CONFIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY: MAGISTRATES
AND YOUTH OFFENDING TEAMS WITHIN THE
YOUTH COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Lucy Ivankovic, YOT Manager, West Sussex Youth Offending Service & Doctoral
Student, University of Bedfordshire

Abstract
One of the effects of 2004 National Standards (Youth Justice Board 2004) appears to have
been that greater emphasis is now placed upon timely and efficient administration, rather
than the content and quality of options presented in the youth court by Youth Offending
Teams (YOTs), (Smith, 2007). This is partly to do with the constantly changing agenda for
YOTs (Thomas, 2008), and the resulting confusion of professional identity for many YOT
staff (Souhami, 2007). Without the clear commitment to children’s rights YOTs have
become susceptible a variety of influences affecting decision making in court, not least the
punitive intolerance described by Muncie and Goldman (2006), prevalent within youth
justice since the 1990s. This can mean that YOTs have a confident, but collusive relationship
with magistrates, rather than providing an independent voice within the court. This article
argues that YOTs need to develop a confident relationship with magistrates, which does not
compromise their integrity and primary commitment to the child’s best interest and their
communities. Furthermore the development of such a relationship has the potential to
modify the punitive culture of many youth courts.

The role of Magistrates is to conduct trials, establish guilt or innocence, determine
sentences, enforce court orders, make bail decisions, issue warrants and remand people to
custody (Newburn, 2007). The role of YOTs is less clear, however, and they have struggled to
establish and maintain a clear identity (Canton and Eadie, 2002). Although YOTs remain
the sole service responsible for young offenders within England and Wales, there has been a
continually moving agenda, from a primary focus upon welfare needs to a growing concern
with enforcement (Thomas, 2008). In the past 10 years there has been an increasing focus on
performance management and target setting which has resulted in YOTs becoming driven by
procedural concerns rather than professional values. As Smith (2007) notes, National
Standards (2004) have ensured that welfare issues have become further marginalised with a
preoccupation with compliance with court orders. Souhami (2007) writes of the loss of
occupational identity within youth justice, citing confusion about the goals and principles of
youth justice work and how external influences affect the way YOTs operate. This article

Confidence and Credibility: Magistrates and youth offending teams within the youth courts in England and Wales
argues that, as a result, both the magistrates and their YOTs are mutually reinforcing local court cultures and outcomes which have become harsher and more punitive over time (Muncie, 2009). It concludes by arguing that if magistrates and YOTs can develop trust and confidence whilst remaining independent of each other’s interests there is also the potential for better outcomes for some young people, with a reduced likelihood of further offending as a consequence.

The term “better outcome” can be viewed as having two elements: firstly, sentences which the young person as well as the court believes will help prevent them from committing further offending or that the young person considers to be worthwhile (McGrath, 2009) and secondly, outcomes which do not damage the young person (Goldson, 2005, 2006). In essence this means limiting the use of custody, for both sentence and remand, in all but the most serious cases because of the substantial evidence concerning its damaging effects on children and young people (Bateman, 2005; Goldson, 2005; Goldson, 2006; Muncie, 2009).

Frances Done, Chair of the Youth Justice Board (YJB) recently noted that:

> We have to help YOTs build as much confidence with local magistrates’ benches as possible. The better the relationship between the YOT and the courts the more confident magistrates are in the reports YOTs do and the better the general understanding of the work of the YOT and the way Referral Order panels work, the more likely it is there will be lower custody rates (Youth Justice News July 08).

There is considerable disparity in the use of custodial sentences around the country, for example, the YJB figures for 2007/8 record Liverpool as having custody rates of 11.8% whereas Newcastle, a YOT of similar size, has custody rates of only 2.1%. John Fasselfelt (2009), Deputy Chair of the Magistrates Association, argues that this might not be due to one Bench being more punitive than another; but “a lack of confidence on the part of magistrates in Youth Offending Teams”.

Bateman and Stanley (2002) examined differences in sentencing patterns across England and Wales and identified a clear correlation between magistrates’ perceptions of the quality of local YOTs and levels of custody. They found that magistrates in areas of high custody rates had less confidence in the local YOT than their counterparts where custody was less frequently used. Their study also revealed lower custody rates in areas with good communication and information exchange within the court.

**Roles within the Youth Court**

The role of the Magistrate is essentially that of a decision maker who has heard information provided by the other courtroom professionals. How those decisions are made is a matter of interest. Parker (1989:116) writes of the “professional ideology of the lay magistrates” wherein magistrates believe themselves to be the only impartial members of the court, citing the “deviousness of defence lawyers, defendant centeredness of social workers and over
enthusiasm of police evidence” (Parker 1989:171). They judge each case on its merits, relying on their own personal and moral judgements of a defendant and their parents and interpret legislation using “common sense” (Parker, 1989). Parker’s research is some 20 years old and there has been little academic research in this area since. However, it appears little has changed in the intervening years, as newly trained magistrates are encouraged to use their own judgements in sentencing using the sentencing guidelines as parameters to gain consistency, but also to use independent discretion to impose sentences on a case by case basis (Grove 2002).

The YOT court officer’s role is to represent the YOT in court (Fishwick, 1989), (Hester, 2008) and has been described by the Youth Justice Board (YJB) as the “face of the YOT for magistrates”. The role of the YOT court officer is to provide accurate, up to date and relevant information to the court on behalf of the YOT without the, possibly distorting, emphases that prosecutors and defence lawyers might place upon this information (Newburn, 2007). The information provided by the YOT should take into account the welfare of the young person, the prospects of rehabilitation, the risks of the young person reoffending, the harm they pose to the public and the proportionality of any proposed penalty (Nacro, 2003). On the basis of this information the YOT make a recommendation to the Court which the bench can follow or not as they choose.

However, that information is likely to be shaped by the author’s perceptions of what the bench will find acceptable (Bateman, 2005). In a situation in which the discourse on youth crime is becoming ever more punitive (Cross et al., 2002; Bateman, 2005; Goldson, 2005; Goldson, 2006; Muncie, 2008) it would not be surprising if YOT recommendations anticipated this shift. However this ‘drift’ towards punitiveness is at the heart of the identity crises confronting many YOTs. In an attempt to resolve the question of the role of the YOT the governments 1997 White Paper, No More Excuses and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 sec 37 indicated that the primary aim of the youth justice system was to prevent offending by children and young persons. However, Souhami (2007) argues that this aim is so broad and poorly defined that virtually any intervention or penalty can be justified. She argues that this has resulted in a loss of occupational belonging for many youth justice staff. Burnett and Appleton’s (2004) research however found the opposite; that the pre existing social work ethos prevailed and a welfare approach remained intact within the YOT, although Bateman (2010) suggests that they are confused about what these values actually are. However, this does suggest that the struggle for identity is specific to each YOT; each developing its own occupational culture which changes over time through influences in the broader political climate and also those working within the profession (Parker, 2000 in Souhami, 2007; Muncie, 2009).

The counter argument to this is that the Crime and Disorder Act also created the YJB, a centralised non departmental body which oversees all parts of the Youth Justice System. The YJB monitors YOT performance, promotes effective practice and provides workforce development opportunities, thereby exerting influence over the development of youth justice
staff. Whilst this leads to greater clarity of direction and accountability, there is the danger that YOTs will focus only on those areas against which they are measured (Newburn, 2007). This has largely dictated the direction of youth justice and has therefore influenced what YOTs are measured upon e.g. output, such as adherence to national standards and enforcement rather than outcomes such as revocation of a court order for good progress. In essence, therefore, it could be argued that youth justice services changed from being organisations which aimed to meet the needs of children and young people who have offended to a youth justice system which is highly prescriptive and preoccupied with process at the expense of outcome (Smith, 2007). Despite the increased corporatism in youth justice outlined by Smith (2007) he also points out the concern at a practice level to retain a link between the processes of standardisation directed from the YJB and the needs of young people. This is particularly clear in courts, where he argues that the “high quality services” (National Standard, 2004) provided by YOTs to courts focus on providing an efficient administrative service, leaving the practitioner to make a decision on the content of that service. As such, YOTs appear to continue to be organisations with wavering identities, whether they are child-centred organisations or criminal justice process organisations, or are struggling to be both.

Within the courtroom, there is a clear distinction between the magistrates as decision makers and YOT staff as influencers. However, if the YOT court officer acting as the face of the YOT in court is not clear about differences in the role, ethos and responsibilities of the YOT and the Court, then the YOT may well find itself colluding with rather than contributing to decision-making within the court, thus compounding the culture of the court.

**Court Cultures**

Court outcomes are determined to a great extent by the culture within each particular court room. Hucklesby, (1997:130) defines court culture as “a set of informal norms which are mediated through the working relationships of the various participants”. These informal norms permit routines to develop which become the standard working practices of a particular court room. The power of a court culture should not be underestimated as Lipetz (1980, in Huckelsby, 1997) found that any threat to those norms, such as a new member or organisational policy, had no lasting impact on court routine. There are a number of influencers and maintainers of court cultures present within each court room.

Magistrates and YOT staff as part of the court culture perpetuate this set of informal norms through their knowledge, experience and expectations of each other. Studies examining court outcomes demonstrate that decisions made in courts have wide regional variations which cannot be explained by factors such as offence type, (Jones,1985 in Cavadino and Digman,1997; Dunbar and Langdon,1998; Feilzer and Hood, 2004 in Ashworth, 2005). Cavadino and Digman (1997) believe that the chief influence on sentencing practice in magistrates’ courts is the sentencing culture of the bench into which new recruits, magistrates or YOT officers, are socialised by shadowing and learning from more experienced colleagues. Chambers (1982) and Parker (1989) examined how magistrates maintain the sentencing
culture of individual courts as they placed little value on consistency between courts and demonstrated limited awareness of decision making outside their own court areas.

There is therefore no reason to presume that the YOT staff are not also collusive within the culture of their local court. Indeed Fishwick (1989) in his book: Courtwork: A Guide for Social Work Practitioners, states on writing a court report:

*Always check with the court officer the expectations of a particular court. It could save you a lot of work and/or embarrassment later on (Fishwick, 1989:43).*

Whilst Fishwick’s advice might be some 20 years old, Bateman (2005) also found court cultures between YOTs and magistrates mutually reinforcing. An example of this is reflected in the YOT recommendations in reports to magistrates where Bateman (2005: 116) found that YOTs’ proposals “second guessed sentencing decisions thereby reinforcing rather than challenging local sentencing patterns”. The issue here is that the court may well be set up as an independent decision maker on behalf of the community, but that there is little independence practised within it, as the participants learn from each other and mutually reinforce the practice within an individual court (Parker et al., 1989 and Bateman, 2005).

Magistrates are, under section 172 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, duty bound to have regard to the Sentencing Guidelines when passing sentences. There is therefore a legislative backdrop which influences the court outcomes and should reduce the inconsistencies which have always been evident within the youth court. However, the 2003 Criminal Justice Act also allows sentencers to depart from those guidelines as long as they state the reason for so doing. This allows magistrates considerable scope for the exercise of discretion resulting as Lord Justice Rose (2008) acknowledged, that “despite seeking consistency, achieving it is impossible”. This flexibility could, however, provide an opportunity for YOTs, should they wish to do so, to seek to persuade magistrates to sentence outside the guidelines should the need arise relating to an individual case, for example, Roberts (2008) writes of the possibility of both sentencers and the public responding positively to the level of remorse shown or the behaviour of a young person since the commission on an offence, which could be viewed as reason for stepping outside of the Sentencing Guidelines.

The legal advisor is a further potential influencer and maintainer of court cultures. Their role is to manage the court and to advise magistrates of firstly, the status of the case and secondly on points of law and procedure. This is a powerful position of influence and as the Justice Clerks Society. Parker et al (1989) recognises the dividing line between offering advice and having an influence on sentencing can be very thin. The position of influence is enhanced as it is the legal advisors who provide training for the magistrates and, therefore, the opportunity to influence outcomes is possible both in the courtroom through advice and more subtly in the power discrepancy of a pupil challenging a teacher. As one serving magistrate wrote on the influence of the legal advisor:
The problem for us non-professionals would be that having hung on their every word in the past, it would require an effort of will to contradict or outvote them in the retiring room (Grove 2002:180).

The rise of managerialism and performance management over the past 10 years is a further source of influence on court culture. The court has been set targets, with the aim of reducing the number of hearings per case and reducing the time taken from arrest to disposal to less than 6 weeks (CJSSS, 2008). The YOTs also have targets; a major one being to reduce the numbers of young people sent to custody to under 5% of all court outcomes. There are times when these targets clash, for example: a YOT court officer requesting an adjournment for a specialist assessment to avoid a custodial sentence could be seen as hindering the achievement of ‘speedier justice’ (CJSSS, 2008).

Collusive Confidence

Given the influences on court culture noted above there is the potential for YOTs and magistrates to collude with, rather than challenge punitive court cultures. In the 1980s Social Enquiry Reports (SER) were presented to the court by youth justice social workers to aid the sentencing decisions of magistrates and Parker’s (1989) research confirms that these reports were the most frequently cited influence in magistrates sentencing decision making. These reports were replaced by Pre Sentence Reports (PSRs) introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and designed to enhance the courts’ confidence in non custodial penalties (Bateman, 2008). Where SERs tended to focus on the social background of a defendant, PSRs were far more prescriptive and written to the format and section headings outlined within National Standards for Youth Justice 2004. They are offence focused documents, outlining the offence and why it was committed, the factors in a young person’s life which affected their offending, the risk they posed to the public and a proposal to the court with an outline of intervention designed to prevent further offending, (National Association for the Care and rehabilitation of Offenders - NACRO Cymru, 2003). PSRs are generally considered to be an important part of the information presented to magistrates when considering the sentencing of a young person (Magistrates Association, 1995 in Haines and Drakeford, 1998).

The PSR’s provided by YOTs to the courts could be an independent opportunity to encourage better outcomes and challenge the belief and practice that persistent offending be punished by harsher penalties. However, Bateman (2005) cites the increasing number of PSRs where not only is this not challenged, but a custodial sentence is proposed. Of the 17 YOTs examined, more than half of the custodial penalties given at court were explicitly proposed by the PSR author. Bateman and Stanely’s (2002) research demonstrates how influential PSRs can be within a court and yet YOTs are potentially missing an opportunity to provide a view of young people which is independent of the current punitive discourse. Instead Bateman (2005: 116) argues “YOT recommendations are... reinforcing rather than challenging local sentencing patterns”. This is concerning given the growing body of research that states harsh penalties such as custody do not result in lower offending rates (Bateman, 2007; Travers, 2009; Batchelor and McNeill, 2005) and furthermore that sentencing
children and young people to custodial sentences is a damaging and detrimental experience (Bateman, 2009; Goldson, 2005; Goldson and Muncie, 2006).

Like sentencing, there are striking regional differences in the use of custodial remands (Thomas, 2005). Ealing has a custodial remand rate of 15.4% where as Walsall has 5% custodial remands (YJB, 2007-2008). Given this variation in the use of custodial remands it would seem that there is an opportunity for YOTs to influence the courts on their bail and remand decisions, which is done through presenting bail packages to court when the question of bail arises.

These packages are designed to encourage the court to have the confidence to grant bail more frequently and the court is assured by the YOT of both a high level of restriction of liberty through reporting and strict enforcement of the bail conditions. The YJB (2003) in Thomas (2005) recorded that only one third of young people offered a bail package will get one, with the remainder being remanded in custody. However, of those remanded in custody, having been seen by the courts as being too persistent in their offending or too dangerous to be allowed home, only 51% will go on to receive a custodial sentence with 24% young people being acquitted (2008 Ministry of Justice Court Proceedings Database, in Hansard, 2009). This data clearly suggests that young people are being held in custody unnecessarily and that the numbers of young people held securely can be affected by both region and local court practice.

Hucklesby’s (1997) research on the importance of court culture with regard to bail showed that when Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) asked for a remand in custody the Magistrates agreed in 86% of cases. She argued that the culture of the court perpetuated the practices of those involved and that the CPS adapted their working practices to fit their expectations of what the court might do and that this was similarly so with defence solicitors on advising their clients on applications for bail. It is, therefore, possible that this is also the case with YOT bail officers, where their judgement on the decision to offer a package or not is influenced by the perceived expectations of courtroom practice and culture. The evidence for this can be seen in remand statistics where it is possible to see a potential variation in court practice; Windsor and Maidenhead have 0.8% custodial remands whereas nearby Wokingham with a similar amount of young people passing through its courts has 7.1% custodial remands (YJB, 2007/8). The question remains as to the independence of the YOT Bail officer. Thomas (2005:94) argues that practitioners who have specialist knowledge and expertise in bail matters and who are effective at building working relationships with their court staff will be more effective as they will be “viewed as part of the professional network”. Whilst this may be so there is then the greater potential to become, as Hucklesby (1997) argues, part of the culture of a court reinforcing local practice, rather than operating independently within the court.

The National Standards by which YOTs conduct their work sets out the expected levels of intervention. It was hoped their introduction would help reassure both sentencers and the public that orders of the court were being strictly adhered to and enforced. Canton and
Eadie (2005) argue the political background in the 1990's led to a revised National Standards which pushed a more rigid line on enforcement, reducing practitioner discretion and requiring manager authorisation for any deviation from the standards. The Government’s Strategic Plan for Criminal Justice 2004-8, outlined in the 2007 Thematic Inspection Report states that failure to ensure compliance reduces public confidence and therefore enforcement of community penalties has become a key performance issue, with set targets, demanding co-operation between Probation, YOTs, Courts and Police.

There has, therefore, been a visible increase in the YOTs use of breach and enforcement processes. The annual YJB workload data for 2006/7 reports a 42% increase in cases being returned to court for breach action compared to 2003/4. The shifting emphasis in the National Standards has resulted in breach and enforcement becoming a normal part of working with young people in the youth justice system rather than the exception. Furthermore it is seen by YOTs as an opportunity to maintain credibility with sentencers, reassure them of the YOTs commitment to justice, and a demonstration of their trustworthiness to deliver justice (Moore, 2005). This has affected court outcomes and there is a correlating increase in custody rates as the level of breach action has increased; The Howard League for Penal Reform now reports that England and Wales has more children and young people locked up as a result of breaching community orders than are imprisoned for burglary offences. This attitude that breach and the resulting punitive enforcement is evidence of YOTs credibility is incomprehensible to some academics:

Youth Justice Practitioners have to reject the entirely fallacious argument that ‘credibility’ with the sentencers depends entirely upon the ability to parade failure before them as quickly and as often as possible (Haines and Drakeford, 1998:130).

Furthermore, there is a clear lack of interest in the use of revocation on the grounds of good progress. Such revocation does not fit in with the current political climate and as such YOTs are not measured on their performance with regard to revocation. It is, therefore, plausible that as revocation is not a measured target, YOTs have simply not prioritised it and as such the practice has become sidelined in favour of breach action. The use of this area of legislation could achieve considerably more credibility with sentencers and increase magistrates’ confidence in YOTs service provision than any amount of enforcement. Revocation on the grounds of good progress by its very name is actively demonstrating to the court the successful progress made by a young person and consequently the suitability and appropriateness of the intervention delivered by the YOT. However, anecdotally this appears to have become virtually non existent within court culture and practice. Academically there is little written or researched on the potential impact on practice for either courts, YOTs or young people.

**Challenging “the Same Hymn Sheet” Culture**

There is, therefore, the need to develop practice in which YOTs do not sing from the same hymn sheet as the other court personnel, but instead operate independently with confidence
and integrity within the court room. This will take considerable, but not insurmountable effort due to the challenge of altering local court culture whilst remaining an active and respected participant. The importance of achieving trust based upon a mutual understanding and respect between the two perspectives of YOTs and magistrates cannot be overestimated. Cross et al (2002) write of Haines and Drakeford’s (1998) advocacy of a child first philosophy, where the basic principle of youth justice practice should be the recognition that all young offenders are children first. This is not an unusual phenomenon; countries such as Belgium or Finland, operate youth justice systems in which the primary focus is on meeting children’s needs rather than punitive responsibilisation (Goldson and Muncie, 2006; Pitts and Kuula, 2005). Furthermore they place investment in health care and social services rather than developing penal institutions. This is due to the belief that this is more likely to deliver positive outcomes without any sacrifice to public safety and consequently Finland has a very low custody rate of between 50 to 100 custodial sentences per year for under young people under 18 years (Lappi-Seppala, 2006). With regards to the youth courts in Belgium the children’s needs principle is in evidence as only protective measures can be imposed, there being no criminal sanctions (Put and Walgrave, 2006). There is a growing body of research (McGrath, 2009 and McNeill and Batchelor, 2002) showing that how a young person perceives their intervention is critical to whether or not it has a positive impact on their future behaviour. Young people who believed the sentences given to them would stop them engaging in criminal activity were less likely to offend. Furthermore McGrath’s (2009) research found that more severe punishments did not equate with greater deterrence and that stigmatising experiences in court tended to exacerbate subsequent offending by young people. Thus, the child focused decisions at court had a longer lasting, more positive impact than decisions based upon political or public need.

A child centred focus also allows children’s rights to begin to emerge. These have long been not only ignored, but violated, in the youth justice system (Munice, 2009). In 2008 each of the four Children’s Commissioners for the UK submitted reports to the United Nations outlining where Britain is continuing to violate the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child despite signing up to it in 1991. Most of these violations concern the criminalisation of young people and their receipt of inhuman and degrading treatment. Goldson and Muncie (2006) argue that justice should be provided within a child appropriate context, of proportionate intensity and duration of the offence and likely to produce positive outcomes for the young person and their victim. Where this is recognised, there are arguably better results for young people from their court experiences and consequently for their future behaviour. This is conversely supported by the well evidenced, recognisable and damaging consequences of incarceration on a child’s well-being and potential to cease offending (Goldson, 2005; Goldson, 2006; Muncie, 2009). This suggests that those courts which operate independently and focus on the young persons’ needs and rights rather than pressures such as public confidence, the more punitive outcomes favoured by political expectations, the existing court culture or the set targets, are more likely to be successful in the young persons’ rehabilitation and by consequence the communities in which they live.
Magistrates and YOTs operating independently, but with confidence in each other within the courtroom, provide the possibility to reduce the impact of the other influences within the courtroom. In effect establishing confidence between YOTs and magistrates has the potential to be so powerful as to supersede influences such as targets or sentencing guidelines. For example it is recognised that the Sentencing Guidelines are an influence within the decision making process, however the magistrates have discretion within the guidelines. Magistrates who are confident of their YOTs service provision could be persuaded of the justification to divert from those guidelines. A young person having committed a knife point robbery, would under the sentencing guidelines, be considered for a custodial penalty. A diversion from this course might be justified if the magistrates were aware of and confident in the YOT provision of a community based robbery programme. Sentencing is a collaborative process (Travers, 2007) and as such, with the development of confidence which is independent rather than collusive, there is room to develop a respectful collaboration and alter existing court cultures.

**Conclusion**

However, no amount of confidence or trust between magistrates and YOTs will matter if YOTs are not clear about their identity and purpose. As has been noted there can be confidence between the two parties, but if this is based on YOTs predicting magistrates’ decisions and tempering their proposals and practice in anticipation of magistrates’ decisions (Bateman, 2005) then the current court cultures will merely continue the existing practice. To gain better outcomes for young people, i.e. outcomes which are proportionate, non-damaging and worthwhile for the young person there will, by necessity, need to be a tension between magistrates and YOTs as each will be independent within their roles. However, if YOTs have confidence in magistrates’ decision making and magistrates in turn are confident in YOT service provision, there will be room to challenge each other to allow a child focused approach to emerge.

How the current court cultures can be successfully challenged to allow a long lasting, respectful, but independent working relationship between YOTs and magistrates is a matter for further research. However, it is likely to involve YOTs exploring their motivations and purpose; recognising that the cultures they are working within, be that court cultures or the wider political arena, can affect their identities and their practice. The continued reliance on processes such as national standards, enforcement and performance management have as Eadie and Canton (2002) state eroded the discretion of youth justice practitioners. By default this has allowed the child focused value base evident in youth justice prior to the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act to take second place to a process culture, which has influenced court practice.

**References**

Children and Young People Now. 2-8 April 2009
CJSSS (2008) Criminal Justice System Business Plan 2007-08, Crown Copyright
Done, F. (2008) Youth Justice News July 08
Fasselfelt, J. (2008) Youth Justice News July 08


Muncie, J. (2008) The “Punitive Turn” in Youth Justice cultures of control and rights of compliance in Western Europe and the USA. Youth Justice 2008;8;107


Nacro Cymru (2003) Pre-sentence reports for young people sentenced to custody: A Welsh review. Nacro Cymru Youth Offending Unit

Nacro (2000) Proportionality in the Youth Justice System. Youth Crime Section


