient numbers. Thus, further analyses were conducted on 5 crime-types (percentages and number of victims are included in brackets): 1) Threat and Physical Assault, Minor (30.2%; n=262); 2) Threat and Physical Assault, Major (46.7%; n=405); 3) Harassment and Hate Crime, Minor (16.2%; n=141); 4) Harassment and Hate Crime, Major (0.9%; n=8), and 5) Robbery (6.0%; n=52). Please note that in some analyses, empty cells meant that crime-types had to be collapsed further into just minor and major crimes.

There were three categories relating to the outcome of the victimisation case: 1) Restorative Justice; 2) Positive Outcome; and 3) Negative Outcome (e.g. Case cancelled, No crime, Prosecution not possible, Case closed). Victim-offender relationship was initially measured on six levels, reduced to four (plus unknown): Unknown, Stranger, Acquaintance, Ex-Partner, and Family/Partner.

Results
Initial contacting
Victims were contacted by Victim Support (Preston), using the following methods of communication: telephone (45.6%), letter (54.0%), and text message (0.5%). An inspection of descriptive statistics shows that 23.5% (n=204) responded to this initial attempt at contact for needs assessment, therefore the majority of victims (n=665, 76.5%) were not contactable at this early stage and consequently no further engagement was possible.
Once successful contact was achieved, the following face-to-face services were offered: Emotional Support, Personal Safety, Practical Support, CJS Support, Advocacy, and Further Support. A large proportion of victims did not book (97.1%) or attend (97.6%) appointments to access these resources, and those that did only attended one appointment (2.0%). Only one case was recorded as ‘ongoing’, the remaining cases were classified as ‘Complete’ (n=868).

Whilst it is apparent that victims do not attend the face-to-face sessions, a sizable proportion of victims (n=183) received support via the telephone only, as opposed to attending the centre, which included: Emotional Support (n=29); Personal Safety Support (n=16); Practical Support (n=32); Criminal Justice (n=28); Advocacy Support (n=14); Further Support (n=16). When the sample of victims who received telephone support only were combined with face-to-face session attendees, an independent samples t-test showed that revictimisation rates since the initial data collection point were not significantly affected by whether the victim engaged with services (telephone and/or attendance) or not; t (867)=.63, p=.529.

Analysis
The first research question investigated the impact of service engagement and whether this reduced victimisation in the future. The total number of face-to-face sessions attended at Victim Support was not significantly related to total revictimisations since the initial data collection point (two-tailed Pearson’s r=.06, p=.082), therefore not related to a reduced risk of future victimisation.

The second research question addressed the predictive ability of crime demographics (i.e. number of previous victimisations and offences across crime types) and victim demographics to predict those most likely to (a) fail to effectively engage with available services, and (b) those most vulnerable to future victimisation.

a) In the following analysis, the total number of appointments attended was considered a suitable indication of engagement and subsequently used as a measure of Engagement with Services. The Engagement with Services scores ranged from 0 to 4 appointments (M=.03, SD=.27). A statistical technique called Standard Multiple Regression was utilised to investigate what victim and crime characteristics might most likely predict service engagement. Possible predictors comprised: Gender, Ethnicity, Type of Crime, the victim’s Intoxication Status (at time of crime), Risk Level, Psychological and Practical needs. The victims’ past offending history for minor and major crimes were also included. The full results are presented in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Standard Multiple Regression to Test Engagement with Services and the Predictive Value for Victim Demographics and Vulnerabilities

Results of the Multiple Regression model were significant, indicating that the predictors included had some relevance to whether or not victims engaged with services, F (9, 858)=38.59, p<.001, R2=.29 (Adj. R2=.28). In particular, the extent to which the victim was classified as having Psychological (β=1.15, p<.001), and marginally Practical Needs (β=.07, p=.063), reliably predicted an increased number of sessions attended at Victim Support. Likewise, other vulnerability factors included in the model were significant predictors of service engagement, i.e. Intoxication Status (β=-.99, p<.001) and Risk Level (β=-.08, p=.014), such that victims intoxicated on drugs or alcohol at the time of the index victimisation were subsequently less likely to engage with Victim Support than those not intoxicated. However, the majority of the sample were victims of threat and/or assault (Major and Minor; 46.7% and 30.2% respectively), whilst sober (n=665, 76.5%), and as such most victims were not considered ‘vulnerable’ at the time of the offence. Interestingly however, victims classified as low risk were likely to attend more sessions at Victim Support than those classified as high risk. Indeed, risk levels were deemed ‘Unknown’ for 84.4% of victims who did not engage. Thus, results relating to risk and vulnerability levels need to be interpreted with caution.

In addition to the Multiple Regression, how the degree of physical injury of the victim related to engagement with Victim Support was investigated using one-way ANOVA, with degree of injury used as a factor with three levels: no injury, minor injury and serious injury, (F [2, 866]=3.51, p=.030). It was found that those victims who sustained serious injuries as a result of their index victimisation subsequently attended more sessions (at Victim Support M=.12, SD=.33) than those with minor (M=.02, SD=.24) and no injuries (M=.03, SD=.27).

b) A further standard Multiple Regression was conducted. In this analysis, possible predictor variables of the number of revictimisation experiences since the initial data collection point were investigated. Predictors comprised: Gender, Ethnicity, Relationship Association, Past Victimisation Rates, Past Offending Rates, Risk level, and Engagement with Services (total number of sessions attended).

The overall Multiple Regression model was significant, F (8, 797)=18.26 p<.001, R2=.16 (Adj. R2=.15). Three significant predictors emerged: 1. Past Victimisation Rates (β=.36, p<.001; pr=.36), 2. Engagement with Services (β=.07, p=.024; pr=.08), and, 3. Risk Level (β=.09, p=.049; pr=.07). Concluding from these results, it is particularly clear that previous victims were more likely to be revictimised in the future, even if they were recorded as high risk and were actively engaging with Victim Support at the time of the initial data recording.

Victim demographics, gender (β=-.04, p=.317) and ethnicity (β=.01, p=.821), did not significantly predict future revictimisation. Likewise, crime demographics such as type of crime (β=.00, p=.940) and relationship association between victim and offender (β=.06, p=.194) did not significantly predict future revictimisation. In addition, prior offending behaviour by the victim did not significantly predict future revictimisation (β=-.02, p=.640. The full Multiple Regression results are presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Standard Multiple Regression to Test Repeat Victimisation Rates and the Predictive Value for Victim Demographics and Past Offending

Discussion
The first research question addressed whether engaging with Victim Support would reduce future victimisation instances. Findings revealed that engagement was not significantly related to future victimisation. Secondly, when further victimisation since the first data collection period was inspected against demographic and crime-related variables, previous victimisation, regardless of the type of crime experienced, was the strongest predictor of being victimised again, despite the fact that they were more likely to be identified as higher risk by the police and even when victims were actively engaging with Victim Support at the time of victimisation. All other predictors were only minimally or non-significant. These findings are broadly consistent with previous research (e.g. Grove, Farrell, Farrington & Johnson, 2012; Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; McCart et al., 2010; Sims et al., 2005; Steel, Blakeborough & Nicholas, 2011) and highlights important issues for victim support services and the police to consider. How these findings relate to the existing knowledge-base and their implications will be explored next.

One example of how the development of specialist victim services have failed to show reductions in repeated victimisation is the study of the successfulness of Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) in England and Wales. MARACs were established in 2003 and are attended by relevant professional agencies (e.g. police and victim support agencies) to assess how best to manage ‘high risk’ victims of domestic violence. Despite approximately 270 MARACs in operation, reports suggest the evidence for their effectiveness at reducing revictimisation is untenable (see Steel et al., 2011 for further discussion). Moreover, in a systematic review of 31 studies on repeat victimisation, Grove et al. (2012) stated that preventing revictimisation was possible through appropriately-tailored situational crime prevention strategies. However, this did not include advice and education for crime victims alone: this method was not effective. Grove et al. noted an urgent need for further research into crime prevention for repeat victimisation across different crime-types with a focus upon the most victimised sub-groups, including what they called ‘near repeats’ (similar crimes, often committed nearby, soon after, against similar targets).

At the moment, in the UK, considering cases that might be considered near-repeats and cases that are deemed ‘lower risk’, is not a priority for specialist services. Taking domestic violence as the key example, a report by journalist, Nushra Mansuri, for the UK newspaper, The Guardian, in December 2014, highlighted the need for specialist service provision that is equipped to handle all victims that need it. In only providing specialist support via MARACs to those deemed to be in the top 10 percent of victims at risk of serious harm or domestic homicide, the vast majority of domestic violence victims are denied specialist help. It is unknown how many victims denied specialist services go on to be further victimised, continuing the cycle of revictimisation. Whilst it is accepted that services do not have limitless funds, it is clear that current practices are far from perfect and new ways need to be considered to better allocate resources to service all victims that do come forward. As the findings from the current study show that previous victimisation strongly predicts future victimisation, it is vital for services to consider interventions as early as possible in the victimisation-cycle, not just at the point from which a case is deemed high-risk.

Consistent with previous research (e.g. Mayhew & Reilly, 2008; McCart et al., 2010; Sims et al., 2005), the vast majority of victims in the current study did not engage face-to-face with any of the support services offered by Victim Support. Less than two percent booked or attended a face-to-face meeting. Just over one fifth of victims engaged over the telephone on at least one occasion to receive help across a range of support options. However, neither face-to-face contact nor telephone support influenced future victimisation events, with victims just as likely to be victimised again whether or not they were receiving support. It has been shown in past research that victim service programmes run in the United States offered no significant improvements on crime victims’ psychological functioning when service users were compared with those that did not use such services (Sims, Yost & Abbott, 2006). It could be similarly in the UK Victim Support services are not creating improvements in psychological functioning that might reduce the risk of future victimisation.

As previously stated, the systematic review by Grove et al. (2012) found that advice-giving or education about crime did not reduce the chance of a victim being revictimised. The example they gave was one of sexual victimisation prevention schemes that aimed to educate repeat victims with advice about how to avoid or manage risky situations that could lead to future revictimisation. They noted that a key problem with education is that it may change attitudes but not the ability to change behaviour. A similar effect may have occurred in the current sample, such that advice from Victim Support may have positive attitudinal benefits, or may benefit engaging victims in some practical ways – but these alone not sufficient to prevent further victimisation.

Additionally, current findings showed that most willing to engage with Victim Support on a face-to-face basis, were those victims already considered physically and psychologically vulnerable, and those with serious physical injuries as a result of their victimisation. This may be because these victims were more aware of their need for support, or indeed, genuinely more in need of it than other victims. Victims not seriously injured during their victimisation experience may feel that their plight is trivial and that follow-up support is not needed. Victims in previous studies have shown the same post-victimisation reactions with conviction that they can cope with recovering on their own (e.g. Jaycox, Marshall & Schnell, 2004), therefore this finding is not unusual or unexpected.

Somewhat worryingly however, victims who were intoxicated on alcohol and/or drugs at the time of the initial victimisation incident were particularly not likely to engage with Victim Support. This could signify that vulnerable victims who do need emotional and practical support are not being reached by a service that could help them. In order to increase the use of Victim Support by vulnerable crime victims, it is necessary to put greater emphasis on highlighting to the public about what services are offered, with services that can meet the needs of specific victim groups, and if necessary, broadening the types of services provided to victims (c.f. Sims et al., 2005). In relation to the broadening of services, it has been known for over a decade that services that offer support to victims of crime tend to ignore symptomology that occurs in the months after a victimisation experience (Winkel et al., 2003). As such, one additional service that Victim Support could offer is specifically for chronic stress after criminal victimisation and/or to develop closer links with services that can provide this service for victims who require it.

Interestingly, those victims recorded as high risk by the police were less likely to seek Victim Support help than those recorded as low risk. High risk victims are likely to be already receiving support from a number of other specialised services, such as those provided by domestic violence organisations and hence do not need additional support, but the data available to the authors at the time of data collection did not provide this information so could not be assessed further.

The current study is not without its limitations. Reliance on the number of revictimisation experiences as one of the key criterion variables in the statistical analysis was limited in its scope because it gives no information on the psychological functioning of victims, or any potential success of engagement. Psychological measures of sense of empowerment, or an increase in resiliency, may be more valuable indicators of success or recovery from an individual victim perspective than purely numeric measures. It was not possible to measure resiliency, empowerment, or other similar concepts in this study, because these variables were not recorded in the data. Using non-psychological, criminal justice data is always going to have limited scope for psychological investigation. That said, having a numeric measure of revictimisation and an investigation of its predictors, plus the data for subsequent victimisations as recorded in the follow-up data collection, is useful information for the police, service providers and future funders of victim services in Lancashire and beyond.

Within the UK at the current time, the future of victim services in general is being evaluated. The commissioning of referral services is transferring from the Ministry of Justice to localised Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in April 2015. In some areas of the UK this transition has already begun. PCCs are in the process of identifying the highest quality, most cost-effective services. Understanding the ongoing needs of victims – which are often complex and long-standing – will identify gaps in existing services and areas where improvements and cost efficiencies can be made. In Lancashire, North West England, where this particular study was conducted, the change to PCC control has been under-way since October 2014 (Lancashire Constabulary, Personal Communication, 2014).

What this means for victims of crime in actuality is a matter of debate. It is hoped that all changes made to victim services in the future will indeed be in the best interest of victims, to provide them with better and more suitable services, than simply cutting down on existing services to save money. One way that victim services might change in future is that there is more funding provided for smaller local victim organisations that currently exist on very small budgets that may have suffered cuts to services throughout the period of austerity since 2008. Such small organisations are not linked directly to the criminal justice process, but offer specific help or advice for particular types of victimisation experience (e.g. racial or anti-gay hate crime, support groups for victims with disabilities, etc.). Victims may prefer to access such services, and allowing local organisations to expand could be beneficial to them. That said, the development of local services at the expense of broad-ranging, nationwide services such as Victim Support could set up a future whereby a range of services available, but lacking consistency in their approach and success. It remains to be seen how well this re-structuring of victim services will work in the future, and it is certain that careful monitoring of this process is needed. Nevertheless, with carefully evaluated care, victim services in the future could see many improvements. It is already known that some victims of crime do not engage with services that could support their needs because of suspicion of formal systems (Zarafonitou, 2011). For these victims, smaller, local specialist services that meet their needs should be highlighted, perhaps on a case by case basis. Indeed, some services are more readily accessible than formal services that require appointments for face-to-face meetings, or lengthy telephone conversations (AuCoin & Beauchamp, 2004). There may be a wide range of reasons why victims are not able to engage with such systems, even if they are in need of emotional and/or practical support. Ease-of-access and cost-effective service provision now includes a wide range of online fora and even mobile phone applications, and it is a move toward the use of modern technologies that might be successful in engaging more victims in future to receive support that they may badly need.

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Published	15/12/2015
Type	Article
Author(s)	Jackie Craissati, Claire Quartey
Corresponding Authors	Jackie Craissati, Consultant Clinical & Forensic Psychologist, Oxleas NHS Trust Claire Quartey, Assistant Psychologist, Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust
DOA
DOI

Disclosure – sharing specific information about an offender with a third party – is an important tool in the range of risk management options available to agencies when managing convicted sex offenders placed on the Sex Offender Register in England and Wales. However, disclosure has not been widely researched, and assumptions that it is effective in reducing the likelihood of further sexual offending cannot be empirically supported as yet. This study aimed to gather descriptive data on the frequency and nature of third party disclosures on Registered Sex Offenders in five London boroughs, with reference to the method of disclosure, the outcome, and subsequent offence failures. One hundred and twenty nine third party disclosures were made over the one year period, most commonly to those in close relationships with the offender. Outcomes were variable in terms of acceptance and rejection, although the method by which disclosure was made had a significant impact on the outcomes. The rate of offender non-compliance with statutory regulations over the research period was relatively high suggesting that this was a group of less compliant offenders. Implications for future research and good practice are discussed.

Introduction
Disclosure is considered to be an important and necessary resource for the effective risk management of sexual offenders. Disclosure, in this context, refers to ‘the sharing of specific information about a MAPPA offender with a third party (not involved in MAPPA) for the purpose of protecting the public’ (MAPPA Guidance, 2012). This should not be confused with information-sharing between agencies.

MAPPA refers to the multi-agency public protection arrangements which were introduced in England and Wales in 2001 under Sections 67 and 68 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act (2000) to facilitate the sharing of information among agencies to improve public protection. MAPPA is now covered by the Criminal Justice Act (2003, section 325-327). Police, probation and prison services form the Responsible Authority with a statutory duty to ensure that the risks posed by specified sexual and violent offenders are assessed and managed appropriately, and other agencies – such as health, youth justice and the local authority – have a ‘duty to co-operate’ (Criminal Justice Act, 2003, section 325(3)).

One of the categories of offenders falling within the remit of MAPPA is Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs). These are convicted sex offenders who are subject to notification requirements under the Sexual Offences Act, 2003. Under the terms of the Act, RSOs must notify police of their name, address, all foreign travel, bank and credit card details, as well as information about their passports and other identity documents. RSOs – as with other MAPPA offenders – can be managed at three levels. Level 1 refers to ordinary agency management where the risks posed by the offender can be managed by the agency responsible for the supervision or case management. This involves information sharing but does not require multi-agency meetings. Level 2 is for those offenders whose risk requires active multi-agency management and for whom risk management plans are agreed via a multi-agency meeting. Level 3 is reserved for cases which meet the level 2 criteria but where the management issues require senior representation from the agencies, and there may be a need to commit significant resources at short notice.

The most recent MAPPA guidance (Section 10.2, 2012) sets out principles underpinning the use of disclosure. Disclosure should be lawful, proportionate, accurate and necessary. Proportionate refers to a number of considerations within the guidance, including the potential risk to the offender as a result of disclosure and the consideration and recording of alternatives to disclosure; the provision of information regarding key triggers for offending behaviour or other advice regarding management, not necessarily an offence history; and procedures to support both victims and offenders in case there is a breakdown in the process. Finally, the guidance suggests that ‘it is preferable that the offender knows that disclosure is taking place. On occasion, the offender may make the disclosure himself or herself in the presence of the police or the Offender Manager (probation officer), or may later confirm or verify the content of the disclosure’ (p.56).

Although there have been process evaluations of the MAPPA process (for example, Wood and Kemshall, 2007), there are only two published research studies on the use of third party disclosure under MAPPA. Cann (2007) reported on a survey of the 43 police areas in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Only 29 of the 40 areas which responded had made disclosures in the preceding six months. The survey revealed that the primary reason for disclosure was child protection, usually precipitated by a change in an offender’s personal relationships, housing or employment situation. Most commonly it was the details of the convicted offence which were disclosed. Both negative and positive consequences were highlighted: potential destabilisation of the offender versus enhanced public protection by limiting opportunities for offenders to access risky situations.

Penny and Craissati (2012) surveyed regular participants in MAPPA level 2 meetings across London with a response rate of 196 questionnaires. Respondents expressed confidence in their knowledge of disclosure law and procedures, but widely divergent views in their response to a range of hypothetical disclosure scenarios. The authors raise implications of the research for practice including improved understanding and guidance around third party disclosure, additional training and governance oversight.

In 2007, the Review of the Protection of Children from Sex Offenders was published, which led to the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme. This scheme was rolled out across England and Wales in three stages and was implemented across the country in 2011. The scheme is primarily the responsibility of the police, who manage a clear access route for the public to register their child protection interest in a named individual and – should there be relevant convictions and a risk posed – to receive a disclosure of pertinent information regarding the individual. A pilot over 36 weeks resulted in 53 enquiries, with 25 child concern reports being raised as a result (Chan, Homes, Murray and Treanor, 2010). Eleven of these reports involved disclosure to a parent regarding the offender’s conviction. The authors note that there was no indication that the scheme had had a negative impact on the behaviour of RSOs in the area, although this was not formally investigated. A related study with similar findings was conducted in four police areas in England and Wales (Kemshall and Wood, 2010). Interestingly, Kemshall, Kelly and Wilkinson’s (2012) reviewed the views of applicants within the Child Sex offender Public Disclosure Scheme. They found that in the few cases where a disclosure was made, the applicants who were not in a professional role remained anxious, and uncertain as to how to make use of the information.

The evidence from the United States, where community notification has been in place from the late 1990s onwards, is equivocal. Sex offender details have been publically available for a number of years; a summary of the evidence (Fitch, 2006) would suggest that there is no empirical evidence that community notification has had a positive impact on sex offender recidivism rates, nor has it resulted in fewer assaults by strangers on children.

There have been some attempts to consider disclosure from the offender perspective. Both Connor (2007) and Hudson (2005) had similar findings. Connor’s qualitative study found that sex offenders were deeply avoidant of situations potentially requiring disclosure, for fear of rejection and retaliation; the offenders had already constructed personal narratives around their offending which avoided stigma – minimising or lying – which disclosure threatened, not least because of a fear of losing control over the disclosure process, and it being used against them.

Traditional approaches to risk management have focused on identifying risk factors for targeted intervention, a strategy identified by Kemshall and Wood (2008) as a “protection strategy” which aims to protect communities through control of risk. This approach is often dominated by the offender adopting avoidance strategies which can lead to impoverished lives and hopelessness, as suggested by the participants in Connor’s (2007) study. There is a growing research literature which suggests that the progression from persistent offending to desistence is the outcome of a complex interaction between subjective and social factors (Farmer, McAlinden and Maruna, 2015); that is, structure (informal social controls such as relationships with intimate partners and employment) and agency (the way in which offenders think about themselves and their lives). For persistent offenders in particular, this entails finding a more positive identity as a nonoffender which includes meaningful engagement in the community, which has a more powerful impact on desistance than traditional risk management methods (Maruna and Farrell, 2004; Farmer, McAlinden and Maruna, 2015). The desistance literature also highlights the importance of building and sustaining hope in the journey from offending to a new non-offending identity, which includes others believing in the offender’s current personal identity rather than his ‘old me’. There has been little published research into desistance from sexual crime. Kruttschnitt, Uggen and Shelton (2000) conducted a retrospective study of 556 sexual offenders to examine whether informal social controls – specifically employment and marriage – predicted desistance from offending, and found that job stability significantly reduced the probability of re-offending but marital status did not. Harris (2014) in a qualitative study of 21 desisting sexual offenders found that the majority of them attributed their desistance to changes in thinking. The most recent qualitative study of apparently desisting sexual offenders (Farmer, McAlinden and Maruna, 2015) found that the offenders themselves attributed their desistance to cognitive factors, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of repeating their crimes. The authors tentatively suggest that the desisting narratives in their study tended to support a move away from backward looking approaches towards future-focused therapeutic interventions with an emphasis on optimism and hope.

As yet, there is no published evidence available to confirm whether disclosure does indeed protect the public by managing (or perhaps avoiding) risky situations, or whether it inadvertently reduces opportunities for accessing socially valued roles (such as a parent, or skilled worker) which in turn impedes processes of recovery or desistance.

The aim of the study was to build on the limited evidence base in relation to disclosure under MAPPA arrangements, by focusing on RSOs and providing details of the frequency of disclosures and how they are made, the life domains in which they are made, and the outcomes in terms of inclusion or exclusion. There were no specific hypotheses, although it was expected that:

• disclosures would probably be made most commonly in higher risk sex offenders;
• there would probably be fairly high levels of rejection as a result of the disclosure.

Methodology
Participants
The sample included all those individuals convicted of a sexual offence, held on the Sex Offender Register in five boroughs of south east London, and who were subject to a third party disclosure at any time within the preceding 12 months (December 2013 to November 2014). The five boroughs were primarily chosen for their geographical proximity to each other (for each of data collection) and were considered to a reasonable spread of types of London borough; the lead author was known to the police teams in the area which greatly facilitated cooperation with the project.

Data was collected on the type of offence (child victims, adult victims, or non-contact sex offending), the start date of the Sex Offender Registration, the risk level (as measured by the Risk Matrix 2000, Thornton et al., 2003), and whether the offender was subject to a Sex Offences Prevention Order (SOPO). Additional data was collected in a semi-structured interview with the Jigsaw teams (the police teams responsible for participation in MAPPA and maintenance of the SOR), including details on the disclosures, how they were made (by the police first by telephone or visit, or offender first, and then followed up by the police), and the outcomes.

Disclosure domains were divided into the following domains: employment (current or potential), training establishments (such as colleges), relationships (family and friends), social (such as clubs, the church, or housing associations).

Outcomes were defined, in relation to the response of the person/organisation disclosed to, as follows: accepted, partially accepted (subject to conditions such as restricted access or supervised contact), rejected, and withdrawal (of the offender prior to the disclosure in anticipation of a disclosure being made).

Offence failures were defined as any re-arrest for a general, violent or sexual offence, or a recall to prison, between the time the disclosure was made and the data collection point. Therefore, the time at risk for a failure was up to a maximum of one year.

Procedure
Anonymised and non-identifiable data was provided by the Metropolitan Police Public Protection Unit, from the ViSOR7* electronic record system, where the specific indicator ‘disclosure’ was endorsed on the offender record. The ViSOR and PNC (police national computer) numbers enabled the Jigsaw teams to identify the offenders, and discuss disclosure information without identifying individual offenders. The Metropolitan Police lead for Public Protection contacted the head of each of the five Jigsaw teams, advising them of the nature of the research, and the support of the London MAPPA Strategic Management Board (SMB). Individual meetings were then set up with each of the five team leaders, in order to work through the semi-structured interviews, and complete any missing information.

The researchers were given local ethical approval by the National Probation Service (NPS) London Division to access the London probation electronic record system; additionally they were provided with a list of the Registered Sex Offenders held on post-custodial licence or community orders by the probation service in the five boroughs, and who had been in the community for the past 12 months (December 2013 to November 2014). This data was cross referenced and checked with the police data (above), and any additional offenders who had been subject to a probation third party disclosure were added to the sample.

Measures
The Risk Matrix 2000 (Thornton et al., 2003) is routinely completed by Jigsaw teams and/or probation officers from file information on all convicted sex offenders across London. It is an actuarial measure predicting sexual reconviction in sex offenders. It comprises a simple baseline risk classification based on conviction data, adjusted at stage two if two or more aggravating factors are found (for example, male or stranger victims). Two cross-validation studies tested the predictive validity of the scale in a short-term follow up sample of treated sex offenders and a long-term follow up sample of untreated sex offenders. The ROC Area under the Curve was 0.77 and 0.75 for the two samples. ROC provides a measure of predictive accuracy, with 0.50 representing no better than chance, and higher scores reflecting increasing accuracy. The two and sixteen year follow up recidivism rates were 0.9% and 8% low risk, 1.3% and 18.3% medium risk, 5.7% and 40.5% high risk, and 17.2% and 60% very high risk, respectively.

Ethical approval
Support for the project was provided by the Strategic MAPPA Board for London, and ethical approval obtained from the Metropolitan Police and from the Deputy Director of the National Probation Service for London. The consideration of safe and anonymised transfer and storage of sensitive information was an important consideration.

Results
The ViSOR records did not identify all the disclosure cases, and some cases recorded as disclosures in fact pertained to information exchange with other agencies. However, Jigsaw teams clearly knew their caseload of offenders on the SOR, and were able to identify all suitable cases with ease. Cross referencing with the probation service records confirmed the police disclosure in 10 cases, and identified a further 19 cases where the probation officer had made a disclosure, not already recorded in police records. An examination of these cases confirmed that there were no significant differences, and they were incorporated into the main analysis.

In December 2014, there were a total of 1,576 offenders on the Sex Offender Register (SOR) in the five boroughs in the study. There were 129 third party disclosures made for this group of offenders across the year of study, suggesting an approximate 8% disclosure rate within the year. All the participants in the study were male (there were no disclosures in relation to female offenders). Of the offenders on the SOR, 51 (3%) were being managed at MAPPA level 2 at the time of disclosure, and all the rest were managed at level 1, save two managed at level 3. The start of the SOR was unknown in 15 cases, but for the remaining 114 offenders, the average time on the SOR was 4 years 8 months (sd 4 years 2 months, range 1 month to 21 years 10 months). The results are set out in more detail in Table 1.

Table 1: Offence related details in relation to Borough

Disclosures were made about twice as often for those with child victims (63, 49%) as for those with adult victims (29, 23%) or those with non-contact offences (37, 29%). However, the spread of offender types was broadly similar across the five boroughs.

There were significant differences between the boroughs in terms of risk level, as measured by the Risk Matrix 2000 (X2 23,075, df 12, p<.05): Borough B and Borough D made disclosures on a much greater number of very high risk offenders, while Borough A and Borough E made the most disclosures on low risk offenders. There were also significant differences between the boroughs in terms of the MAPPA level at which the offenders (for whom there was a disclosure) were being managed (X2 27.540, df 4, p<0.01): Borough E and Borough D managed nearly all the disclosures at Level 1, while Borough A managed the majority at Level 2. There were no significant differences in relation to risk between offender types.

There were 47 (36%) offenders on Sex Offences Prevention Orders (SOPOs), with a proportionally greater number in Borough A borough although this was not a significant difference (p<.09). Although there were no significant differences in the number of SOPOs by offence type, there were significant differences in relation to risk level (X2 12,987, df 3, p<.01): 11 (52%) low risk, 8 (18%) medium risk, 10 (30%) high risk, and 16 (62%) very high risk offenders were on SOPOs.

For 10 of the 129 disclosures (8%), either the method of disclosure or the outcome was unknown, and these cases were therefore excluded from the following analysis. By far the most disclosures were made in the domain of relationships, and training was the least common domain. Overall the most common method was for the police to telephone the disclosure recipient (22, 19%) or to visit and disclose ((47, 40%). However, in terms of relationships, almost half the disclosures were made by the offender informing the recipient first and this being followed up by the police and confirming the disclosure. Table 2 provides more detailed findings.

Table 2: Method of disclosure and outcome in relation to disclosure domains

Disclosures and outcomes
Employment
There were 20 disclosures to potential or actual employers, two thirds of which resulted in rejection of the offender. Within the sample, only one offender (out of 29) with adult victims had an employment disclosure, and he was accepted. Fifteen (out of 62, 24%) disclosures were in relation to offenders with child victims, of whom 60% were rejected; all six (out of 37) of the non-contact offenders were rejected. Offenders were no more successful in applying to work for charitable organisations (paid and unpaid) than for private companies.

Training
Disclosures were evenly spread across offender types. Twenty-two percent of offenders were rejected by training establishments, either by withdrawing an offer, or by not responding following the disclosure. There was no difference in outcome in relation to how the disclosure was made.

Relationships
Disclosures were evenly spread across offender types. Two thirds of offenders (44, 67%) were accepted by those to whom the disclosure was made, and a further 3 (5%) were accepted with conditions, usually regarding supervised contact with their children. However, 19 (29%) were rejected following the disclosure. Forty of the disclosures were to partners (including ex-partners) or the offender’s children; the rest were made to friends and close family members with children. Offenders were half as likely to be rejected (37% versus 63%) if the offender disclosed first rather than the police (X2 15,395, df, 6, p<.05).

Social
Disclosures were evenly spread across offender types. These disclosures were to situations regarding shared housing, schools, churches and clubs. Overall around half resulted in rejections although the disclosure was significantly more likely to result in acceptance if the offender disclosed first (X2 15,395, df 6, p<.05).

Further analysis of the data to explore the possible relationships between the method of disclosure, disclosure domain, outcome and risk level did not result in any significant findings.

Offence failures
Overall, there were 25 (20%) failures, in terms of re-arrest or recall, following the disclosure, but within the study period. However, these failures were linked to 20 offenders, as one offender failed after two disclosures, and another offender failed after five different disclosures. There was one re-arrest for a sexual offence, and one for a violent offence; there were five general (acquisitive) re-offences, three for failing to reregister/breach of notification requirements, and seven breaches of SOPO. Three further offenders were recalled without any re-arrest for a further offence. There were no significant differences between offender types and failure overall, although there was a significant difference in the way in which offender types failed (X2 21,161, df, 10, p<.05): 75% of those failures with adult victims breached their SOPO, and 44% of failed noncontact offender generally re-offended. Although the numbers were very small, the one violent failure and all three of the recalls had been rejected following disclosures. The most significant association with failure was the risk level (X2 7.685, df 3, p<.05): 2 (10%) of failures were low risk, 3 (8%) medium risk, 8 (24%) high risk, and 7 (28%) of failures were very high risk. Furthermore, 7 (64%) of those on a SOPO failed by breaching their order (X2 11,380, df 5, p<.05).

Offenders were significantly more likely to fail following disclosure to employment if the police made the disclosure first (X2 16,232, df 4, p<.01). There were no significant findings in relation to disclosure method and failure in the other domains. However, those offenders who were rejected by training establishments were significantly more likely to fail (X2 9,000, df 2, p<.05).

Discussion
This paper presents the results of a descriptive study into the frequency and nature of third party disclosures on RSOs in five London boroughs, with reference to the method of disclosure, the outcome, and subsequent offence failures. The overall aim was achieved, providing data which can serve as a bench mark for other MAPPA areas in London and further afield.

There were some methodological limitations to the study. First, the official records were not entirely accurate, in terms of the ViSOR system, and although the police teams clearly had a good grasp of their caseload, some disclosures may have been missed. Furthermore, there seemed to be no routine recording within the probation electronic record of disclosures, and there was an impression that the probation service were only leading on disclosure decisions in a minority of cases (18 out of the 129). It is not clear whether this accurately reflects practice, but may raise questions as to whether probation staff should be leading such decisions where the offender is under their statutory supervision.

The decision to disclose, and the outcome of disclosure may have been related to factors not picked up in this study, such as the non-compliance of the offender, or the inappropriateness of the life domain in which they wished to participate. The study can make no judgment on the appropriateness or otherwise of the decision to disclose. The findings should therefore be interpreted with caution, and require further exploration.

Nevertheless, some interesting differences and associations were found. The boroughs were not identical in their practice, with one borough making twice as many disclosures during the study period as any of the other boroughs, despite no discernible difference in risk levels; and another borough managed the majority of disclosures at MAPPA level 2 as compared to the other boroughs who were making decision at level 1. The MAPPA Guidance (2012) suggests that disclosure decisions should be made at a level 2 meeting, although in reality, the lead agency may consider it more expedient to make decisions and carry out the actions without reference to the multi-agency setting.

The tentative hypothesis that disclosures would be more likely to be made on higher risk RSOs was only partially borne out, with a significant number of low risk RSOs in two boroughs also being subject to disclosure. Similarly, there were significantly more SOPOs (in the disclosure group) in the low and the very high risk category, as compared to the medium and high risk categories. These findings suggest that there is a group of low risk offenders who are subject to stringent risk management arrangements. Without further information, it is not possible to know whether this relates to the particular living circumstances of the offender – perhaps a family setting with available child victims – or different professional practices across boroughs.

Disclosures were made twice as often on offenders with child victims than for those with adult victims or non-contact offences. Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions without knowing the proportion of offender types on the SOR; however, there were no differences in risk level across offender types, and it may therefore reflect a greater focus on those with child victims, mirroring public concerns.

The suggestion that disclosures would result in rejection was also only partially borne out. As might be expected, the greatest number of disclosures were made in the relationships domain, but this was also the category most likely to lead to acceptance. This may be of some reassurance to offenders who fear rejection within relationships as a result of disclosure. However, the protective quality of these relationships was not investigated in this study, and there is the possibility that the acceptance into relationships led, in some cases, to further involvement from social services. Although training was the least common domain, the outcomes were also encouraging with around 80% acceptance. The caveat to this is that those who were rejected from training establishments were significantly more likely to fail than those accepted.

The picture was least encouraging with the employment domain, and to some extent, the social domain, with relatively high levels of rejection. This may represent the appropriate management of high risk situations, but raises the possibility that RSOs are encountering obstacles which may not always be warranted, when seeking the social capital (i.e. the ‘new me’ roles) which is central to a model of desistence from offending. Potential employers, charities, clubs, churches and housing associations may not have any significant investment in tolerating or managing risk in the current climate of public concern.

The rate of offence failure (20%) during the study period seemed to be rather high, although only one offender was re-arrested for a sexual offence. Half of the offence failures related to breaches of statutory requirements (SOPOs and SOR notification). In particular the majority of offenders with adult victims breached their SOPO, and almost half the non-contact offenders were re-arrested for general offences. This raises the possibility that these were particularly non-compliant or antisocial offenders; an interesting question is whether disclosures tended to target less compliant offenders, whether less compliant offenders were more likely to be alienated by the disclosure process, or an element of both.

The disclosure method yielded some interesting findings which may have implications for practice. Although not a universal finding, it would appear that when the offender was able to make the disclosure first – followed up by the police – the acceptance rate was significantly improved, particularly in the relationships and social domains. Furthermore, when the police initiated disclosure in the employment domain, this was significantly associated with subsequent offence failure. This suggests that allowing the offender opportunities to initiate the process of disclosure may improve the offender’s sense of control, and enhance the willingness of the person/organisation to whom the disclosure is made, to be accepting. However, not surprisingly, the most robust association with offence failure was the risk level, which provides some additional reassurance that the RM2000 is a reasonable tool for use by MAPPA agencies.

The implications of this study for future research and practice fall into two broad areas:

• Replicating the investigation with a larger sample across London or in less urban environments, in order to explore further the decisions to disclose, and their positive impact in terms of effective risk management, reduced offence failures and increased community reintegration.
• Investigating the emerging possibility that it might be feasible to improve social integration and acceptance by developing a good practice model for carrying out disclosure – including allowing the offender to make the disclosure first – which could be further evaluated.

Disclosure remains an important and potentially powerful tool for effective risk management. Public protection and the needs of victims should always be the priority. However, this study provides an opportunity to ensure that disclosure decisions are consistent across areas and between agencies, and raises opportunities to enhance good practice models which have positive outcomes for both offenders and victims.

 

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the London MAPPA Strategic Management Board (SMB) in conducting this research, and to thank the Metropolitan Police teams who gave their time to engage with the study.

7* ViSOR is a UK-wide system used to store and share information and intelligence on those individuals who have been identified as posing a risk of serious harm to the public; it is designed to facilitate the work of MAPPA by assisting co-operative working between the three ‘Responsible Authorities’ (police, probation and prison services).

8* Total on Sex Offender Register (SOR) as at December 2014.

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