

# **‘London Reducing Reoffending Programme’ Evaluation**

**ICF GHK with Sheffield Hallam University and Manchester Metropolitan  
University**

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## Executive Summary

The 'London Reducing Reoffending Programme' (LRRP) was an innovative Payment by Results (PbR) programme that aimed to reduce youth reoffending in London. It was co-ordinated by the London Criminal Justice Partnership (LCJP)<sup>1</sup> and funded by the London Development Agency (LDA),<sup>2</sup> using match-funding from the European Social Fund (ESF). It began in April 2010 and ended in March 2012. ICF GHK led a partnership with Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) and Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) that was commissioned by LCJP in September 2011 to evaluate LRRP.

### The Evaluation of the London Reducing Reoffending Programme (LRRP)

The evaluation involved extensive qualitative fieldwork with stakeholders from across the programme, including young offenders themselves. In total 185 interviews were conducted including 93 with young offenders participating in the programme. A proven re-offending study was conducted to explore whether a cohort of young people supported by LRRP had a conviction recorded in the twelve months since joining the programme. It compares the twelve months before the cohort of young people joined the programme with the twelve months after they joined, whether or not these participants were in custody or in the community at the time of registration. 'DIESEL'<sup>3</sup> is the database developed for performance management of the ESF programme by the LDA and provides information about the young people engaged by LRRP; Police National Computer (PNC) data provides data about the number and type of convictions recorded for those young people.

The cohort of young people for this study is all of those registered with LRRP from the inception of the programme in April 2010 to the end of October 2010. This is so a period of twelve months, plus six months for any convictions to be processed within the criminal justice system, can be analysed. This is the standard approach to the period of time to consider in studies of re-conviction carried out by the MoJ and Home Office. But we have not been able to take account of when any participants were released from custody when we know they served a custodial sentence, due to limitations of the data available to the evaluation. This is an important caveat in the analysis that means it does not meet the other elements of what would be expected in a standard approach. Although the analysis provides the strongest approach possible with the available data, in addition to the caveat relating to missing custody release data the approach also means that no young offenders who engaged with LRRP from October 2010 – and as the programme matured – are included. To include all programme participants would require an analysis beginning in 2014 (to enable the twelve plus six months for all). Thus there are two very important caveats to consider when drawing conclusions from the analysis.

There is also no counterfactual or comparison group for the evaluation. This is because LRRP was pan-London in approach and therefore there was not geographical targeting to enable within London comparisons to be identified. It was not feasible to seek the engagement of areas outside of London within the resources available to the evaluation (with time and commitment required from other authorities) and the initial timescale for analysis and reporting.

The evaluation also includes: the analysis of DIESEL data; a self-assessment survey; and data from the assessment tools used with young offenders (ASSET for those aged up to 17 years and OASys for those aged 18 years and over). These latter two elements are not included in this summary due to low numbers of cases.

The evaluation was structured using a programme theory, or 'theory of change' approach. It was peer reviewed by academic experts.

### The London Reducing Reoffending Programme (LRRP)

LRRP consisted of three strands ('specifications'), each targeting a different group of young offenders aged 15-19 years. The specifications each aimed to provide holistic, personalised and responsive

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<sup>1</sup> LCJP bring together agencies from across London to coordinate criminal justice services.

<sup>2</sup> In April 2012 the LDA ceased to operate and key functions were transferred to the Greater London Authority (GLA).

<sup>3</sup> Direct Input Entry System ESF LDA

resettlement support to young offenders as they came to the end of community or custodial sentences. Resettlement Brokers assessed, action-planned and supported young people to engage with a range of services towards and into sustained education, training and employment (ETE). The model of resettlement provision was developed from an evidence base that highlights how supporting young offenders into ETE reduces their reoffending. A single worker providing holistic support is shown to be an effective model in supporting young offenders into ETE.

Each specification targeted a different group of young offenders.

ESF Prospectus Specification	Target group
2	Young male offenders aged 15-19 serving custodial sentences (later amended to include those serving community sentences).
3	Young female offenders serving custodial sentences (later amended to include those serving community sentences).
4	Male and female young offenders aged 18 and 19 under the supervision of London Probation and those who had completed community sentences of less than 12 months and who are not receiving any support.

## Payment by Results

A 'Payment by Results' (PbR) approach structured the LRRP. Specifications were delivered by lead providers working in partnership with others. Two of the specifications were designed to be split between two lead providers. One specification had a sole provider. Three providers (Catch 22, Nacro, St. Giles) came from the voluntary and community sector (VCS), one was a statutory agency (London Probation Trust) and one came from the private sector (Serco). St Giles withdrew from their contract shortly after the evaluation began. The LCJP developed a governance structure for the programme on behalf of the LDA.

Achievement	Definition	Percentage of payment
Contract signing	To contribute to set-up costs	10%
Starts	Payment for each young person entering specification support	15%
Progression	Young people taking part in positive activities and skills-based provision (outputs)	25%
Entries	Young people entering education, training or employment (outputs)	20%
Outcomes	Young people entering sustained – defined as being continual for six months <sup>4</sup> – education, training or employment	30%

Following the initial commissioning, each provider was given an opportunity to re-profile their contracted outputs and outcomes, taking into account delays in finalising and signing contracts following the general election of May 2010. After contracts had been awarded, revisions to the profiles and delivery models were also required due to changes in sentencing practice that meant that there were fewer young offenders being placed in custody and more being given community sentences ('community orders'). In response to the lower numbers in custody, targeting was broadened to enable providers to recruit more young offenders serving community orders and under YOT supervision. As two specifications were split between different providers, different geographies were identified for each to supplement the division of YOIs between them. Targeting young offenders in both settings brought challenges.

<sup>4</sup> This did not have to be with a single placement. 'Continual' was defined as for 20 of 26 weeks at the tracking date six months after entry to ETE.

## The Support Pathway

Across all specifications the pathway to ETE outcomes that the Resettlement Broker role supported was:

- **Start** – following referral from a YOT, London Probation or within the YOI an initial meeting introduced the specification and support available. Participation was voluntary. If the young person wanted to engage, an assessment was undertaken and an action plan agreed.
- **Positive activities** – the young people were supported to access community-based positive activities. These were sometimes leisure based but most often had a low level skills or learning element. They were tailored to the young person's interests and their action plan. In custody, a course was provided to engage and provide skills for the young person.
- **Skills development** – in parallel, each young person then attended skills development training, culminating in the award of a formal, recognised qualification. The training was either a full Skills for Life qualification at pre-entry or entry level; or a non-accredited course of 30 hours focused on preparation for training or employment and culminating in a certificate from the provider.
- **Entry into education, training or employment** – young people were provided with range of Resettlement Broker support to enter ETE. Specification 4 (working with 18-19 year olds) was designed to support employment only.
- **Sustained education, training or employment** – young people were then supported to sustain their education, training or employment for six months. 'Sustained' was defined as continuous for 20 of 26 weeks. So if a placement came to an end or broke down, the young person was supported into another opportunity.

## Outputs and Outcomes

- **Starts** – all providers exceeded their targets for initial engagement. They were not paid for starts above their target but increased numbers increased their chances of achieving outcomes (and the higher payments associated with them). More than a half of all individuals were drawn from black and minority ethnic (BME) groups. In total, 2389 young people were recruited, against a target of 2223.
- **Positive Activities** – providers' performance in achieving positive activity outputs ranged from 50%-78%. Overall, 61% of all starts achieved this.
- **Skills Development** – providers' performance ranged from 40%-73%. Overall, 53% of all starts achieved this.
- **Education and Training** – providers' performance ranged from 12% to 17% of all starts entering ETE; of these 23%-58% of entries were sustained as outcomes. Overall, 15% of starts achieved entry and of these more than 50% were sustained for six months. Education and Training was only a target for those of compulsory education age and the programme prioritised employment. The lowest rates were achieved for young female offenders, who were reported to face particularly complex barriers to engagement.
- **Employment** – providers' performance ranged from 11%-33%, with a total of 16% of starts to the programme overall and 33% of these sustained for six months.

When considering the proportions of starts who achieved entry to and sustained ETE it should be noted that these proportions were expected in the design of LRRP, with targets for each stage of the progression pathway reflecting the expected difficulties in successfully supporting this challenging group of young people along each stage and into sustained ETE. Targets for sustained ETE were around a fifth of the targets for starts, apart from Specification 3 following revisions in light of early delivery challenges. Rates for entry almost achieved targets. Lower numbers achieved sustained ETE, although these have improved since the evaluation ended.<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, the job-entry rates achieved by the programme compare favourably with comparative data for young people leaving custody.

<sup>5</sup> Following the completion of the evaluation and analysis further data has been provided by LDA and this shows that conversion rates from entries to sustained have changed to: Catch 22, 21%; Nacro, 86%; Serco, 15%, LPT, 55%. This suggests that as the programme matured providers were placing and supporting young people more effectively. Nacro and Serco both had their contracts extended and achieved higher outputs and outcomes, which are noted in the report.

## Proven Re-offending Analysis

There are important caveats that must be borne in mind when considering the findings of this analysis (outlined above and discussed in full in the report).

The analysis shows that across the cohort of 518 young people, 217 re-offended in the 12 months after registration with LRRP. **This gives a statistically significant re-offending rate of 41.9%.** This represents a statistically significant percentage reduction in offending of 41.2%. There was also **a statistically significant reduction in the number of offences committed of more than 50%.** There was a statistically significant re-offending rate of 50.8% for those serving community sentences and 70.9% for those serving custodial sentences. The analysis also shows **a statistically significant relationship between the achievement of ETE outcomes and the likelihood of being reconvicted after starting the programme.**

There are a range of different sources that offer broad comparison with the results of the proven re-offending analysis presented here. These sources take account of custody release data, which is not available for this evaluation, and have much higher numbers in their cohorts making the results much more robust.

The latest published proven re-offending rate from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) for young people (aged 17 and under; LRRP supported 19 years and under) released from custody from July 2010 to June 2011 is 72.7%. For Youth Community Penalties and Youth Rehabilitation Orders who re-offend it is 65.9%.<sup>6</sup> Although the LRRP analysis compares favourably with these rates, the differences are small for custodial settings.

## Themes of Effective Practice

*“Without [Resettlement Broker] I probably would have messed up a long time ago.”*

- **Resettlement Brokers** – the role of the Resettlement Broker was central to LRRP’s design. There were two elements: they supported young offenders during and after their sentence towards sustained ETE outcomes; and they liaised with local partners to gain referrals and broker packages of support. In practice, Resettlement Brokers fulfilled a demanding and multi-faceted role, requiring a range of skills and a flexible, responsive approach. They were central to the achievement of all outputs and outcomes.
- **Positive Activities** – positive activities were more likely to be completed if they were tailored to the needs of the young person and clearly linked to their individual action plan and thus engaging and relevant. Nonetheless, a great deal of support can be required to ensure that it is both accessed and completed.
- **Skills Development** – the most popular courses were reported to be those that were directly related to employment. Important aspects of effective provision were its informal, engaging nature which was often described as being in contrast to previous education or training experiences and perceptions of these.
- **Employer Engagement** – was essential to securing employment opportunities for the young people participating in LRRP. It was time consuming and required dedicated roles and resources for consistent success. The engagement identified opportunities and promoted the cohort of young people as motivated and supported to succeed.
- **Supporting Education Training and Employment** – a high level of support was provided to young people to enable them to apply for and secure employment. The Resettlement Broker model ensured that bespoke, responsive and often intensive practical and emotional support was provided. Sustained education and training was supported in the same way
- **Partnership Working** – effective partnership working was key to delivery of LRRP outputs and outcomes. All of the providers had worked to establish partnerships as part of their tender for their specification and the model they devised. There were difficulties establishing and maintaining some partnerships. In part this was related to the need to negotiate or amend partnerships at short notice. Partnership working was required amongst the providers and the governance

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Justice (2013) *Proven Re-offending Statistics Quarterly Bulletin, July 2010 to June 2011, England and Wales*, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/192631/proven-reoffending-jul-10-jun-11.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192631/proven-reoffending-jul-10-jun-11.pdf), Table 18b



provided, particularly once LCJP had put additional structures in place, supported and facilitated this.

- **Payment by Results** - The PbR model for LRRP was challenging and complex. It provided a great deal of learning for all involved. Despite initial difficulties, providers and strategic stakeholders were positive it. The exception was St Giles who withdrew from their contracts. Expectations around payment linked to PbR were not met for some partners and they were also less positive.

All of the providers welcomed the flexibility afforded to them in how targets were met. There were two areas of concern for them. First, the targets proved to be extremely challenging for delivery due to the data that was used to develop the specifications. Second, the interim output payments and demands in achieving 'sustained' outcomes lead some providers to consider that they were insufficiently rewarded for the work required to support young people.

The PbR focused providers on achieving the defined outcomes and for LDA it ensured that only strong performance was rewarded. The use of PbR was innovative and all stakeholders worked hard to make the programme a success and to learn together from the experience of the programme.

## Conclusions

- Providers successfully recruited young offenders to the programme and most achieved outputs including ETE entry that were broadly in line with targets set in expectation of performance.
- Providers were less successful in meeting targets for sustained ETE. Nonetheless, the job entry rates achieved compare favourably with those achieved by mainstream provision and benchmarks for sustained employment are not available.
- A proven re-offending analysis was undertaken. It has important caveats that mean caution must be used in interpreting the results. It suggests that LRRP was successful in reducing reoffending.
- The reconviction analysis demonstrates that the achievement of ETE was an important factor in reducing reoffending across the programme.
- The evaluation also included an estimation of the economic impact of the programme. This indicates that significant savings have been provided to the public purse and the programme provided value for money.
- The programme provided strategic learning about the importance of joint and coordinated work in London to support young offenders.

## Recommendations

- The Resettlement Broker model should be central to supporting young offenders towards and into ETE and provide on-going support to sustain outcomes. This model of provision prevents re-offending and is cost effective.
- When providing a Resettlement Broker model of support, caseloads should be carefully managed and extra aspects of brokers' roles limited so that other necessary elements, such as partnership development and job brokerage do not limit the capacity for supporting young offenders.
- The GLA and other agencies should consider how coordinated packages of support can be provided that are appropriate to individuals' needs.
- In designing PbR for reduced reoffending, a wide range of partners must be consulted in design, so that the challenges of young offenders' progression pathways are sufficiently recognised within the model of payments for outputs and outcomes.
- In designing PbR the pathway towards final outcomes should be carefully considered so that it recognises the work required to achieve them without removing incentives and rewarding outputs over outcomes.
- When commissioning using PbR, sufficient resources must be dedicated to contract and performance management. There is a great deal of work in the early stages, especially when PbR is new to commissioners and/or providers. But there is also on-going work to manage and audit the process.
- PbR is an effective tool for managing performance and driving a focus on outcomes. Because of this, there can be underspend. Considerations of how to reinvest underspend from budgets should be included from the beginning of PbR design. If the contract fails then outcomes will not be delivered, with the potential for unmet need.



# 1 Introduction

Five projects within Specifications 2, 3 and 4 of the '*London Development Agency European Social Fund Co-financing Programme 2007-2013 Youth Prospectus*' were known collectively as the 'London Reducing Reoffending Programme' (LRRP). LRRP was an innovative *Payment by Results* programme that aimed to reduce youth reoffending in London. It was co-ordinated by the London Criminal Justice Partnership (LCJP)<sup>7</sup> and funded by the London Development Agency (LDA),<sup>8</sup> using match-funding from the European Social Fund (ESF). It began in April 2010 and ended in March 2012.

ICF GHK led a partnership with Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) and Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) that was commissioned by LCJP in September 2011 to evaluate LRRP.

This report provides the final evaluation of the programme. It draws on the analysis of qualitative data from extensive fieldwork with programme participants and stakeholders and quantitative data from programme monitoring and performance management. It includes a reconviction study undertaken to Ministry of Justice standards and an economic impact analysis.

## 1.1 The London Reducing Reoffending Programme (LRRP)

LRRP consisted of three strands ('specifications'), each targeting a different group of young offenders aged 15-19 years. The specifications each aimed to provide holistic, personalised and responsive resettlement support to young offenders as they came to the end of community or custodial sentences. Resettlement Brokers assessed, action-planned and supported young people to engage with a range of services towards and into sustained education, training and employment (ETE). LRRP was part of a wider ESF co-funded programme of six specifications targeting young people in London: the European Social Fund Co-financing Programme 2007-2013 Youth Prospectus. LRRP was specifications two, three and four.

A 'Payment by Results' (PbR) approach structured the LRRP, with providers paid for the achievement of outputs and outcomes. Specifications were delivered by lead providers working in partnership with others. Two of the specifications were designed to be split between two lead providers. One specification had a sole provider. Three providers (Catch 22, Nacro, St. Giles) came from the voluntary and community sector (VCS), one was a statutory agency (London Probation Trust) and one came from the private sector (Serco). St Giles withdrew from their contract shortly after the evaluation began.

LCJP developed a governance structure for the programme on behalf of the LDA, with a programme board providing strategic overview and direction and sub-groups providing an operational focus. The LDA provided procurement and contract management, paying providers in line with their results and targets.

Section 2 provides more detail about the programme including the PbR approach.

## 1.2 The evaluation of LRRP

A set of research questions was specified for the evaluation (Annex 1). These can be summarised as:

- What are the outcomes and impacts of the programme?
- What are the features of the programme that are successful (and what are the barriers to success)?
- What are the views of participants and stakeholders?

<sup>7</sup> LCJP bring together agencies from across London to coordinate criminal justice services.

<sup>8</sup> In April 2012 the LDA ceased to operate and key functions were transferred to the Greater London Authority (GLA).

■ Is the PbR model effective?

Following an initial scoping stage to refine the evaluation, which involved the review of programme documentation and discussions with key stakeholders, these questions have been explored through a range of research and evaluation activities. They are returned to in the conclusion of this report (section 3).

### 1.2.1 Qualitative fieldwork

An extensive programme of qualitative fieldwork was undertaken from November 2011 to April 2012. Table 1.1 presents the number of participants from each specification by each of five stakeholder groups identified to organise the research. Individual interviews were undertaken, unless otherwise stated.

**Table 1.1 Evaluation fieldwork participants**

Stakeholder Group	Specification Two: Catch 22	Specification Two: Nacro	Specification Three: Serco	Specification Four: London Probation Trust	Specification Four: St Giles	Total
Delivery staff- Resettlement Brokers and those managing delivery.	6	9	7	8	5	35
Delivery partners – staff from organisations working with lead providers.	11	12	5	2	3	33
Participants – the young offenders engaged by the specifications	27 <sup>9</sup>	32	15 <sup>10</sup>	16	3	93
Families – the parent(s)	1	3	2	0	0	6
Employers	3	0	2	2	0	7
Programme Board	-	-	-	-	-	11
<b>Total</b>						<b>185</b>

Numbers are lower for Specification 4 St Giles as this provider withdrew from their contract shortly after the evaluation began (see 2.3.2).

The evaluation team found it difficult to engage employers. They did not see participating in the evaluation as a priority or as relevant to them; many said they were simply too busy or that they did not wish to participate. There were also difficulties engaging families. Some young people's relationships with their families had broken down and this was an issue being addressed through programme support. Others lived independently from their families. As a result, many parents did not see engaging with the evaluation as something that was relevant to them. Otherwise, engagement across the different groups was broadly in line with targets. All participation was voluntary.

### 1.2.2 Proven re-offending study

The central aim of LRRP was to reduce reoffending by young offenders through the achievement of sustained employment, education and training for participants. The evaluation includes a study of programme participants' 'proven re-offending' – an analysis of data relating to participants' reconviction for a crime following their registration with the programme. Full details of the study are provided in 3.5.

The analysis explores whether a cohort of young people supported by LRRP had a conviction recorded in the twelve months since joining the programme. It compares the

<sup>9</sup> There were 12 individual interviews and focus groups with a total of 15 participants

<sup>10</sup> There were 8 individual interviews and a focus group with 7 participants

twelve months before the cohort of young people joined the programme with the twelve months after they joined, whether or not these participants were in custody or in the community at the time of registration. 'DIESEL'<sup>11</sup> is the database developed for performance management of the ESF programme by the LDA and provides information about the young people engaged by LRRP; Police National Computer (PNC) data provides data about the number and type of convictions recorded for those young people.

The cohort of young people for this study is all of those registered with LRRP from the inception of the programme in April 2010 to the end of October 2010. This is so a period of twelve months, plus six months for any convictions to be processed within the criminal justice system, can be analysed. This is the standard approach to the period of time to consider in studies of re-conviction carried out by the MoJ and Home Office. But we have not been able to take account of when any participants were released from custody due to limitations of the data available to the evaluation. This is an important caveat in the analysis that means it does not meet the other elements of what would be expected in a standard approach. This is discussed further at 3.5 and in full in Annex 2. The cohort of young people in the study is 579 offenders and compares the period twelve months before *registration with* LRRP with the period twelve months after *registration*. All convictions recorded on the PNC are included, including both cautions and court sentences, but excludes breaches of civil orders and recalls to custody.

Although the analysis provides the strongest approach possible with the available data, in addition to the caveat relating to missing custody release data the approach also means that no young offenders who engaged with LRRP from October 2010 – and as the programme matured – are included. To include all programme participants would require an analysis beginning in 2014 (to enable the twelve plus six months for all). Thus there are two very important caveats to consider when drawing conclusions from the analysis. It also means that the rates for participants in the programme once it had reached a level of maturity and overcome initial differences were not included.

There is also no counterfactual or comparison group for the evaluation. This is because LRRP was pan-London in approach and therefore there was not geographical targeting to enable within London comparisons to be identified. It was not feasible to seek the engagement of areas outside of London within the resources available to the evaluation (with time and commitment required from other authorities) and the initial timescale for analysis and reporting.

### 1.2.3 Establishing education, training and employment (ETE) outcomes

The evaluation has undertaken extensive analysis of the performance management and monitoring data collected by the LDA. The data was collected and collated within the DIESEL management tool. DIESEL contains data about programme participants and about the outputs and outcomes required by the PbR model. The evaluation has benefited from being able to report after the end of LRRP and therefore to include full and final outcomes contained within DIESEL.

The evaluation also includes an analysis of the distance travelled by programme participants, using data from the assessment tools used with young offenders (ASSET for those aged up to 17 years and OASys for those aged 18 years and over).<sup>12</sup> This data was gathered for the proven re-offending study cohort to supplement that analysis. It was not sought for all participants due to the burden that this placed on Youth Offending Teams. Data was requested:

- 'Before' – at the point closest to the participant registering with the programme; and
- 'Later' – at the point closest to the participant exiting the programme.

The data obtained for this element was partial. Of 321 requests made for data relating to young offenders within ASSET, 158 were returned and 36 of these were partial. For those

<sup>11</sup> Direct Input Entry System ESF LDA

<sup>12</sup> Each tool provides a common assessment framework for that age group. ASSET is the tool for all young offenders; OASys for all adult offenders (those aged 18 years and above).

young offenders within OASys, data was requested for 186 cases and 184 were provided. The evaluation did not include a comparison group design. Improvement across these assessments would be expected. Annex 2 provides more detail on the collection of this data.

Because of this and the difficulties expected with accessing ASSET and OASys data, programme participants were asked to complete a simple self-assessment survey. 39 agreed and completed the survey.

These latter two approaches supplement the DIESEL data, as an attempt to provide as fuller understanding as possible. In particular, the two distance travelled elements explore dimensions of criminogenic need and to provide a fuller analysis of these factors in relation to the rates of reconviction explored in that analysis.<sup>13</sup>

All data was provided with participants' consent and securely transferred and stored.

#### 1.2.4 Economic impact analysis

Understandings from the qualitative research and the outcomes analysis informed an economic analysis. Data about the costs associated with offending (and thus the savings from reduced reoffending), the value of qualifications and the savings to the state from the move away from NEET status were used to identify the savings to the public sector from the LRRP investment. The qualitative work informed the rationale for each of the assumptions that are necessary when estimating the contribution of the programme to different impacts.

#### 1.2.5 A programme theory approach

The evaluation was structured using a programme theory approach. 'Programme theory evaluation' has become the dominant approach to evaluation in the US, the UK and Europe. It is used by the UN and a range of agencies supporting development programmes across the globe. The government's guide to policy and programme evaluation recommends this approach is used.<sup>14</sup> These approaches each entail:

- Evaluation activity that identifies the *theory* (or '*theory of change*') inherent in a programme ... which involves establishing
- *What* has been put in place, in order to achieve the *outcomes* that are intended, and *why* these activities are expected to achieve these outcomes for this *target group* and in this (policy and practice) *context* ... and then uses
- A logic model that makes explicit this theory and the way in which the programme is structured.

For the LRRP evaluation this approach involved:

- Undertaking a scoping stage that reviewed programme documentation and holding discussions with key stakeholders;
- Developing initial logic models for each specification and a detailed narrative to accompany it, providing detail of the way in which the programme was designed to operate (the theory);
- Exploring the key features and their rationale for each specification and for the programme overall through the evaluation design;

<sup>13</sup> Criminogenic needs are the risk factors that research has established as relating to adult and youth offending and re-offending. They include both attitudinal – for instance their attitudes to their own offending, perceptions and self-esteem – and situational – such as levels of education, employment status and history. Criminogenic needs at the heart of Ministry of Justice approaches to working with offenders (see <http://www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/before-after-release/obp> for an example). This understanding is also at the heart of both ASSET (Youth Justice Board) and OASys (Ministry of Justice) approaches to assessing and supporting offenders (see <http://www.justice.gov.uk/youth-justice/assessment>).

<sup>14</sup> See HM Treasury (2011) *The Magenta Book*, London: HM Treasury p.21; [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/magenta\\_book\\_combined.pdf](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/magenta_book_combined.pdf)

- Developing final logic models and accompanying narratives that draw on both qualitative and quantitative data analysis to understand the processes behind the achievement of outputs and outcomes and to identify learning for models of effective practice.

This detailed understanding then acts as a source to inform the evaluation.

### **1.3 The structure of this report**

This report provides the final analysis, conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation of the LRRP. It is structured by the following sections:

- Section 2 provides some background to LRRP and an overview of the three specifications, including a logic model for each;
- Section 3 explores the outputs and outcomes achieved by LRRP;
- Section 4 explores the themes of effective practice that emerge;
- Section 5 discusses the conclusions from the evaluation and the implications for future policy and practice.

## 2 London Reducing Reoffending Programme (LRRP)

This section provides the background to LRRP and an outline of the programme. A short review discusses the evidence base and the context for LRRP. Logic models are provided for the programme each of the three specifications. They show how the programme was structured and what each achieved. A narrative provides additional detail of the way in which each specification operated. The outcomes achieved are discussed fully in section 3

### 2.1 Background to the programme

LRRP was part of a broader programme that aimed to support disadvantaged young people across London. In November 2008 the Mayor of London published '*Time for Action*',<sup>15</sup> which identified a wide range of actions for partners from across London to reduce youth crime and address youth violence by '*equipping young people for the future*' through education, positive activities and training and employment support. Employment is a key factor in reducing reoffending.

In response, the London Development Agency (LDA) developed a co-financed programme, match-funding ESF (European Social Fund) funding; the ESF Co-financing Programme 2007-2013 Youth Prospectus. There were six strands (specifications) within the programme; the European Social Fund Co-financing Programme 2007-2013 Youth Prospectus. Four specifications focused upon young offenders. LRRP consists of three of these specifications. The other is 'Project Daedalus', which is a key element of *Time for Action* and is subject to its own evaluation.<sup>16</sup> The remaining two specifications focused upon a broader group of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET). The young offenders targeted by LRRP were all NEET.

A 'prospectus' set out the requirements of the six specifications and invited proposals for funding invited. Providers' proposals were expected to involve a range of partners including local community and voluntary sector groups as well as mainstream agencies. Proposals led by the voluntary and community sector were encouraged. Two of the three LRRP specifications were expected to be delivered by more than one contracted provider.

LRRP consists of three strands ('specifications'), presented in Table 2.1.

**Table 2.1 The three strands of LRRP**

ESF Prospectus Specification	Target group
2	Young male offenders aged 15-19 serving custodial sentences (later amended to include those serving community sentences).
3	Young female offenders serving custodial sentences (later amended to include those serving community sentences).
4	Male and female young offenders aged 18 and 19 under the supervision of London Probation and those who had completed sentences of less than 12 months and who are not receiving any support.

#### 2.1.2 Education, training and employment

The ESF funding utilised by the LDA for the prospectus was from the 2007-2013 Regional Framework Priority 1.2.<sup>17</sup> This priority aims to increase the rate and quality of economic participation of London's young people. Achieving education, training and employment (ETE) outcomes for young people was the central aim of LRRP. The specifications emphasised the importance of sustained ETE outcomes for this group of "*hard to reach*" young people. Targets were set for outputs that were part of the progression towards these

<sup>15</sup> For more information, see <http://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/crime-community-safety/tackling-priority-crimes/tackling-youth-violence>

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/LYRRP%20\(Daedalus\)\\_Final%20Report\\_1.pdf](http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/LYRRP%20(Daedalus)_Final%20Report_1.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> The London ESF Regional Framework (<http://www.london.gov.uk/esf/regional-framework>) addresses the priorities in the national ESF Programme and sets the strategic direction for the London ESF Programme.



outcomes: 'positive activities' which were intended to engage the young person and provide constructive opportunities; and 'skills development' activities that were expected contribute to increased employability.

Each specification was expected to provide flexible, intensive support to engage young people and to tackle the multiple barriers that they face in achieving ETE outcomes. Employer engagement was also expected, to include job brokerage and support that was tailored to opportunities within the labour market.

### 2.1.3 Resettlement Brokers

Each of the four specifications targeting young offenders (Daedalus and the three that are LRRP) were required to provide Resettlement Broker support as key to their delivery model. The aim was to provide holistic support that was personalised, responsive and intensive. Resettlement Brokers were expected to assess, action plan and support young people to engage with a range of provision towards and into sustained education, training or (primarily, for those aged over 16 but not for those below) employment (ETE). A model of Resettlement Broker support was thus central to each specification – although not all participants were 'resettled' from custody, they were all supported in this holistic way (see 2.2 below for a discussion of the evidence base).

### 2.1.4 Payment by Results

All of the specifications were commissioned using a 'Payment by Results' (PbR) model. This model splits the way in which payment is made so that it is linked to the achievement of outputs and outcomes. Initial start-up costs are supported by an advance payment, with the remaining funding linked to outputs and outcomes. To emphasise their importance over outputs, the highest proportions of funding are linked to the achievement of outcomes.

PbR is an innovative model, emerging across the public sector, which is intended to incentivise providers and ensure more responsive, tailored services and greater value for money.<sup>18</sup> This is in contrast to traditional grant funding models where payment is made regardless of performance. Table 2.2 presents the way in which the PbR was structured for LRRP.

**Table 2.2 The structure of the LRRP PbR**

Achievement	Definition	Percentage of payment
Contract signing	To contribute to set-up costs	10%
Starts	Payment for each young person entering specification support	15%
Progression	Young people taking part in positive activities and skills-based provision (outputs)	25%
Entries	Young people entering education, training or employment (outputs)	20%
Outcomes	Young people entering sustained – defined as being continual for six months <sup>19</sup> – education, training or employment	30%

## 2.2 The evidence base

The centrality of education, employment and training as a factor in young people's offending and reoffending is well established.<sup>20</sup> The Audit Commission (2010) found that young

<sup>18</sup> HM Government (2012) *Open Public Services*, London: Cabinet Office  
[http://files.openpublicservices.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/HMG\\_OpenPublicServices\\_web.pdf](http://files.openpublicservices.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/HMG_OpenPublicServices_web.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> This did not have to be with a single placement. 'Continual' was defined as for 20 of 26 weeks at the tracking date six months after entry to ETE.



offenders are 2.6 times more likely to be NEET for six months or more compared with young people who have not been offenders.<sup>21</sup>

### 2.2.1 Supporting young offenders into ETE outcomes

Research has found that providing additional resources for the education of young offenders can lower rates of reoffending. Hurry and Moriarty (2004) report their evaluation of the Youth Justice Board's 'Education, Training and Employment Projects' (which aimed to support young offenders towards qualifications in literacy and numeracy). They found that:

*"Where students did make headway, in terms of literacy, qualifications or further training or employment, their levels of reoffending were lower than their less successful peers."*<sup>22</sup>

This remained the case across different offending histories.

### 2.2.2 A single worker providing holistic support

The 'Engaging Young People who Offend' evidence review for the Youth Justice Board (2008) found that interventions that are holistic, based on an initial assessment of the young person's needs, provide long-term engagement and have a relational basis – building trust and understanding – are essential elements of effective practice in supporting young offenders.<sup>23</sup> Other studies have highlighted:

- The importance of having a single worker who supports the young person throughout ETE interventions: *"it was one-to-one support work from their mentors and [Connexions] PAs that the young people found to be most effective in assisting them to prepare for ETE."*<sup>24</sup>
- The benefit of support delivered by staff *"less predominantly identified with the Criminal Justice System and so able to provide more mainstream support"*,<sup>25</sup> which build supportive relationships.
- How a holistic approach that takes a 'mentoring' role can support young offenders to address the multiple barriers that they face in achieving and making progress towards ETE outcomes.<sup>26</sup>
- The importance of a multi-faceted, holistic approach in addressing the factors linked to young people's offending and reoffending.<sup>27</sup>
- How young offenders themselves value such approaches: *"Most young people felt that staff encouragement and support in approaching ETE engagement had been helpful in motivating them to try new options that they may not have previously considered."*<sup>28</sup>

<sup>20</sup> For instance, see EdComs (2008) *Education, Training and Employment Source Document*, London: Youth Justice Board; YJB (2006) *Barriers to engagement in education, training and employment*, London: Youth Justice Board

<sup>21</sup> Audit Commission (2010) *Against the odds*, London: Audit Office

<sup>22</sup> Hurry, J & Moriarty, M (2004), *The National Evaluation of the Youth Justice Board's Education, Training and Employment Projects*, London: Youth Justice Board p. 5

<sup>23</sup> Adapted from Mason, P. and Prior, D. (2008), *Engaging Young People who Offend*, London: Youth Justice Board

<sup>24</sup> Cooper, K et al (2007), *Keeping Young People Engaged: Improving education, training and employment opportunities for serious and persistent young offenders*, London: Youth Justice Board p. 174

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 176

<sup>26</sup> Including: Newburn, T and Shiner, M (2005), *Dealing with Disaffection*, Oxon: Willan; YoungMinds (2006), *Making Mentoring More Effective*, London: Young Minds; Foster, J. (2006), *Entry to Employment*, London: Youth Justice Board

<sup>27</sup> Vennard, J. and Hedderman, C. (1998) 'Effective Interventions with Offenders,' in Goldblatt, P. and Lewis, C. (Eds) *Reducing Offending: an assessment of research evidence on ways of dealing with offending behaviour*, London: Home Office

<sup>28</sup> Cooper, K et al (2007), *op.cit.* p. 174

### 2.2.3 Supporting young people across transitions from custody to community

The 'Engaging Young People Who Offend' review found that times of transition – from a custodial setting to the community, or from criminal justice to mainstream provision including ETE – are identified as key stages for young offenders in evaluations of effective provision. The review suggested that supportive relationships should be sustained across transitions to ensure that young people remained engaged across interventions and packages of provision. Continual, caseworker-type support: coordinates holistic support; is responsive to issues as they emerge; and, ensures that knowledge and relationships are sustained across services and professions.<sup>29</sup>

## 2.3 Overview of LRRP

A logic model that summarises LRRP is provided below (see Figure 2.1). A logic model for each specification then follows. Here we discuss key features of the programme's governance and delivery.

### 2.3.1 Governance

The LDA was the contract manager for each specification. The LDA Project Manager monitored outputs and outcomes on a monthly basis, reviewing progress against the targets that each provider was contracted to deliver. This ensured that sufficient progress was being made both with recruitment to the programme and to the progress that young people made towards outcomes. For quality assurance, 10 % of participants' records were checked in arrears to ensure that the evidence retained by the delivery partner supported the outputs and outcomes that had been claimed. In addition, DWP's ESF Audit Authority undertakes annual checks on the LDA's ESF programme to ensure compliance with ESF requirements.

The London Criminal Justice Partnership (LCJP) brings together agencies from across London to coordinate criminal justice services. LCJP was commissioned by the LDA from the outset of Project Daedalus (Specification 1) to perform a programme coordination and governance role. In spring 2011, once delivery was underway, they were commissioned to provide a similar role for Specifications 2, 3 and 4.

LCJP extended the Project Daedalus governance to include LRRP.

- A **Programme Board** brought together all of the criminal justice agencies in London and included the Youth Justice Board, local authorities and the providers of each specification;
- An **Operations Group** brought together the different providers and provided a forum to identify and resolve issues with delivery; and
- A **Champions Group** brought together the different providers with leads from different agencies to share experiences more widely and promote joint working.

### 2.3.2 Amendments to outputs and outcomes

Following the initial commissioning, each provider was given an opportunity to re-profile their contracted outputs and outcomes, taking into account delays in finalising and signing contracts following the general election of May 2010 and subsequent uncertainty around the role and budget of the LDA, and also some delivery partner start-up delays. The re-profile was particularly significant for Specification 3, as declining custody numbers had significantly affected the population of young female offenders.

After Grants had been awarded, revisions to the profiles and delivery models were also required due to changes in sentencing practice. These changes meant that there were fewer young offenders being placed in custody and more being given community sentences ('community orders'). Specifications 2 and 3 initially targeted those in custody and due to be released, although there was some scope for support to be provided in the community. In response to the lower numbers in custody, targeting was broadened to enable providers to

<sup>29</sup> Mason, P. and Prior, D. (2008) *op.cit*.pp.45-46

recruit more young offenders serving community orders and under YOT supervision than was envisaged in the design of the programme. As two specifications were split between different providers, different geographies were identified for each to supplement the division of YOIs between them. There were complex negotiations about how providers could split target areas and groups. The governance structures provided by LCJP helped to facilitate this.

One provider (St Giles) that was awarded a contract for Specification 4 and was a partner within Specification 3 withdrew late in 2011 due to difficulties achieving targets. Recruiting young offenders was split so that London Probation Trust (LPT) took referrals from London Probation and St Giles took referrals from YOIs and other non-probation service routes for over 18 year olds (such as Attendance Centres). Although St Giles had initially proposed a 'through the gates' model, working with those in custody it proved to be very difficult to recruit sufficient numbers due to the way potential recruits were dispersed and the associated time required to negotiate and establish effective referral routes. To attempt to address this issue, the probation offices of London were then divided between the two providers as sources of referral. Despite this, performance on the St Giles project did not improve and St Giles decided to withdraw due to their concerns about the economic viability of the contract for them and associated reputational risk. Young people who were already on St Giles' caseload were transferred to the continuing provider (LPT) to ensure no loss of support.

These issues are returned to in discussion about the achievement of outputs and outcomes (section 4) and the learning from the PbR model (4.8).

### 2.3.2.1 Targeting

LRRP targeted young people serving custodial (specifications 2 and 3) and community (specifications 2, 3 and 4) sentences. As outlined at 2.3.2 above, the target groups changed from the initial design subsequent to the award of contract so that those serving community sentences were included in all specifications. Targeting young offenders in both settings brought challenges.

Developing new provision within YOIs, even though providers were experienced and had the support of LDA and LCJP was time consuming. Although negotiations took place at the earliest stages of the programme, staff working within YOIs needed to be trained to enable them to operate safely and securely there.

There was difficulty in developing effective partnership working with some YOTs, who were a key source of referrals due to their role of supporting young offenders in the community. Reduced budgets and public sector reorganisation created flux for many YOTs during 2011 and 2012. Developing effective partnerships was sometimes difficult in this context. For instance, the people in key posts sometimes changed, posts themselves were sometimes subject to reorganisation or internal demands associated with reorganisation took priority over external partnerships.

### 2.3.2.2 Engaging young people

In custodial settings, Resettlement Brokers met with young offenders to discuss the benefits of being involved in the programme. An assessment was undertaken of their strengths, needs and goals for the programme. This discussion informed the development of an action plan which was agreed between the Resettlement Broker and the young person, detailing the future activities to be undertaken to move towards and into ETE.

*"I say: 'You're going to be released soon. You're going to need education, training and employment and I'm here to make that easier... to broker you into those things. I need you to want to do this and to be enthusiastic. If you don't, you don't have to sign up. But if you do you can do group work with us... I can prepare you for potentially getting a job.'"*  
(Resettlement Broker)

Some 'light touch' skills development activities were then delivered, including giving the young people information about the provider's support model and the benefits of engagement post-release. Some group work took place, discussing issues such as gang awareness. There was some employability work undertaken, including introductory work on

developing CVs and sessions exploring how young people should disclose their criminal record to prospective employers. 'Positive activities' and 'skills development' were provided to prepare young offenders for employment on their release.

In community settings, following a referral of someone serving a community order, an initial meeting and assessment was undertaken as with the custody model. Referrals were provided by YOTs or probation centres but it worked differently in different settings. Brokers and providers worked with many different people in many different settings to engage as many referrals as possible. The model for engaging participants and providing support had a common core – set out here – with differences explored throughout this report.<sup>30</sup>

### 2.3.2.3 *Supporting young people*

In the community, young people were supported through their individual action plan to address their barriers to progression to ETE outcomes. The action plan included the 'positive activities' – enrichment activity such as sports, arts, community-based activities – and 'skills development' activities – chosen to reflect the young person's interests and the barriers they faced. Skills activities could include 'tasters' of possible future ETE opportunities. This is the flexible resettlement planning and support at the heart of the Resettlement Broker role.

Across these activities, Resettlement Brokers supported young people along their action plan and towards ETE. A key activity provided was support with CVs and job applications, coaching for job interviews and practical support with attending job interviews and, if successful, work itself. Similar support was provided for education and training opportunities. The pastoral care side of the role included providing *ad hoc* practical and emotional support in response to emergent needs (such as help with problem with accommodation or providing advice in a time of relationship crisis).

### 2.3.2.4 *Employer engagement*

Each of the specifications included a job-brokerage or employer engagement function. This was undertaken by a mix of dedicated staff, Resettlement Brokers and sub-contracted partner organisations. This mixed approach took time to develop. Some providers amended their initial models to ensure a clearer and more substantive focus on this element following early difficulties in achieving employer engagement. There was learning, through the Operations Group, from early successes by Nacro who had a dedicated post for this work from the outset. Providers undertook some joint work through job fairs and other employer liaison events.

The economic downturn created a challenging context for this work. But employers were successfully recruited according to two key rationales: through their corporate social responsibility commitments (or, for construction firms, clauses in their contracts with local authorities requiring the employment of particular groups that include ex-offenders); and, through the in-work support provided by Resettlement Brokers that aimed to ensure employment was sustained.

### 2.3.2.5 *The support pathway*

Across all specifications the pathway to ETE outcomes that the Resettlement Broker role supported was:

- **Start** – following referral from a YOT, London Probation or within the YOI an initial meeting introduced the specification and support available. Participation was voluntary. If the young person wanted to engage, an assessment was undertaken and an action plan agreed.
- Providers were paid for each start. (We have data on starts but not on those referred but who did not engage).

<sup>30</sup> The programme shares a core design with the Daedalus programme, Specification 1 in the ESF Prospectus, which provided Resettlement Broker provision to young offenders in the Heron Unit which was specifically developed to provide resettlement support at HMYOI Feltham. <http://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/policing-crime/mission-priorities/project-daedalus>

- **Positive activities** – as initial steps to promote engagement and introduce the young people to learning (many of whom were likely to have been out of formal learning or employment settings for some time), they were supported to access community-based positive activities. These were provided by partner organisations and were sometimes leisure based but most often had a low level skills or learning element. They were tailored to the young person's interests and their action plan. These short activities, totalling at least seven hours, introduced time keeping, attendance and the other requirements or education and employment. In custody, a course was provided to engage and provide skills for the young person.

Providers were paid for each young person who completed seven hours of positive activities.

- **Skills development** – in parallel, each young person then attended skills development training, culminating in the award of a formal, recognised qualification – Skills for Life Level 1 or 2. These were provided in community settings, by partner organisations contracted by lead providers – except for Catch 22's Specification 2 model, where an in-house programme was developed and delivered. Resettlement Brokers supported young people to access and attend their course.

The training was either a full Skills for Life qualification at pre-entry or entry level; or a non-accredited course of 30 hours focused on preparation for training or employment and culminating in a certificate from the provider.

Providers were paid for each young person's completion of skills training.

- **Entry into education, training or employment** – young people were then supported into appropriate education, training or employment. Specification 4 (working with 18-19 year olds) was designed to support employment only. Resettlement Brokers provided a range of activities to support young people to apply, attend interviews for and attend employment or education.

Providers were paid for each young person who entered education, training or employment.

- **Sustained education, training or employment** – young people were then supported to sustain their education, training or employment for six months. This included support meeting the costs of travel and clothing as well as providing encouragement, motivation and mediation with any problems that arose. 'Sustained' was defined as 20 of 26 weeks. So if a placement came to an end or broke down, the young person was supported into another opportunity.

Providers were paid for each young person who sustained education, training or employment for six months.


### 2.3.3 LRRP logic model

The programme theory logic model for LRRP is presented at Figure 2.1. It summarises the features of the LRRP. It shows:

- The *inputs* to each specification;
- The *target group* for each specification;
- The *activities* at the centre of each model (as outlined in the pathway above);
- The *rationale* for these activities – why they are featured;
- The *outputs* achieved by the programme as a whole and each of the specifications;
- The *short-term outcomes* of the programme and specifications;
- The *medium-term outcomes* defined as the final outcomes achieved;
- The *impacts* that these outcomes are expected to achieve.



Figure 2.1 LRRP logic model



### 2.3.4 Specification logic models

Logic models for each of the specifications are provided below, followed by a short summary. Figure 2.2 presents Specification 2, Figure 2.3 presents Specification 3 and Figure 2.4 presents Specification 4. Each model builds on the overall LRRP model above and presents a more detailed overview of each specification:

- The *inputs* – the funding and resources used;
- The *target group* – the young people targeted ;
- The *activities* delivered and the *rationale* for them;
- The *outputs* achieved – starts, positive activities and skills development;
- The *short-term outcomes* achieved – the entry into ETE;
- The *medium-term outcomes* achieved – the sustained ETE; and
- The *long-term outcomes* that were expected to be achieved as a consequence of the programme (such as reduced reoffending).

The models are broadly similar due to the common structure provided within the ESF Co-financing Programme 2007-2013 Youth Prospectus for adaptation by each specification provider.

## 2.4 Summary

This section has presented an overview of the background to LRRP, how the programme was designed and why. It has shown that the programme was developed to meet key objectives stemming from the Mayor of London's *Time for Action* strategy to address youth crime through improved employment and skills for young offenders.

There was a clear evidence base for the programme, with employment clearly established as a key factor in reducing youth offending and reoffending. The evidence base is also clear that effective provision for young offenders should be holistic, responsive and tailored to individual needs. Supporting the transition from custody and from community sentences to mainstream services also emerges as an element of effective provision.

LRRP consisted of separate, interrelated 'specifications' each targeting a different group of young offenders in order to provide a comprehensive approach. Each specification had a similar model where Resettlement Brokers provided flexible, holistic support as suggested by the evidence base to support young people. The progression pathway each specification's Resettlement Brokers supported young people through was:

- Engaging the young offender in the programme (a 'start') and assessing their needs to produce an individually tailored action plan;
- Attending engaging positive activities and accredited skills development provision;
- Entry into education, training or employment; and
- Sustaining education, training or employment sustained for six months (defined as 20 of 26 weeks).


To ensure young offenders were supported into appropriate employment each specification included an employer engagement element to promote the programme to them and identify suitable vacancies.

The programme was commissioned using an innovative Payment by Results model, intended to drive the achievement of outcomes. Payments were structure to provide initial funding for set-up costs with the remainder linked to outputs and outcomes of the progression pathway at the heart of the LRRP model. The highest payment was provided when sustained education, training or employment was achieved.

Section 3 presents the outputs and outcomes achieved by LRRP. Section 4 discusses the themes of effective practice that emerge from the evaluation.



Figure 2.2 Specification 2 logic model



### Specification 2 Summary: Catch 22

Catch 22's programme was called 'Inspire' and targeted young people in custody aged 15-19 years, later amended to include those serving community sentences from primarily east London boroughs.

Support followed the pathway outlined at 2.3.2.5.

A distinct feature was the 'Beyond the Door' programme developed by a Learning and Development Coordinator based within the team to provide both skills development and positive activities. It was delivered to groups in custodial settings by Resettlement Brokers. It covered issues relating to gangs and knife crime but the focus was on preparing for work towards ETE. The programme was accredited as one unit at NVQ level 3. Catch 22 also delivered activities in the community, although they made greater use of partners as the programme developed. This was to ensure the right mix of provision was available to meet the different needs of young people.

### Specification 2 Summary: Nacro

Nacro's programme was called 'In Touch' and also targeted young people in custody aged 15-19 years, later amended to include those serving community sentences from primarily West London boroughs.

Support followed the pathway outlined at 2.3.2.5.


In custodial settings, a mix of different workshops were provided to provide positive activities and skills development. A distinct feature was the use of mentors for some of the more vulnerable young people alongside Resettlement Brokers (although this was also initially part of Catch 22's design (see 4.1.1). Nacro also made more use of partner organisations to deliver community provision from the outset.

Nacro had a higher level of dedicated employment brokerage activities by core team members, working to promote the programme and identify vacancies, from the outset of the programme than the other providers had (see 4.4).

Nacro received an extension to their contract but the data reported here is to the end of the programme period March 2012.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Their final achievements were: starts, 961 (907 in this report); positive activities, 783 (701); skills development, 708 (658); entry to education and training, 204 (156); education and training sustained, 123 (89); entries to employment, 194 (119); sustained employment, 151 (52). The contract was extended to May 2012 for starts and outputs (entries) and to September 2012 for outcomes (sustained ETE).

Figure 2.3 Specification 3 logic model



### Specification 3 Summary: Serco

Serco's programme was called 'Keep it Moving'. It targeted young women in custody aged 15-19 and was the only one to do so. This was later amended to include young women serving community sentences. There were early problems with achieving the targets that were set due to the declining number of young women in custody since the programme was developed.

Serco contracted partners to provide Resettlement Broker role (cast as Mentors) and ETE broker roles, as well as the positive activities and skills development provision. This division between two complementary roles was a distinct feature.

The model of support followed that common to the programme, see 2.3.2.5.

St Giles was originally a key partner in the model, but withdrew from this when they withdrew from their delivery of Specification 4 (see 4.8). This meant that Serco were required to spend additional time reorganising their model and renegotiating with partners.

The young women were widely recognised as having higher level and more complex needs than many of the young men within other specifications, due to the nature of those young women who receive sentences for offending.<sup>32</sup>

Serco received an extension to their contract but the data reported here is to the end of the programme period March 2012.<sup>33</sup>


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<sup>32</sup> See for example this joint study by the Cabinet Office and Ministry of Justice from 2009, highlighting "*the complexity of women offenders' lives and needs*":

[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/209663/setf\\_shortstudy\\_womenoffenders.pdf](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/209663/setf_shortstudy_womenoffenders.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> Their final achievements were: starts, 208 (187 in this report); positive activities, 115 (87); skills development, 116 (90); entry to education and training, 27 (26); education and training sustained, 27 (6); entries to employment, 58 (45); sustained employment, 10 (1). The contract was extended to May 2012 for starts and outputs (entries) and to September 2012 for outcomes (sustained ETE).



**Figure 2.4 Specification 4 logic model**


**Specification 4 Summary: London Probation Trust (LPT)**

LPT's programme was called 'LYRIC' (Linking Youth to Realistic and Innovative Choices). It targeted both young men and women (which was a distinct feature of Specification 4 projects) aged 18-19 years who were under statutory supervision (in custody at YOIs, at attendance centres, those on community service and those on probation after release from custody).

When the specification was awarded, LPT were intending to recruit from the Probation Service and St Giles were intending to recruit from non-probation routes. St Giles withdrew and LPT then recruited from all settings.

The model of support followed that common to the programme, see 2.3.2.5.

**Specification 4 Summary: St Giles Trust**

St Giles Trust's programme was called 'REP' (Real Employment Project). It targeted young men and women (which was a distinct feature of Specification 4 projects) aged 18-19 years who were under statutory supervision in non-probation settings (in custody at YOIs, at attendance centres). Due to difficulties establishing referral routes, this was amended to include four probation services (which were removed from LPT's remit).

After 18 months St Giles withdrew from their contract as they were concerned that the difficulties they experienced in establishing effective, multiple, referral routes meant they were unable to recruit enough 'starts' to make the contract financially viable.

The model of support followed that common to the programme, see 2.3.2.5.

St Giles Trust's delivery of Specification 4 was ending at the time the evaluation began.

### 3 Programme Achievements

This section discusses the outputs and outcomes achieved by LRRP within and across the different specifications. As well the outputs and outcomes captured in the programme's performance management and monitoring information (MI) to the end of March 2012 (and included in the logic models in section 2) additional analysis undertaken by the evaluation team is presented. This includes a proven reoffending study, which explores recorded reconvictions amongst a cohort of LRRP participants following registration with the programme.

The presentation of the data is structured by the framework provided by the evaluation programme theory logic model, developed to reflect the design and rationale of LRRP and the PbR structure. The logic models presented above (figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4) summarise the achievements against target for each provider and each specification across the progression pathway.

The learning to emerge from the qualitative work to understand and identify effective practice in support of these outcomes and differences in performance is discussed in section 4.

Nacro and Serco both received extensions to their contracts but the data reported here is to the end of the programme period March 2012. A footnote at 3.8 gives their final achievements.

#### 3.1 Target group

This section presents data about the young people engaged by LRRP.

Table 3.1 shows the number of young people engaged ('starts') by LRRP across the different specifications and their providers (including St Giles, prior to withdrawal from contract). The young people were recruited through a variety of routes, following the re-organising of LRRP and the re-profiling of targets (see 2.3.2).

**Table 3.1 Starts achieved by LRRP by specification and provider**

Specification and provider	Starts	Target <sup>34</sup>
2 (Catch 22)	606	568
2 (Nacro)	907	841
3 (Serco)	187	145
4 (LPT)	472	372
4 (St Giles)	217	297
<b>Total</b>	<b>2389</b>	<b>2223</b>

#### *DIESEL data*

All providers exceeded their targets for initial engagement. They were not paid for starts above their target but increased numbers increased their chances of achieving outcomes (and the higher payments associated with them).

Table 3.2 presents a breakdown of starts by ethnicity.

<sup>34</sup> These are the re-profiled targets. Initial targets were higher (see 2.3.1)



**Table 3.2 LRRP starts by ethnicity**

Ethnic Group	Specification Two: Catch 22	Specification Two: Nacro	Specification Three: Serco	Specification Four: London Probation Trust	Specification Four: St Giles
Asian & Asian British	9.1%	9.7%	9.5%	11.1%	10.1%
Black & Black British	52.4%	46.5%	30.7%	32.8%	45.9%
Mixed Heritage	15.2%	17.9%	16.8%	10.9%	13.3%
White	23.4%	25.9%	43%	45.2%	24.3%
Other	12.3%	8.9%	4.3%	4.4%	6.5%
Total	552	795	179	451	216

**DIESEL data**

This shows that more than a half of all individuals were drawn from black and minority ethnic (BME) groups. This percentage rises to more than three quarters for specification two (Catch 22 and NACRO) and the St Giles cohort. Black and Black British is the biggest BME group in all of the specifications. The percentage of 'White' participants is roughly double that for Serco and LPT compared to the other providers. The total number of individuals reported here (2193) is lower than the total of programme starts due to incomplete ethnicity data in DIESEL data provided to the evaluation.

The young people who were engaged were expected to have, as young offenders (and NEET), a range of barriers to the achievement of ETE outcomes. These were confirmed by providers who found the young offenders had low self-esteem, low if any skills and little if any employment experience. Many were reported to be involved in gangs. The young women engaged were identified as having particularly complex needs, including substance misuse problems and histories as victims of domestic and other violence.

*“[The young people] will test you, test your loyalty, and push you to see if you will let them down, as they have been many times in their lives. They believe you expect them to fail.”*  
(Resettlement Broker)

Although DIESEL data did not record it, and therefore it cannot be linked to other information held and presented below, data from the specification providers reported directly to LCJP for the management board 'performance dashboards' breaks starts down to community and custody starts for specifications 2 and 3. Both of these specifications were initially expected to work in custodial settings. It should be noted that this data does not tally with the DIESEL data provided for the evaluation, due to differences in reporting timelines (i.e. this data does covers delivery to the end of May and not March 2012).

Because of this the DIESEL data cannot be analysed according to community or custodial starts, only in terms of overall performance.

**Table 3.3 Breakdown of LRRP starts by community and custody**

Specification and provider	Community starts	Custody starts	Custody starts as a percentage of total starts
2 (Catch 22)	179	398	68.9% of 577
2 (Nacro)	384	383	49.9% of 767
3 (Serco)	140	34	19.5% of 174

*Programme Management Performance Dashboards March 2012*

It is noteworthy that Catch 22 have a much higher proportion of custody starts than the other providers. Different views were expressed to the evaluation team about the impact this could have had, if any, on the achievements for this specification. Some felt that young people in custody may have had additional barriers to those in community settings. Others felt that this group is often more motivated to change. Young people who participated in the evaluation all expressed clear motivations to achieve ETE whatever the origin of their referrals.

*“As soon as I got to prison I realised that I don’t ever want to return there.”* (young person)

*“I live in a really depressing place with other young girls just out of prison and I cannot afford anything on £30 a week. I want a job - it is a ticket to my independence.”* (young person)

The next sections explore the outputs and outcomes achieved by participants, and the attrition of participants – the numbers of young people who dropped out of the programme and when.

## 3.2 Outputs

Outputs are presented here as the positive activities and the skills development activities completed by the young people on their progression pathway following registration.

### 3.2.1 Positive activities

Table 3.4 presents the positive activities achieved by each specification provider. It shows that Nacro had the highest success in completing this output.

**Table 3.4 LRRP positive activities achieved**

Specification and provider	Number achieved	Target	Percentage of starts
2 (Catch 22)	301	369	49.7% of 606
2 (Nacro)	701	785	77.3% of 907
3 (Serco)	87	126	46.5% of 187
4 (LPT)	284	295	60.2% of 472
4 (St Giles)	100	140	46% of 217
<b>Total</b>	<b>1473</b>	<b>1715</b>	<b>61.6% of 2389</b>

*DIESEL data*

### 3.2.2 Skills development

Table 3.5 presents the skills development activities completed by each provider. The performance is very similar to Table 3.4, with Nacro achieving a higher proportion of all starts than the other providers.

**Table 3.5 LRRP skills development output completed**

Specification and provider	Number achieved	Target	Percentage of starts
2 (Catch 22)	242	265	39.9% of 606
2 (Nacro)	658	724	72.5% of 907
3 (Serco)	90	120	48.1% of 187
4 (LPT)	194	279	41.1% of 472
4 (St Giles)	87	140	40% of 217
<b>Total</b>	1271	1528	53.2% of 2389

*DIESEL data*

*“When I was in [YOI], [the programme] was showing me things I could do but at the same time, I was enjoying it ... I didn’t feel like I was being pressured into doing anything... It showed me that even though I had a criminal record, there were still things I could do... From here, it’s up to me.” (young person)*

### 3.3 Short and medium term outcomes

This section presents data for the short-term outcomes of ETE entry and the medium term outcomes of sustained ETE. Targets are also included and it should be remembered that these are the final targets revised during delivery in light of performance and expected conversion rates from start to outcome.

#### 3.3.1 Education and training

Education and training targets were not set for Specification 4 nor for young people in the other cohorts aged 18-19 years. This was because these young people are above the age of compulsory education and the programme was intended to promote their employment.

Table 3.6 presents the outcomes achieved by specifications 2 and 3.

**Table 3.6 Education and training outcomes achieved by LRRP**

Specification and provider	Entries achieved	Target	Percentage of starts	Sustained achieved	Target	Percentage of entries
2 (Catch 22)	72	80	11.9% of 606	35	80	48.6% of 72
2 (Nacro)	156	168	17.2% of 907	89	121	57.1% of 156
3 (Serco)	26	69	13.9% of 187	6	9	23.1% of 26
<b>Total</b>	254	317	14.9% Of 1700	130	210	51.2% of 254

*DIESEL data*

This table shows a slight difference of 5% in the percentage of entries sustained within Specification 2. Catch 22 had a much higher number of custody starts (see Table 3.3) than Nacro and this may be a factor given the additional barriers expected for this group. Specification 3 targeted young female offenders who were reported to face complex barriers to engagement.

#### 3.3.2 Employment

Employment entry and sustained employment targets were set for all specifications.

**Table 3.7 Employment outcomes achieved by LRRP**

Specification and provider	Entries achieved	Target	Percentage of starts	Sustained achieved	Target	Percentage of entries
2 (Catch 22)	67	72	11% of 606	10	91	14.9% of 67
2 (Nacro)	119	221	13.1% of 907	52	151	43.7% of 119
3 (Serco)	45	67	24% of 187	1	3	2.2% of 45
4 (LPT)	156	120	33% of 472	65	100	41.7% of 156
4 (St Giles)	28	131	12.9% of 217	6	102	21.4% of 28
<b>Total</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>611</b>	<b>16.2% of 2389</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>447</b>	<b>33.1% of 387</b>

*DIESEL data*

When considering the proportions of starts who achieved entry to and sustained ETE it should be noted that these proportions were expected in the design of LRRP, with targets for each stage of the progression pathway reflecting the expected difficulties in successfully supporting this challenging group of young people along each stage and into sustained ETE. Targets for sustained ETE were around a fifth of the targets for starts, apart from Specification 3 following revisions in light of early delivery challenges. Rates for entry almost achieved targets. Lower numbers achieved sustained ETE, although these have improved since the evaluation ended.<sup>35</sup>

Nonetheless, the job-entry rates achieved by the programme compare favourably with comparative data for young people leaving custody. NOMS data shows, for example, that just 7.5% of individuals at male YOIs entered employment on release in 2010/11. The percentage of female offenders entering work ranged from 8.1% of those previously detained in female local prisons to 39.8% of those released from female open prisons in 2010/11.<sup>36</sup> We are unable to compile benchmarks for sustained employment as this data is unavailable.<sup>37</sup>

Analysis was undertaken exploring differences by age and ethnicity but there was little of note to emerge. One point revealed was that within Specification 4 there was little difference between the proportion of male and female starts who achieved employment entry (32.8% of males and 35.6% of females) and sustained employment (42.1% and 37.5%), suggesting provision was successfully tailored to different groups and different needs.

**3.3.3 Attrition**

The final analysis of the Diesel data explores the attrition by participants; the extent to which participants 'dropped out' of an ETE placement, an output, before it was sustained, becoming an outcome.

<sup>35</sup> Following the completion of the evaluation and analysis further data has been provided by LDA and this shows that conversion rates from entries to sustained have changed to: Catch 22, 21%; Nacro, 86%; Serco, 15%, LPT, 55%. This suggests that as the programme matured providers were placing and supporting young people more effectively.

<sup>36</sup> MoJ Information Release July 2012. *National Offender Management Service Annual Report 2011/12: Management Information Addendum*) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/prison-probation/prison-probation-performance-stats/noms-annual-report-2011-12-addendum.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> We are unable to compile benchmarks for sustained employment because the national target for supporting offenders into sustained employment was removed in 2011/12. Data was still collected as management information but this is presented as a global figure and offers little insight for the analysis here: 17,149 offenders sustained employment for 4 weeks or more in 2011/12 compared to 17,769 in 2010/11. (MoJ Information Release July 2012 *op.cit.*)

Table 3.8 shows the attrition for employment outcomes and Table 3.9 shows the attrition for education and training outcomes.

**Table 3.8 Attrition rates for employment outcomes**

Specification	Provider	No Job Entry	Started Employment & Dropped Out	Started and Sustained Employment	Attrition
2	Catch 22	543 89.0%	54 8.9%	13 2.1% of 610	80.6% of 67
2	NACRO	830 84.8%	20 2.0%	129 13.2% of 979	13.4% of 149
3	SERCO	152 76.4%	38 19.1%	9 4.5% of 199	80.9% of 47
4	St Giles	190 87.2%	22 10.1%	6 2.8% of 218	78.6% of 28
4	LPT	316 66.9%	69 14.6%	87 18.4% of 472	44.2% of 156
	Total	2031 82.0%	203 8.2%	244 9.8% of 2478	45.4% of 427

*DIESEL data*

This table shows that Nacro had by far the lowest rate of attrition. This is particularly striking compared to Catch 22 who also delivered Specification 2. LPT also had low attrition. Both these providers were identified in the qualitative work as having strong employer liaison - Nacro from the outset of delivery and LPT following early learning.

**Table 3.9 Attrition rates for education and training outcomes**

Specification	Provider	No Education or Training Entry	Started Education or Training & Dropped Out	Started and Sustained Education or Training	Attrition
2	Catch 22	513 84.1%	58 9.5%	39 6.4% of 610	59.8% of 97
2	NACRO	792 81.7%	66 6.8%	111 11.5% of 979	37.3% of 177
3	SERCO	178 84.8%	14 6.7%	18 8.6%	43.7% of 32
4	St Giles	218 100%			
4	LPT	472 100%			
	Total	2031 82.0%	203 8.2%	244 9.8% of 2478	45.4% of 447

*DIESEL data*

Specification 4 supported young people aged 18 and over and clearly focused upon employment outcomes for this group. For the other providers, again Catch 22 had a higher attrition rate.

### 3.4 Distance travelled

The evaluation team undertook an assessment of distance travelled, to complement the data collected for programme management (see 1.2.3). There were two aspects – a self-assessment survey of participants in the qualitative work (which 39 young people completed)

and the use of ASSET and OASys scores *around the time* of programme entry and exit, (as assessments were not undertaken in line with the time of exit).

### 3.4.1 Self-assessment survey

The results of this survey should be treated with caution due to the low number (39) of participants and because it is a *self-assessment* undertaken in the presence (and most often assisted by, due to low literacy levels of participants) a member of the evaluation team. Questions were linked to the domains of ASSET and participants rated each question on a scale of 1 – 5. The demographic data collected was partial and therefore is not reported. The low numbers and uneven spread across the specifications mean this breakdown is not included.

Participants were asked to indicate on a Likert scale<sup>38</sup> how they felt at the start of the project and how they felt at the time of interview. They were also asked to identify how much of any change they attributed to the programme.

Table 3.10 presents the findings.

**Table 3.10 Responses to distance travelled self-assessment**

Question	Positive change <sup>39</sup>	Negative change	No change	Attribution of positive change to LRRP <sup>40</sup>	Attribution of negative change to LRRP
Having a job is important to me	68%	-	32%	78%	-
I feel positive about finding employment in the future	85%	3%	13%	93%	-
I am confident that I can cope with the problems I experience in life	56%	-	44%	86%	-
I feel confident that I can move away from a criminal lifestyle	33%	31%	36%	40%	40%
I feel that I can make a positive contribution to society	68%	-	32%	79%	-
I want to stop committing crime	56%	-	44%	73%	-
I know what I need to do to stay away from crime	54%	-	46%	64%	-

#### *Self-assessment questionnaires*

Overall the results are encouraging. The one area where there is not a clear positive change attributed to the programme is participants' confidence in moving away from crime. We

<sup>38</sup> An example of a Likert Scale question (taken from the survey) is: **I want to stop committing crime**

#### **Start of project**

Disagree 1      2      3      4      5      Agree

#### **Now**

Disagree 1      2      3      4      5      Agree

#### **Is this change because of the project?**

Not at all 1      2      3      4      5      Very much so

<sup>39</sup> A positive change is defined as a minimum 1 point positive difference between the 2 time points

<sup>40</sup> Positive attribution is defined as indicating either a 4 or 5 on the question 'Is this change because of the project?'

know from the qualitative work with young people that this is due to the difficulty they felt of being certain of this and their caution about being certain they would never offend again. Whilst they were confident that they could stay out of trouble and the importance of employment to this, during the earlier stages of support in particular young people were aware they were still working towards this permanent future. LRRP itself prompted the young people to reflect on the reality of their situation and the hard work over time to make and sustain change. This question is perhaps off-set by the stronger answers in relation to finding employment, making a positive contribution and wanting to move away from crime.

*“If I didn’t get a job by the end of this year I’d have gone back to what I was doing before, as I need to support myself and my family, my son. So I would have had to go back to my old ways of doing that.”* (young person)

### 3.4.2 Comparing ‘before’ and ‘later’ assessments

The evaluation team requested information from London Probation and YOTs for the young offenders engaged in LRRP that are the cohort for the reconviction study (see 1.2.3). Of 321 requests made for data relating to young offenders within ASSET, 158 were returned and 36 of these were partial. For those young offenders within OASys, data was requested for 186 cases and 184 were provided. The low number of participants means that the analysis is unlikely to produce statistically significant results. There is not a comparison group for this analysis as one was not created for the evaluation. This caveat is returned to below and in the section reporting the proven reconviction study.

#### 3.4.2.1 ASSET analysis

This analysis relates to 158 cases which makes it unlikely to produce statistically significant results. Table 3.11 includes the assessment scores at the early and later assessments, with higher scores representing greater needs, and *p-values* that indicate whether the change in the assessment mean (average) score is statistically significant for each domain. **If it is significant then  $p<.05$  or  $p<.01$ . Domains with a statistically significant reduction are highlighted in bold.** A positive change is reflected in a lower score.

**Table 3.11 ASSET assessment comparison**

Area of assessment	Early assessment average score	Later assessment average score
<b>Living Arrangements</b> ( $p<.01$ )	1.46	2.28
Family and Personal Arrangements	1.77	1.73
<b>Education, Training and Employment</b> ( $p<.05$ )	1.95	1.66
<b>Neighbourhood</b> ( $p<.05$ )	1.86	1.64
<b>Lifestyle</b> ( $p<.01$ )	2.74	2.49
<b>Substance Use</b> ( $p<.01$ )	1.54	1.27
Physical Health	0.37	0.32
Emotional and Mental Health	1.23	1.15
<b>Perception of Self and Others</b> ( $p<.01$ )	1.60	2.65
Thinking and Behaviour	2.69	2.57
<b>Attitudes to Offending</b> ( $p<.05$ )	2.19	2.01
Motivation to Change	1.91	1.81
Total Assessment Score ( $p<.01$ )	19.88	14.62

ASSET scores



Although quite complex, there are two items of note. Firstly, assessment scores have decreased during the period the young people engaged with the programme and this is statistically significant: this therefore may represent a significant reduction in identified criminogenic need. However, it should be noted that such a reduction may well have occurred anyway, but without a comparison group to provide baseline figures, the assessment of the LRRP contribution to this reduction is unknown.

Second, although variable across the assessments some key domains show a statistically significant reduction, including 'employment, training and education' and 'attitudes to offending'. There are a number of domains that have seen an increased need, namely 'living arrangements' and 'perception of self and others'. These differences may be because the focus on ETE prioritised these domains over others. They may be because the support provided led to criminogenic needs being more apparent to the offender themselves and the professional undertaking assessment. But without a comparison group to explore in relation to this analysis and with this analysis undertaken after evaluation fieldwork was completed, firm conclusions cannot be drawn.

### 3.4.2.2 OASys analysis

The OASys data was provided for almost all the cohort requested and was of a higher quality than the ASSET data. OASys data is different to ASSET and includes the Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS). OGRS is a predictor of re-offending produced by combining OASys assessments of different domains.<sup>41</sup>

The area with a statistically significant finding is highlighted in bold.

**Table 3.12 OASys assessment**

Area of assessment	Proportion with identified need: early assessment	Proportion with identified need: later assessment
Accommodation	20.6	26.9
<b>Education, training and employability (p&lt;.01)</b>	61.1	53.2
Financial management and income	47.4	49.1
Relationships	29.1	33.3
Lifestyle and associates	79.4	80.7
Drug Misuse	32.6	33.9
Alcohol Misuse	24.6	22.8
Emotional well-being	20.0	19.9
Thinking and behaviour	90.3	92.4
Attitudes	53.1	57.3

#### *OASys assessment data*

This analysis presents a more mixed picture, with some domains increasing. Nonetheless, the ETE domain shows a significant reduction of almost 8 points. Emotional wellbeing and alcohol misuse also show reductions. The reasons for increases in some domains may be the same as those considered above in the discussion of ASSET scores (3.4.2.1) and with the caveat that there is no comparison group for this analysis.

A comparison of the OGRS scores shows that there is an increase across the cohort from 58.3 to 59.16 (0.86 increase) although this is not statistically significant ( $p>0.1$ ).

<sup>41</sup> There are 12 domains in OASys but only 11 are included because the 'health and other considerations' domain data was corrupt.

### 3.5 Proven re-offending analysis

A proven re-offending analysis was undertaken to explore the impact of LRRP on the reconviction rates of young people engaged in the programme to the end of October 2010. This date enables the analysis to explore whether or not any of the young people had a reconviction recorded in the 12 months after registering as a start with LRRP, plus an additional six months for this to be processed. Allowing this additional 6 months is a standard approach to enabling the 12 months since registering with LRRP to be compared with the 12 months afterwards. However, there are some important caveats to bear in mind when considering the results of this analysis.

- The analysis covers the period of 12 months from registration with LRRP not from exit from custody or community sentence. There was only data on release dates for a minority of participants (and these were split across the different specifications). This means that some of the cohort was in custody during the period of analysis and thus unable to offend (although registration took place in the final stages of a sentence).
- The analysis does not take account of the number of sentences a participant had received prior to joining LRRP and thus cannot explore the different offending histories across the cohort and the relationship, if any, this had with proven re-offending.
- There is not a matched comparison group and therefore it is not possible to attribute change to LRRP. Some of the young people will have changed their behaviour without participating in LRRP but the analysis cannot account for this without a comparison group.
- These two caveats mean that the analysis is not comparable with the highest standards in proven re-offending studies. The analysis has been peer reviewed as the best possible with the data available.
- The cohort is limited to those registered with the programme by end of October 2010, the last date that allowed for 12 months plus 6 months to pass for the evaluation (original) reporting timeline. This limits the numbers who can be included. Specification 3 was not included due to the very low numbers of young female offenders recruited by October 2010.
- As with all proven re-offending analysis, recorded crime data may not reflect the true level of these young people's offending.

The analysis and its limitations are set out in detail in Annex 2.

A total of 579 young offenders are included in the cohort. Table 3.13 shows how many young offenders were included from each specification.

**Table 3.13 Number of young offenders in the reconviction cohort by specification**

Specification and provider	Number of young offenders
2 (Catch-22)	128
2 (NACRO)	83
4 (LPT)	186
4 (St Giles)	182

*DIESEL data*

#### 3.5.1.2 Results of the analysis

The analysis explored the data across the different specifications. It shows the reoffending rate and the reduction in offending for each specification and each provider of the cohort.

**Table 3.14 Young offenders reoffending rate and reduction by specification and provider**

Specification and provider	Percentage re-offended in the 12 months after registration with LRRP	Percentage reduction in offending in the 12 months before and after registration
2 (Catch-22)	43.3 52 of 120	50.1
2 (NACRO)	36.1 26 of 72	50
4 (LPT)	38.1 64 of 168	46.6
4 (St Giles)	47.5 75 of 158	19.3
Total	41.9 217 of 518	41.2

*DIESEL data and PNC data*

The analysis shows that across this single cohort, 217 out of 518 young people re-offended in the 12 months after registration with LRRP. **This gives a statistically significant re-offending rate of 41.9%.** This represents a statistically significant percentage reduction in offending of 41.2%.<sup>42</sup>

The re-offending rate is broadly similar across all of the providers, apart from St Giles. The analysis cannot account for this.

An alternative way to assess re-offending is to take account of the frequency of re-offending, rather than just whether or not someone re-offends. Table 3.15 shows the average number of convictions for an offence in the 12 months before and after registration with LRRP. **This shows a statistically significant reduction in the number of offences committed of more than 50%.**

**Table 3.15 Average number of convictions before and after LRRP registration**

Specification and provider	Average number of convictions before LRRP start	Average number of convictions after LRRP start	Percentage reduction
2 (Catch-22)	3.13	1.03	67.09
2 (NACRO)	3.24	1.10	66.05
4 (LPT)	1.77	0.99	44.07
4 (St Giles)	1.68	1.16	30.95
<b>Total</b>	2.26	1.07	52.65

*DIESEL data and PNC data*

Analysis by gender did not reveal any results of statistical significance due to the low numbers of females in the reconviction cohort (25). Analysis by outputs achieved – positive activities and skills development – also did not reveal results of statistical significance.

<sup>42</sup> It is worth noting that a significant proportion (28.8%) of the cohort overall did not have a conviction recorded by the PNC in the 12 months prior to allocation to LRRP. It may be that they were allocated to the programme as a result of offences pre-dating the 12 month period, or following a breach of conditions imposed on them as a condition of release from custody.

### 3.5.2 Analysis by custodial or community sentence

This part of the analysis compares the reconviction of young people who began their engagement with LRRP from a community sentence with those who engaged from a custodial sentence.<sup>43</sup> Because data about sentence type was not available for all of the cohort, the numbers in this analysis are lower than those in the analysis above.

Table 3.16 presents the proven re-offending analysis by provider and by community and custody sentence at time of programme registration.<sup>44</sup>

The analysis shows that **there was a re-offending rate of 50.8% for those serving community sentences and 70.9% for those serving custodial sentences**. This represents a statistically significant percentage reduction in offending of 46.9% for those who were serving community sentences and 26.1% for those who were serving custodial sentences.

**Table 3.16 Percentage of young offenders reconvicted by community and custodial sentence**

Specification and provider	Sentence type	Percentage re-offended in the 12 months after registration with LRRP	Percentage change in offending in the 12 months before and after registration
2 (Catch-22)	Community	100% 14 of 14	+14.3
	Custody	78.9% 90 of 114	-12.4
2 (NACRO)	Community	50% 1 of 2	-50.0
	Custody	69.1% 56 of 81	-29.7
4 (LPT)	Community	42.6% 40 of 94	-57.4
	Custody	70.7% 65 of 92 (p<.01)	-29.3
4 (St Giles)	Community	52.2% 35 of 67	-44.8
	Custody	64.3% 74 of 115	-34.8
<b>Total</b>	Community	50.8% 90 of 117	-46.9
	Custody	70.9% 285 of 402 (p<.01)	-26.1

*DIESEL and PNC data*

<sup>43</sup> Because data about 'starts' was not recorded by Diesel, PNC data was used to identify the sentence occasion in each person's offending history that was current at the time of their engagement with LRRP. The disposal – the sentence – was then categorised as 'custodial' where this was evident and all others were therefore categorised as 'community'.

<sup>44</sup> This is an imperfect measure of where the programme was delivered. For example, an offender may have received a custodial sentence on the most recent sentencing occasion, but may have been released prior to being allocated to LRRP. Similarly, a community sentence may have resulted at the most recent disposal, but the offender may already have been serving a custodial sentence, and the allocation occurred during the custodial period. In short, without either accurate and robust data relating to start and end dates of periods actually served in custody, or data relating to where LRRP was initially delivered, a more accurate measure was impossible. It is important to also distinguish between this variable, and whether an offender had **any** prior experience of a custodial sentence: it is likely that a proportion of 'community' offenders had served some custodial time previously.

The table shows higher rates for those serving custodial sentences, as would be expected due to these sentences being given for more serious offences. There is some variation across the providers but these are often small sub-group sample sizes. In particular there is an increase for those supported by Catch 22 but this is a small sample and a small change.

An analysis of numbers of convictions according to sentence type (as with Table 3.14 above) shows no differences between different specifications or providers.

### 3.5.3 The influence of ETE outputs and outcomes on reconviction

Achieving a sustained employment outcome has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of reconviction. The achievement of outputs and short term outcomes towards this also have a statistically significant impact. The results come from a highly technical, to the lay reader, multivariate analysis that is included in Annex 3. As with all of the analysis presented here, it does not take account of a counterfactual group.

The analysis shows a statistically significant relationship between the achievement of ETE outcomes and the likelihood of being reconvicted after starting the programme:

- an employment start (a reduction in risk of around 50% points( $p < 0.43$ )); and
- a sustained employment outcome (a reduction in risk of around 55% points( $p < 0.98$ )).

*“Now that I work, I never think about offending again. Also, I have had issues with alcohol previously, and with the training and the new job I have learned to control my drinking and to avoid those risky situations.”* (young person)

*“I know a job will keep me out of trouble. I need something to do; otherwise I get bored and hang out with the wrong crowd.”* (young person)

### 3.5.4 Comparisons with other proven re-offending studies

There are a range of different sources that offer broad comparison with the results of the proven re-offending analysis presented here. These sources take account of custody release data, which is not available for this evaluation, and have much higher numbers in their cohorts making the results much more robust.

The latest published proven re-offending rate from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) for young people (aged 17 and under; LRRP supported 19 years and under) released from custody from July 2010 to June 2011 is 72.7% (LRRP analysis 70.9%). For Youth Community Penalties and Youth Rehabilitation Orders who re-offend it is 65.9% (LRRP analysis 50.8%).<sup>45</sup>

Although the LRRP analysis compares favourably with these rates, the differences are not great for custodial settings. Notwithstanding, these comparisons should also be treated with caution due to the issues outlined above and explored further in Annex 2: there is no comparison group for these rates and no data to take account of exit from custody.

The cohort for the reconviction analysis included only those young people recruited to the programme to the end of October 2010. This was before the programme models matured. It was before LCJP took responsibility for the governance of the programme and supported the specification providers to share learning and improve their performance. The breakdown by starts reveals that many more young offenders were recruited from community settings as the programme developed.

## 3.6 Economic impact analysis

The evaluation team used the findings from the analysis of performance management and monitoring data, the reconviction analysis and the analysis of the qualitative data gathered through interviews to estimate the economic impact of LRRP. The analysis is informed by

<sup>45</sup> Ministry of Justice (2013) Proven Re-offending Statistics Quarterly Bulletin, July 2010 to June 2011, England and Wales, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/192631/proven-reoffending-jul-10-jun-11.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192631/proven-reoffending-jul-10-jun-11.pdf), Table 18b



HM Treasury Guidance and economic impact literature. The way in which the analysis was conducted – the assumptions made and sources drawn on – is included in Annex 4.

The analysis estimates the savings to public sector spending for the different outcomes achieved by LRRP. Table 3.17 presents the findings associated with the lifetime savings from improved outcomes for young people supported by LRRP. The insights from the qualitative work were used to estimate the amount of impact that can be attributed to the programme, rather than what would have been achieved without it (deadweight – see Annex 4 for a full description).

**Table 3.17 Economic impact of LRRP**

Impact evidenced by LRRP	Total number of young people benefitting	Additional number of young people benefitting	Impact (£m)
Reduction in reoffending (criminal justice saving)	772	772	55.4
Skills uplift level 1 <sup>46</sup>	82	74	1.9
Skills uplift level 2 <sup>47</sup>	17	15	0.5
Increase in GVA from jobs created	134	16	0.9
<b>Total</b>			<b>58.7</b>
<i>Saving from reduction in NEETs<sup>48</sup></i>	264	238	26.1

The total cost of the programme was £5.2m (the budget was £9m). These figures do not include the cost of contract management and governance. Table 3.17 shows the estimated benefits from the programme are £58.7 million and that considerable benefits were achieved by LRRP through the funding provided. However, this is an uncertain estimate, with some of the benefits from the programme not estimated (see Annex 4).

Increasing the skill levels of a young person increases their likelihood of finding work and the level of income that can be expected from work over the lifetime. There are also large and well established savings from a young person ceasing to be NEET – as achieved by the LRRP for large numbers of young people (238). The significant reduction in reoffending brings the biggest savings, due to the criminal justice system costs associated with crime. Well established sources were used for all calculations. The results of the reconviction analysis (3.5) have been applied to the whole of the cohort to the end of March 2012.<sup>49</sup>

As PbR contracts are new to the youth justice field, there are no examples of similar programmes in the UK with which to compare the outcomes of LRRP. Full Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of youth crime interventions are not widely available. Some have been carried out in the USA, but no examples have been found in the UK to compare the economic outcomes of this programme to. The sources for calculating the savings associated with the outcomes achieved are listed in (Annex 4).

<sup>46</sup> This is 90% of the total number of beneficiaries achieving a qualification at this level – as deadweight is assumed to be 10%, so 10% of beneficiaries would have achieved the qualification without the programme.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> This is 90% of the total number of beneficiaries entering a sustained outcome – as deadweight is assumed to be 10%, so 10% of beneficiaries would have found ETE outcomes without the programme.

<sup>49</sup> The assumed criminal justice system cost of £71,739 per reoffender is taken from the 2007 DfES evaluation of the Full Service Extended Schools Initiative, and inflated to 2011 values. This cost includes prosecution, incarceration and supervision, family intervention and care costs. This estimate is based on Nacro (1998) *Wasted Lives: Counting the cost of juvenile offending*, London: Nacro

### 3.7 Strategic Added Value

The evaluation attempted to estimate the Strategic Added Value of the programme through questionnaires distributed to strategic stakeholders who participated in the evaluation.<sup>50</sup> There were just seven responses. Based on these seven responses, the areas where LRRP added most strategic value are:

- Being consistent with the vision set out in the LDA's Economic Development Strategy;
- Having an influence on the regional agenda on this issue; and
- Helping organisations form appropriate partnerships in the area.

Robust conclusions cannot be drawn from this analysis, although the findings are supported by the qualitative data gathered from strategic stakeholders.

*"[LRRP] is clearly linked to the Mayor's priorities for young people and has provided learning about violence, girls who offend, gangs, the transition at 18, lots of relevant learning that will be taken forward."* (stakeholder from YOT).

*"[LRRP] has taught the Youth Justice Board and all partners a lot about how to work better together for improved outcomes for young people in London."* (stakeholder from Youth Justice Board and Programme Board)

Yet it should be noted that there was some disagreement about the added value of LRRP amongst YOT and Probation stakeholders. Some viewed the programme as providing an additional resource that contributed to outcomes all were working towards – reduced reoffending. These stakeholders welcomed additional support for and attention on resettlement activity structured around a model they recognised as based in the evidence of an effective approach. Others saw it as duplicating existing work or taking resources away from mainstream services, potentially replacing them in the longer term. They were concerned that the programme would provide an exemplar for new forms of public sector contracting, which would see core YOT or Probation Service functions commissioned in new ways and from new providers. But this was a mixed picture and there was not a comprehensive approach to exploring the views of all YOT and Probation stakeholders.

### 3.8 Summary

This section has presented the outputs and outcomes achieved by LRRP. These are identified through the analysis of performance management data and monitoring information and through additional analyses undertaken by the evaluation team. The evaluation covers the programme to the end of March 2012. Nacro and Serco both received extensions to their contracts beyond this date. Their final achievements were higher than those reported here and thus the impacts of the programme greater.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Strategic Added Value is 'broadly the added value realised through coordinating and influencing activities that result in project outcomes being delivered by others, in addition to outcomes directly delivered through funded activities'; Greater London Authority (2011 update) London ERDF Programme 2007-2013 Project Evaluation Toolkit, available at <http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Project%20Evaluation%20Toolkit.pdf>

<sup>51</sup>

For Nacro: starts, 961 (907 in this report); positive activities, 783 (701); skills development, 708 (658); entry to education and training, 204 (156); education and training sustained, 123 (89); entries to employment, 194 (119); sustained employment, 151 (52).

For Serco: starts, 208 (187 in this report); positive activities, 115 (87); skills development, 116 (90); entry to education and training, 27 (26); education and training sustained, 27 (6); entries to employment, 58 (45); sustained employment, 10 (1).

The contracts were extended to May 2012 for starts and outputs (entries) and to September 2012 for outcomes (sustained ETE).

The analysis indicates that, other than St Giles, the providers of each specification successfully met the targets they were given for recruiting young offenders to the programme. High numbers of young offenders engaged with positive activities and skills development, although for some of the providers this was around half of all young people. Nacro had notably higher success rates. The proportion of young people entering education, training and employment and then sustaining employment declined as a proportion of starts at each stage of the progression pathway. An analysis of attrition clearly demonstrates how some providers were more successful than others in achieving sustained outcomes.

Nonetheless, an element of drop out was expected in the design of LRRP, with targets for each stage of the progression pathway reflecting the expected difficulties in successfully supporting this challenging group of young people along each stage and into sustained ETE. Targets for sustained ETE were around a fifth of the targets for starts. The specifications were broadly successful in meeting their targets. Although there were challenges meeting targets for sustained ETE, job-entry rates achieved by the programme compare favourably with relevant data from mainstream provision.

The evaluation included a proven re-offending analysis. This can only be understood as indicative because of important caveats in the design that was possible. The results should be interpreted with caution. The analysis does not take account of when participants were released from custody. There is no counterfactual to assess the attribution of the programme to outcomes. The analysis suggests that LRRP was successful in reducing reoffending (as evidenced through reconviction) and the rate achieved compares favourably with that achieved by mainstream provision. Additional analysis indicates that the achievement of ETE was an important factor in reducing reoffending across the programme.

The evaluation also included an estimation of the economic impact of the programme. This indicates that significant savings have been provided to the public purse.

Illustrative quotes from young people and stakeholders in LRRP have been included alongside the quantitative data. Section 4 discusses the learning about effective practice that was explored through the evaluation's extensive qualitative fieldwork programme.

## 4 Themes of Effective Practice

This section discusses the themes of effective practice that emerge from the evaluation of LRRP. They relate to key aspects of the programme and to learning from the delivery of the outputs and outcomes presented in section 3.

### 4.1 Resettlement Brokers

The role of the Resettlement Broker was central to LRRP's design and the evaluation findings confirm the rationale for this model. There were two elements to the role: they supported young offenders during and after their sentence towards sustained ETE outcomes; and they liaised with local partners to gain referrals and broker packages of support. In practice, Resettlement Brokers fulfilled a demanding and multi-faceted role, requiring a range of skills and a flexible, responsive approach. They were central to the achievement of all outputs and outcomes. Two specification models had Resettlement Brokers that were employed by the providers themselves (Catch 22, Nacro), one commissioned partners (Serco) and two used a mix of both (LPT, St Giles).

#### 4.1.1 Supporting young offenders

Although working within the overall structure of the individual action plan, Resettlement Brokers responded to multiple and complex barriers that young offenders faced as they emerged or where identified, identified ways in which these could be addressed and supported access to provision that aims to achieve this. Throughout, they provided on-going practical and emotional support and acted as mentors. For instance, they would telephone young people in the morning to ensure that they were out of bed and ready to attend a positive activity; they would also take calls late at night if a young person they are supporting was in crisis; they would help open bank accounts; they would accompany the young person to a health or other appointment; they would address accommodation problems. Resettlement Brokers built trusting relationships with the young people they worked with and provided a flexible, holistic response to their needs. It was consistently as intensive, demanding work due to this range of support provided across the whole day (early morning to late at night). Caseloads varied but up to 150 young people were reported as being assigned to brokers at one time – but this spanned those who were just entering support to those coming to the end of six months in ETE. Operational caseloads were much lower – but because brokers supported young people until the very end of their ETE as well as recruiting new starts, the total case load could be very high even many though those nearing the end of their ETE would (mostly) need very minimal support or contact.

Quotes from young people who participated in the evaluation fieldwork are included in Box 1. They illustrate the impact of the work of the brokers and the centrality of a relational approach to the achievement of LRRP outputs and outcomes. This included providing a supportive, non-judgemental but challenging approach.

#### Box 1 Young people talk about their Resettlement Broker

*"When I came out [of prison] I was a bit lazy and didn't bother to contact them but [my resettlement broker], she contacted me... and since then, she's been a big help to me... Without her I probably would have messed up a long time ago... They were quite persistent... they contacted me even though I was supposed to contact them."*

*"Without [Resettlement Broker] I probably would have messed up a long time ago."*

*"They were the only ones that committed to helping me when I got out not just while I was in prison."*

*"It made me believe that when I came out [of prison] they'd actually do something ... In the first / second day he contacted me and I knew he'd help me find opportunities"*

*"To be honest, they're good. If there is anything you want to do, all you have to do is ask,*

*and they will advise you on how to do it.”*

*“I spoke to [Resettlement Broker] and said I needed help. Since that day she’s never let me down. She’s always been there, by my side, helping me out through thick and thin.”*

Volunteer mentors supported Resettlement Brokers in Nacro’s model. Nacro had 28 Mentors (reducing to 18 by the end of the programme) and this support was viewed as invaluable by young people and the brokers themselves. In the other provider models, Resettlement Brokers fulfilled the dual role without this additional capacity. Catch 22 had intended to recruit volunteer mentors, but found it difficult to achieve and they focused instead on the support provided by their paid staff. Across all models, Resettlement Brokers provided mentor-style support. There was a view from some of the providers that two roles could be confusing rather than complementary, given the extensive work of the Resettlement Brokers. In Specification 3, with young female offenders, the Resettlement Broker role of the other models was split between a Mentor role and an ETE Broker role, both delivered by different partners. Mentors focused on pastoral support and Brokers on ETE support.

*“Since she met [mentor], my daughter has behaved much better. I can see that the programme has helped.” (parent)*

#### 4.1.2 Working with youth and criminal justice partners

The second element of the Resettlement Broker role involved working with YOTs, YOIs and London Probation Service to promote their specification and the support available for young people. YOTs were sometimes difficult to engage, as outlined at 2.3.2, due to restructuring, changes in staffing and the uncertainty and flux created for some. There were also reservations within some YOTs and amongst the Case Support Workers who support young people in the community, about the role of Resettlement Brokers and a perception that LRRP would duplicate and could replace their own work. Careful negotiation was required to address these concerns and to promote LRRP as an additional resource that complements YOT and probation provision. Resettlement Brokers were able to promote their shared agenda in stopping young people reoffending.

Different YOTs (and those in key posts within them) had different attitudes to the programme and to the provider organisations. There were different levels of referral from different YOTs and these patterns changed over time. Some Resettlement Brokers were placed within YOTs for part of their time, facilitating close working and welcomed as an additional resource. Case Support Workers, YOT staff who support their clients in the community, had differing views of LRRP.

Working in YOIs requires training to enable key-holding responsibilities (necessary for movement within a secure establishment), bringing another dimension to the Resettlement Broker role. Brokers also needed to develop and maintain knowledge of local service provision and the partners engaged and contracted by provider organisations to deliver elements of the programme.

As with all partnership arrangements, time was required to develop shared understandings and promote confidence in LRRP so that referrals were made. This took place alongside work to engage and support young people. There was a heightened concern with ensuring sufficient referrals were made because payments were dependent upon it and because the models had changed from working in custodial settings to community settings. Low ‘starts’ had implications for the whole of the specification as it limited the numbers of young people and thus the numbers who could achieve outputs and outcomes linked to payments. The characteristics of young people referred and engaged also influenced the likelihood of achieving outputs and outcomes due to the high levels of support required to address their barriers – although the programme was never intended to target those with low level needs or minimal barriers to ETE

## 4.2 Positive activities

In community settings, positive activities were more likely to be completed if they were tailored to the needs of the young person and clearly linked to their individual action plan. For some young people this meant activities that were leisure based – for example gym membership or community-based arts or sports activities – for others it meant including a more formal (however light touch) learning element. Young people in the community required high levels of support for these activities, intended as entry level engagement to build confidence and preparedness for more formal opportunities. Resettlement Brokers would text and call young people, visit them at home and travel with them, meet them at venues and attend activities with them to support their engagement.

In custodial settings, although there were less barriers to address to ensure young people attended the activities were still required to be engaging to ensure that they were completed. Catch 22 combined their delivery of positive activities with skills development in a single course, 'Beyond the Door', which included sessions around gangs and knife crime alongside work for an entry level qualification. Unfortunately we do not have data that relates specifically to this delivery (DIESEL did not record where positive activities were completed). Perhaps unsurprisingly, providers reported that attendance and completion of positive activities was easier to achieve in custodial settings than in community ones, given the paucity of activities for young people in custody. Catch 22 contracted partners to provide these activities for young people serving community sentences. This proved to be of variable quality and revisions were made to the model and to those who were contracted in order to improve young people's satisfaction and thus attendance and completion.

*"For many years I have struggled with my self-esteem. I have been on several programmes before and found them rubbish. In this one, I found my feet again. It brought my old self back."* (young person)

*"It's helped me. I had nothing else to do. I've got something to do now to keep me occupied."* (young person)

## 4.3 Skills development

Following positive activities to engage the young person, they were supported to access skills development training (see 2.3.2.5). These activities were delivered by partner organisations contracted by the providers for that purpose. The providers each had a range of partners in place, so that they could tailor the activities to the young people they were supporting, in line with their individual action plan. The most popular courses were reported to be those that were directly related to employment – for example those providing (young men) with CSCS cards.<sup>52</sup> Important aspects of effective provision were its informal, engaging nature which was often described as being in contrast to previous education or training experiences and perceptions of these.

Specification 3 commissioned an accredited course of three days learning and one day of interviews with potential employers from a community provider partner for the young female offenders supported. Where this was deemed unsuitable, due to particular interests of the young person, alternatives were offered. The course itself was tailored to individuals within it. It consisted of motivational training to improve confidence and self-belief and to identify strengths. The course was viewed positively by young people who participated in the evaluation. The opportunity to meet employers and to participate in an interview (some of which reportedly led to employment) was particularly valued by those contributing to the evaluation. Completion rates were the second highest of all providers (48%).

*"I have never done anything like this before – it has helped me to view myself and my opportunities in a much more positive light."* (young people)

<sup>52</sup> The Construction Skills Certification Scheme is compulsory for work in the construction sector, providing proof of identification and a record of achievement.



As with positive activities, Resettlement Brokers reported that a great deal of support was required to engage the young people in the skills development activities and for them to complete it. Although this was expected by providers before delivery began, the scale and breadth of the work was greater than anticipated and this was an important learning point, albeit one that was quickly learnt.

Again, the importance of tailored provision and holistic support with engagement and completion are all key messages to emerge.

#### **4.4 Employer engagement**

Securing employment for young people and sustaining this was at the heart of LRRP. Employer engagement was expected of each specification, to ensure that young people were trained in skills that matched labour market vacancies. Although all of the providers included it in their models, to meet this requirement, different approaches were initially taken. In most models, this employer liaison was part of Resettlement Broker roles as well as being part of other project management roles within the specification. It was also expected to be provided by partner organisations.

In Nacro's model, there was a dedicated employer engagement and job brokerage from the outset of their delivery. Employers agreed to take young people from the start of the programme. As a result they were more successful in securing opportunities for the young people they supported than others during the first months of LRRP. The analysis of attrition shows it was much lower for Nacro than other providers. This suggests that their employer engagement may have resulted in more appropriate placements for young people earlier in the delivery process.

The other providers learnt from this success, partly through the Operations Group established by LCJP (see 2.3.1) and greater resources were focused upon this as a result by providers themselves. Greater emphasis was placed on this as an activity as it was recognised that this level of resource was necessary for the success of the programme, and thus for the achievement of the higher payments linked to employment, by the providers. The Operations Group also facilitated joint work between the specification providers in engaging employers, through job fairs and employer liaison events. These events introduced LRRP to employers, promoting the young people as highly motivated to seek work and the support LRRP provided them with to prepare and sustain them. All of this meant that employer engagement could be resource intensive. It was required on an on-going basis to ensure that there was an on-going supply of opportunities for young people from the programme to access.

There was direct work with key employers – for instance, in the catering and construction sectors – who were targeted with leaflets, phone calls and visits. Employers were successfully engaged according to two key rationales: through their corporate social responsibility commitments (or, for construction firms, clauses in their contracts with local authorities requiring the employment of particular groups that include ex-offenders); and, through the support provided to the young people by Resettlement Brokers to support their employment. In some instances, positive experiences of young people from LRRP that were employed led employers to offer more vacancies to providers. Through these activities, vacancies appropriate for young people to apply for were identified.

#### **4.5 Supporting employment**

A high level of support was provided to young people to enable them to apply for and secure employment, however a vacancy was identified. Young people supported by LRRP Resettlement Brokers applied for vacancies that were available through the open labour market.

As well as the work to address barriers and address issues in a holistic way through their individual action plan, young people were supported to apply for suitable employment by Resettlement Brokers and partner organisations in a number of ways. These included:

- **Writing or re-writing a CV:** most beneficiaries did not have a suitable CV, and had little relevant experience;
- **Writing or re-writing a letter of disclosure:** some of the participants had a letter of disclosure if they had been to a YOI, but for those that did not already have a letter of disclosure this was an important step. Existing letters were often revised;
- **Working with the young person on job application forms:** group (for instance job club) and individual support with application writing and tailored, one-to-one advice;
- **Interview training:** coaching the young people so they knew what to expect in interviews and therefore were comfortable in their answers. This included how to talk about their offending history and their current motivations;
- **Ensuring the young person had appropriate clothing for an interview:** The Resettlement Brokers would make sure the young person had appropriate clothing for an interview and if they did not would buy them;
- **Support on the day of the interview:** Resettlement Brokers would telephone before and on the morning of the interview, meet them and make sure they were in the right frame of mind. They would also provide transport costs and travel to interviews to support young people and build their confidence; and
- **Arranging childcare:** for young mothers.

Resettlement Brokers were clear about why they thought LRRP was successful:

*“...because we offer such a bespoke service. There were no other projects that would meet the client in the morning, give them an Oyster card, prepare them for interview, take them to buy clothes, mentor them and so on.”*

Once in employment Resettlement Brokers would provide a range of support to the young people so that it was sustained. This would often be more intensive during the early stages of employment, enabling it to become established. This support included:

- **Meeting costs:** for the first month or until the first pay was received some of the costs associated with work would be met – transport, basic clothing or equipment, lunch – were the young people had little money or other resources to draw on;
- **Keeping in contact:** to ensure that the young person was getting up in the morning and attending work, to encourage and motivate them and to provide emotional support. It also enabled any issues to be identified and support provided or interventions made.
- **Liaising and mediating with employers:** so that any issues were identified and addressed before they escalated.

Through this, issues and problems were addressed in a way that they are not for employees recruited through the open labour market. The young people from LRRP who applied for and entered work were described by employers as being well prepared and well supported. It was also reported that this group of young people were seen as being particularly motivated to succeed. Employers reported the young people with a troubled past often work harder than those without a criminal record. The employers elaborated:

*“As a company we didn’t know what to expect working with young offenders. But I have been pleasantly surprised at how well it worked. As soon as you show support to these young people, they take it on and do their best.”* (catering industry)

*“We are so grateful to have access to young people who are more prepared and committed than many others.”* (hospitality industry)

## 4.6 Education and training

Sustained education and training was supported in the same way as employment. Therefore there is less learning about this element that is distinct. Support was provided to access and sustain education in much the same way, with a mix of both practical and emotional support.

Specification 4 did not include education or training outcome targets due to the age of this cohort being above that for compulsory education. Other specifications did not receive payment for any young people aged over 18 years entering education or training. Some reservations were expressed about this by Resettlement Brokers and other stakeholders. Young people in this age group may have aspired to enter education or training rather than work. Or education may have offered a longer term route to longer term outcomes:

*“[The lack of an education target] takes away the opportunity to apply for a higher status job”.* (Resettlement Broker)

*“[If a young person is coming up to their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday] the worker might be influenced to say to the young person ‘why don’t you go into work instead’. We might be setting them up to fail.”* (Resettlement Broker)

Entry to education was also limited by its organisation around terms – with typically two entry points, January and September, each year. Therefore the requirement to move young people into an entry that they could sustain (with both linked to payments) would not always align with these timings.

## 4.7 Partnership working

Partnership working was a key dimension to effective delivery of LRRP outcomes. There is an established literature on effective partnership working, highlighting the importance of clarity of roles, clear and on-going communication, personal relationships and the time it takes for effective partnerships to be established.<sup>53</sup>

All of the providers had worked to establish partnerships as part of their tender for their specification and the model they devised. Although there were some differences in the amount of delivery kept ‘in house’, effectively managed partnerships were required. This included working with both new and more established partners – those the provider had previous experience of working with to deliver funded programmes. The re-profiling of the specifications to work with higher numbers of community starts and to reflect challenges in recruitment that providers faced (see 2.3.2) impacted upon these partnership models: working in new geographical areas and delivering amended packages of support in the community rather than custody required new partnerships to be negotiated and agreed. The need to recruit starts and deliver outputs and outcomes created pressure to establish these partnerships quickly if opportunities for delivery were to be maximised.

As a result, some partnerships were not always strong in terms of shared understandings. Providers found that partner’s provision was not always as popular with young people as they expected, or sometimes they had concerns about its quality. When providers took a negative view of a partners’ provision they would begin to use it less. If there were delays with recruitment to the programme, referrals to partner provision would be lower than planned. The partners expectations about referrals and hence payments linked to delivery, would then not be met. This lack of expected income created tensions. Some organisations reported that the lack of financial security around the programme created problems for them in terms of longer term planning or building a stable staff group. Using sessional staff and volunteers enabled some providers to be flexible and build their experience. Others wished to build a more permanent staff group.

Resettlement Brokers were often at the forefront of these negotiations, as they were coordinating young people’s packages of support. Formal negotiation and agreement was the responsibility of project staff. The difficulties experienced damaged relationships between some providers and some of their partners, to the potential detriment of future provision. In contrast, where referrals worked well it strengthened relationships as effective partnerships developed.

<sup>53</sup> See for example Sullivan, H. and Skelcher, C. (2002) *Working Across Boundaries: Collaboration in Public Services*, London: Palgrave

Partnership working was required amongst the providers and the governance provided, particularly once LCJP had put additional structures in place, supported and facilitated this. Working across multiple geographical boundaries, and the institutional barriers associated with these, required negotiation and coordination. For instance, some provision is linked to particular geographies; provision suitable for some young people may not be local to them so a tight geographical focus is not always possible. London offers a large and complex context for programme coordination, particularly in the criminal justice field and LCJP provided critical support to the LDA in achieving LRRP's pan-London approach.

## 4.8 Payment by Results (PbR)

The use of the Payment by Results (PbR) model for LRRP was innovative in two respects: to structure a programme supporting young offenders; and, to structure a programme of ETE outcomes. By combining these two aspects, LRRP presented significant challenges to both the commissioner of the programme and the strategic partners providing governance; and, to the providers who tendered for and won the contracts. The structure of the PbR is presented above at 2.1.4.

LRRP was commissioned through competitive tender. Lead providers brought together partnerships to deliver their specification and included their own costs in tendering. Output and outcome payments were derived from these costs and the proportions of total payment – the structure of the PBR – that was set out in the funding prospectus. Thus, in the awarded contracts, there were different payments for the same outcomes. But there was little difference within specifications where there was more than one provider.

### 4.8.1 The design of LRRP

LRRP was developed by the LDA, using ESF funds to provide a match-funded programme (see 2.1). The LDA had two separate teams; a development team that was responsible for developing the programme; and a contract management team, which dealt with the procurement and contracting of the project. At the time the LDA managed more than 100 ESF projects as well as other London employment projects.

The development team consulted with a range of organisations including YOIs, YJB and LCJP seeking views on what the programme should aim to achieve, together with meeting the ESF requirements. A key challenge for the programme related to the expectations of recruitment to the programme from custodial settings (for specifications 2 and 3). The information used regarding the numbers of young people, especially in prisons and YOIs were taken as a snapshot and not as a trend. This was used to make assumptions about the numbers of young people that would be eligible for the programme and who would achieve outcomes. Subsequent to the programme being commissioned, changes to sentencing policy meant that less young offenders were sentenced to custody and more to the community. Whilst some participants highlighted how the lack of trend data may have created an inaccurate picture of custodial use over time, the change to sentencing could not be foreseen and this impacted on the fundamental design of LRRP whereby different specifications targeted different, discrete settings. The assumptions about the number of young people who could be recruited to the programme from within the YOIs were too optimistic and this in turn affected the financial modelling.

LDA Project Managers had not previously worked in the criminal justice field and therefore had limited knowledge of the area. A strategic stakeholder stated that:

*“...in hindsight we would do it again differently, we needed a more collaborative approach with outputs, much more thought about the targets and numbers. Scanning, on how to future proof the project.”*

As a result, the targets set for LRRP specifications were challenging to meet – there were different numbers in custody than expected and more diverse referral routes were required. Initially, although the programme was redesigned – so that instead of providers focusing upon different YOIs (Specification 2) or on community settings or YOIs (Specification 4) the different local authorities of London were divided amongst the providers to ensure each had

particular geographies and were not in competition for the same young people as starts – and most providers (with the exception of Serco) kept their targets at the contracted levels (and thus protecting total potential contract value). Following early set up and delivery, LDA required providers to re-profile their targets as progress to reflect lack of progress to date (i.e. to reduce their final target) in March 2011, six months after delivery and recruitment of starts began. Because output and outcome payments were set, this reduced the overall contract value and therefore providers kept targets that would maximise value. Because these targets were ambitious as a result, further re-profiling took place later in delivery through LDA's active management of each contract.

Re-profiling specification targets and negotiations around the geographies each provider could target was time-consuming and caused delays as delivery partnerships and pathways were amended.

#### 4.8.2 Provider experience of delivering LRRP PbR

All of the providers welcomed the flexibility afforded to them in how targets were met, within the overarching model of Resettlement Broker support. There was also a concern to be part of LRRP due to the expected increase of PbR in the commissioning of public services to voluntary and community sector and private sector providers. The providers therefore expected some difficulties and were prepared to invest in LRRP in order to gain valuable experience and learning. Nonetheless the providers regarded the structure of the PbR as having two particularly difficult elements.

First, the targets, even when re-profiled, were viewed as extremely challenging. This was recognised by strategic stakeholders involved in the programme governance. For instance:

*“PBR puts the focus in the right place, but in this case is very ambitious.”* (Programme Board member)

Second, there was a consensus amongst providers that the payment structure did not adequately reflect the amount of support required from Resettlement Brokers to engage this group of young people along the progression pathway and to sustain their ETE. Although the targets set in the design of LRRP recognised that decreasing proportions of starts would achieve the outputs and then outcomes of the progression pathway, a great deal of work was required to support the young offenders whether or not they achieved them. The aim of PbR is to promote the achievement of outcomes and to value these in light of the costs associated with achieving them. Output payments are made to assist with cash-flow – so that providers have funds in lieu of outcome payment – as well to recognise partial achievement of outcomes. For LRRP providers, the difficulty in achieving outcomes for this group meant that the costs of the support provided to get them close to them were not always met sufficiently.

*“Positive activities are paid for, but not the support work. But on average it takes three meetings to ensure that a young person attends a positive activity.”* (Programme Board member)

It made balancing the costs of support with the payments for outcomes difficult to achieve. Although the definition of ‘sustained’ outcome was 20 weeks from 26, providers reported that maintaining this 20 week engagement was extremely demanding on time and resources.

It was suggested by some providers and strategic stakeholders that a tariff approach may have been a way of recognising the challenges presented by different young people and to reflect differences within this heterogeneous group. Under a model structured this way, higher payments could have been provided for more complex clients. For example, an OGRS (Offender Group Reconviction Scale – based on offender characteristics and previous offending a likelihood of reoffending with 12 and 24 months – and referred to above in the reconviction analysis 3.5) style weighting could be devised to quantify the different characteristics of young people. Other suggestions were payments linked to assessments of job-readiness; and, more nuanced but lower payments for positive activities and skills developments – as these were only made for placements *completed* not just attended. Although it was acknowledged that additional complexity would not necessarily benefit the



model, some strategic stakeholders also recognised that future PbR structures should consider a different interim payment structure.

Performance data was submitted to the LDA by providers on a monthly basis to release associated payments. Anything that impacted upon the number of starts or the achievement of outputs and outcomes affected the payment received for the work being delivered. This led to tight performance management by the providers themselves as they realised the need to ensure monthly targets were being met. This improved delivery as problems could be identified and addressed quickly. However, there were also concerns that this could be overly burdensome. Similarly, the management of the contracts placed large demands on the LDA and governance more broadly was also demanding.

#### 4.8.3 Issues with LRRP PbR

The PbR was described as a learning process by all of those involved in LRRP that participated in the evaluation – provider’s project managers, Resettlement Brokers and strategic stakeholders. Understanding the way the contracts would operate was “a *steep learning curve*” for all involved. There was commitment across all stakeholders to work together to make the programme a success.

The renegotiation of targets and geographies caused particular problems. St Giles had devised a particular model building on existing links and particular sites of (others’) provision. Their difficulties in recruiting starts and thus young people to support into outputs and outcomes led them to view the contract as financially unviable, leading them to withdraw. Their model was not successful. They also withdrew from their role as a partner for Specification 3, led by Serco. Their delivery models did not work successfully. In other specifications, expectations around payment linked to PbR were not met for some partners within providers’ models (see 4.7) and they were less positive.

The providers’ contracts were managed on an individual basis by the LDA. LPT spent the early period of delivery ensuring that ‘starts’ were registered and they exceeded their targets. Similarly, Catch 22 were focusing upon recruiting young people and redesigning their programme. LDA were concerned that there was insufficient focus on achieving outcomes for these young people and capped the number of starts that LPT and Catch 22 could receive payment for, to prevent payments for starts that were not further supported. In contrast, Nacro had an early focus upon securing outcome payments and their target for starts and outcomes were increased by the LDA to reward a greater ratio of start to outcome achievement. Other providers felt unfairly treated, but they recognised the need to focus upon outcomes in order to deliver their contracts and receive payment. Because higher payments were linked to outcomes and these were themselves dependent on the starts achieved (to support conversions from starts to outcomes), early problems securing starts had a negative impact upon the providers ability to receive payments. The LDA allowed unlimited starts, but would not pay beyond the capped target, to enable providers to receive payment for outputs and outcomes achieved. Crucial to success of the PbR was not just recruitment but the movement from start to sustained outcome and some providers had more success with this than others. The ability of providers to identify and address any issues within their model – their methods of engagement and support – was at the centre of their success or otherwise. The earlier a successful model was in place, the more payment could be received during the contract. Thus early problems could have a lasting impact.

LCJP supported overarching governance and worked with the LDA to bring the providers together to identify and resolve problems – for example securing employment vacancies. This was sometimes difficult due to tensions between providers as a result of their views of the reasons behind their differing performance. There was a sense of competition between them but a growing recognition of the need to cooperate and work together to achieve their own outcomes and thus payments.

A common concern with PbR models is that if they are not designed correctly, providers can choose to work with the clients most likely to achieve outcomes and leave those most



difficult – referred to as ‘skimming’ or ‘cherry picking’.<sup>54</sup> In LRRP, this could have manifested itself in providers focusing upon those young people with the least barriers to ETE – those easiest to place and sustain in employment in order to release those payments. Providers recognised this risk but denied acting in this way – and the data analysed by the evaluation team does not indicate any differences in the cohorts supported to different outputs and outcomes. The providers, most of whom were from the voluntary and community sector, highlighted their commitment to supporting young offenders and vulnerable young people and pointed to the huge amount of support provided to young people who did not achieve the outputs and outcomes that would release payments. Resettlement Brokers were not employed on PbR contracts and were experienced professionals committed to supporting young people whatever their achievement of the PbR outputs and outcomes.

But there was a tension between meeting LRRP outputs and outcomes and providing the wider resettlement support that some saw young people needing. Although the rationale for the programme was to provide this holistic support to ensure young people progressed along a pathway to ETE, some practitioners felt that they were required to focus more on the identification of, access to and support within ETE. For example:

*“The way this contract has been set up has meant we’ve effectively been ETE brokers which has not necessarily been the best thing for anyone.”* (Resettlement Broker).

#### 4.8.4 Benefits of LRRP PbR

Although there were difficulties in developing the programme and some concerns about the detail of the model, in general the LRRP PbR was viewed positively by providers and strategic stakeholders. Providers recognised that the PbR model had ensured they focused upon outcomes, notwithstanding their concerns about the payment structure’s ability to reward all of the work done with young offenders. For LDA as funders, the programme enabled them to pay for outcomes that were delivered in contrast to grant funding. It enabled them to manage performance effectively. Strategic stakeholders highlighted how the PbR had successfully affected providers’ behaviour to ensure effective performance through a focus on (sustained) outcomes and not just recruitment and participation (the traditional grant funding model). Targets for starts could be exceeded even though this did not bring any additional payment, as outlined above. Greater numbers of starts increased the chances of conversion to outcomes and thus higher payments.

Due to delays to LRRP, underperformance against targets by some providers and the reduction of targets and thus grant values, there was an under-spend of almost £4m (around 45% of the total budget). These figures do not include the cost of contract management and governance. Because of their strong performance Nacro received an extension, enabling them to continue to recruit starts and achieve job and training entries beyond November 2011. Partly because of the problems they experienced described above – with low numbers of young female offenders and the withdrawal of St Giles – and partly to ensure continued availability of support for young female offenders, Serco also received an extension.<sup>55</sup> Strategic stakeholders acknowledge that there was not an early enough recognition of the likely level of under-spend or a way of reinvesting it effectively. The LDA and all stakeholders wished to spend all of the funding to achieve even greater outcomes for young people. Nonetheless, the PbR structure was seen to have ensured that the funding that was used has only paid for outputs and outcomes achieved, in contrast to funding where block grants are provided regardless of performance. All stakeholders worked hard to make the programme a success and to learn together from this innovative programme.

<sup>54</sup> Battye, F. and Sunderland, J. (2011) *Thinking about... Payment by Results*, GHK  
<http://www.ghkint.com/Portals/4/Downloads/PaymentByResultsGHK%20.pdf>

<sup>55</sup> Footnote 51 details the achievements of Nacro and Serco following these extensions.

## 4.9 Summary

This section has discussed evidence of effective practice to emerge from the qualitative work to explore the processes within the specifications of LRRP that led to or hindered the achievement of outputs and outcomes.

The role of the Resettlement Broker emerges as central to the success of LRRP. Resettlement Brokers fulfilled challenging, demanding and multi-faceted roles. The evaluation confirms the rationale and design of LRRP that this holistic, flexible support is required to support young offenders into ETE. Whilst positive activities and skills development for these young people must be engaging and relevant, a great deal of support can be required to ensure that it is accessible and attendance completed.

Employer engagement was a feature of LRRP's design and it proved to be an essential element of effective provision to identify relevant vacancies and to support young people to apply and access them. Employer engagement can be resource intensive and demanding. It must be on-going. Access to education and training is limited by the availability of opportunities to term time scheduling. The lack of payment for education and training outcomes for those 18 years and over was a weakness of LRRP as it acted as a disincentive for delivery partner to promote these opportunities for this age group. Partnership working was key to LRRP. There were difficulties establishing and maintaining some partnerships. In part this was related to the need to negotiate or amend partnerships at short notice.

The PbR model for LRRP was challenging and complex. It provided a great deal of learning for all involved. Despite initial difficulties, caused in part by the data used in design and subsequent changes to sentencing policy, providers and strategic stakeholders were positive about the LRRP PbR model. The exception was St Giles who withdrew from their contracts. Expectations around payment linked to PbR were not met for some partners and they were also less positive.

All of the providers welcomed the flexibility afforded to them in how targets were met. There were two areas of concern for them. First, the targets proved to be extremely challenging for delivery due to the data that was used to develop the specifications. Second, the interim output payments and demands in achieving 'sustained' outcomes lead some providers to consider that they were insufficiently rewarded for the work required to support young people.

The PbR focused providers on achieving the defined outcomes and for LDA it ensured that only strong performance was rewarded. The use of PbR was innovative and all stakeholders worked hard to make the programme a success and to learn together from the experience of the programme.

## 5 Conclusion

This section presents the final conclusions, and the implications for policy and practice that emerge, from the evaluation of LRRP. LRRP was an innovative programme that used a PbR approach to structure three strands of provision, each targeting different groups of young offenders coming to the end of their sentences in custody and the community in London. It ran from mid-2010 to March 2012. LRRP was designed to reflect evidence about the features of effective support for young offenders and the importance of ETE in reducing reoffending.

### 5.1 Evaluation questions: key findings

The evaluation used a programme theory approach to explore four broad evaluation questions. Here the key findings from the evaluation are summarised for each.

#### 5.1.1 What were the outcomes and impacts of the programme?

The output, outcomes and impacts of LRRP were presented in Section 3.<sup>56</sup> They are evidenced through the analysis of performance management and monitoring data collected by the programme and by additional data collected and analysed by the evaluation team. This analysis shows that:

- Providers successfully recruited young offenders to the programme and most achieved outputs including ETE entry that were broadly in line with targets set in expectation of performance.
- Providers were less successful in meeting targets for sustained ETE. Nonetheless, the job entry rates achieved compare favourably with those achieved by mainstream provision and benchmarks for sustained employment are not available.
- A proven re-offending analysis was undertaken. It has important caveats that mean caution must be used in interpreting the results. It suggests that LRRP was successful in reducing reoffending.
- The reconviction analysis demonstrates that the achievement of ETE was an important factor in reducing reoffending across the programme.
- The evaluation also included an estimation of the economic impact of the programme. This indicates that significant savings have been provided to the public purse and the programme provided value for money.
- The programme provided strategic learning about the importance of joint and coordinated work in London to support young offenders.

#### 5.1.2 What were the features of the programme that were successful?

The evaluation found that LRRP was effective in reducing young people's offending and promoting ETE outcomes. Learning about the themes of effective practice was presented in section 4. The messages emerge from the qualitative research undertaken with stakeholders including young people from across the specifications. The analysis shows that:

- The role of Resettlement Broker was central to the success of LRRP and the outcomes and impacts achieved. They fulfilled a demanding and multi-faceted role.
- The design of the LRRP as provision that was flexible, holistic and individually tailored to the young people supported was proved to be effective. A relational, trust building approach was central.

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<sup>56</sup> See also footnote 51, which details the additional achievements of Nacro and Serco through their contract extensions.

- As well as being engaging and relevant to them, a great deal of support is required to ensure young people access and engage with positive activities and skills development.
- Employer engagement was another feature of LRRP design and the rationale for including it has been supported by the evaluation findings. However, it proved to be resource intensive, demanding and requiring on-going attention.
- Employers were recruited through a range of activities. Successful recruitment emphasised the high level of support provided to young people to prepare them and then sustain them in employment. Some employers have corporate responsibility objectives and commitments to employing local people. Both of these offer a rationale for employing young offenders.
- Access to education is limited by its availability being broadly restricted to term time arrangements. The lack of payment for education and training outcomes for those 18 years and over was a weakness of LRRP as it acted as a disincentive for delivery partners to promote these opportunities for this group.
- Partnership working was key to the achievement of LRRP outcomes. But effective partnerships were hampered by some of the features of the programme – changes to the design meant that some partners' expectations were not met; the time to develop some partnerships was limited.

### 5.1.3 What were the views of participants and stakeholders?

A programme of qualitative research explored the views of project managers, Resettlement Brokers, strategic stakeholders, young people, their families and employers. Quotes from them are included throughout the report to support and illustrate the findings discussed. They include:

- Positive views of the Resettlement Broker role:

*"Without [Resettlement Broker] I probably would have messed up a long time ago."* (young person)

- Positive views of the programme:

*"For many years I have struggled with my self-esteem. I have been on several programmes before and found them rubbish. In this one, I found my feet again. It brought my old self back."* (young person)

- The views of employers:

*"As a company we didn't know what to expect working with young offenders. But I have been pleasantly surprised at how well it worked. As soon as you show support to these young people, they take it on and do their best."* (catering industry).

- Reflections on the challenging nature of the PbR model:

*"PBR puts the focus in the right place, but in this case is very ambitious."* (Programme Board member).

- Evidence of wider learning from the programme:

*"[LRRP] has taught the Youth Justice Board and all partners a lot about how to work better together for improved outcomes for young people in London."* (stakeholder from Youth Justice Board and Programme Board)

### 5.1.4 Was the PbR model effective?

The PbR model is reflected on throughout this report and discussed in detail in section 5.

- The PbR model was effective in focusing providers on the delivery of sustained outcomes and in ensuring payment was only provided for the achievement of them.
- Concerns were expressed by providers about the ability of the PbR model to recognise and reward the amount of work undertaken with this challenging group of young people

to support them towards outputs and outcomes. It was felt by some providers that a more nuanced model could recognise that some young people require a greater level of support than others to achieve outcomes.

- The LRRP PbR model was challenging and complex. Providers were motivated to engage with LRRP by an expectation that there will be greater use of PbR in future commissioning.
- LRRP was a learning process for those involved. The use of PbR was innovative and all stakeholders worked hard to make the programme a success and to learn together from the experience of the programme.
- The data that was used to inform development of the specifications combined with a changing sentencing environment impacted upon the ability of providers to deliver the target outputs and outcomes. This was recognised and delivery models were changed by providers. Proposed and targets and profiles were renegotiated, but this process took time.
- One provider, who was finding it particularly challenging to deliver against their targets, withdrew due to concerns about the financial viability of the contract.
- Despite initial difficulties, providers and strategic stakeholders were positive about the LRRP PbR model. Expectations around payment linked to PbR were not met for some partners and they were less positive.
- There is not a counterfactual to explore the performance of the PbR model compared to other provision.

## 5.2 Recommendations for policy and practice

Based on the findings of the evaluation the following recommendations for future policy and practice.

### 5.2.1 Provision for young offenders

- A Resettlement Broker model is an appropriate and effective way of supporting young offenders. The multi-faceted and interlinked nature of the barriers to engaging with and achieving sustained ETE that they face require the holistic, flexible approach that Resettlement Broker support can provide.
- Young offenders will engage with positive activities and are motivated to progress towards and into ETE but they must be well supported to access appropriate, high quality provision.

*The Resettlement Broker model should be central to supporting young offenders towards and into ETE and provide on-going support to sustain outcomes. This model of provision prevents re-offending and is cost effective.*

- Effective support for young offenders is delivered through a relational approach, which takes time to develop. Resettlement Broker roles must be recognised as demanding and resource intensive, regardless of the outcomes achieved.

*When providing a Resettlement Broker model of support, caseloads should be carefully managed and extra aspects of brokers' roles limited so that other necessary elements, such as partnership development and job brokerage do not limit the capacity for supporting young offenders.*

- Progression pathways for young offenders require packages of support that necessarily involve joint and partnership working. Work across different London boroughs requires coordination and the recognition of institutional as well as geographical boundaries to ensure effective provision across the city.

*The GLA and other agencies should consider how coordinated packages of support can be provided that are appropriate to individuals' needs.*

- PbR can be an appropriate structure for resettlement and other programmes aimed at reducing reoffending programmes, but it takes time to design a framework and on-going resources to manage effectively and to ensure resources are allocated appropriately.

*In designing PbR for reduced reoffending, a wide range of partners must be consulted in design, so that the challenges of young offenders' progression pathways are sufficiently recognised within the model of payments for outputs and outcomes.*

### 5.2.2 PbR approaches

- PbR can effectively incentivise providers to focus upon outcomes over outputs, maximising long-term outcomes for participants and minimising commissioners' spending on poor provider performance. But the balance of risk for the failure to deliver outputs and outcomes must be carefully considered in design and closely monitored during delivery. Models developed in response to commissioners' design may not be effective and close performance management is required to identify and address problems.

*In designing PbR the pathway towards final outcomes should be carefully considered so that it recognises the work required to achieve them without removing incentives and rewarding outputs over outcomes.*

- As with other payment models, PbR can create perverse incentives that promote gaming and close monitoring of performance across the PbR structure is required to ensure that outcomes are achieved and delivery is provided to target groups as intended.
- PbR is innovative and commissioners and providers lack experience of developing, delivering and managing PbR contracts. The time required for support and learning should be factored into PbR design and delivery.

*When commissioning using PbR, sufficient resources must be dedicated to contract and performance management. There is a great deal of work in the early stages, especially when PbR is new to commissioners and/or providers. But there is also on-going work to manage and audit the process.*

- Tariffs should be considered as a way of recognising the different challenges of different clients or beneficiaries within target groups. But complexity must be balanced with clarity. Work with stakeholders – not potential providers – in developing PbR programmes will help to identify and address these issues.
- When well structured, PbR is an effective tool for managing performance and driving a focus on outcomes. In contrast to grant funding, resources are only paid for performance and outcomes can be rewarded over outputs.

*Because of this, there can be underspend. Considerations of how to reinvest underspend from budgets should be included from the beginning of PbR design. If the contract fails then outcomes will not be delivered, with the potential for unmet need.*



# ANNEXES

## Annex 1 Evaluation Questions Proposed in Invitation to Tender

The evaluation questions specified in the Invitation to Tender, and summarised for the evaluation analysis and reporting were:

- What are the differences in outcome between treatment and comparison group (if available)?
- Does the engagement of a resettlement broker both inside and outside custody have an effect on the intended outcomes?
- Are there other elements of the project, in addition to the resettlement brokers, that have an effect on the intended outcomes?
- Does the allocation of a resettlement or community broker enhance the resettlement journey for young people and adults? Are there any unmet areas of need?
- What are young people's views and attitudes and their perception of the effectiveness of the programme model and individual elements of the model;
- What are the views and perceptions of stakeholders as to the effectiveness of service provision within the programme model?
- Has the payment by results model, as delivered by the LDA, worked to incentivise providers to deliver better outcomes? If not, why not?
- Explore views and perceptions of staff as to the effectiveness of their service provision within the programme model.
- What is the distance travelled in specified outcomes before and after engagement in the programmes?
- Which of the specifications (and providers in the specifications) appears to have the most effective resettlement model and why?
- Did young offenders on community orders access the scheme and did they achieve the required outcomes

## Annex 2 Proven reoffending study

### Introduction

This annex discusses the limitations of the evaluation's proven re-offending analysis. The evaluation used a before and after design and did not use a comparison group. This annex explains why and also describes why it was not possible to include custody data – information on when participants entered and left custody and the number of previous custodial sentences – in the analysis.

### Evaluation Research Design

The aim of any impact evaluation is to provide the most robust analysis possible. The aim is to rule out competing explanations for changes in outcomes and confidently assign the cause to the intervention being implemented. The Maryland Scale is the best known of way of assessing the strengths of different designs, with level 5 being the most robust.<sup>57</sup>

Level 1. Correlation between a crime prevention program and a measure of crime or crime risk factors at a single point in time.
Level 2. Temporal sequence between the program and the crime or risk outcome clearly observed, or the presence of a comparison group without demonstrated comparability to the treatment group.
Level 3. A comparison between two or more comparable units of analysis, one with and one without the program.
Level 4. Comparison between multiple units with and without the program, controlling for other factors, or using comparison units that evidence only minor differences.
Level 5. Random assignment and analysis of comparable units to program and comparison groups.

Deciding which evaluation design to adopt is always a decision where the need for methodological robustness is balanced by the practicalities of the evaluation and research setting. In the context of the evaluation of LRRP, the key factors for consideration were as follows:

- The appointment of the evaluation team after the start of the programme;
- The available data: this was limited to intervention data recorded by the programmes, and PNC data relating to conviction and re-convictions in the 12 months before and after allocation to the programme;
- The range of organisations from those which were contractually obliged to engage with the evaluation research (providers) to others who were not (YOTs);
- Limited capacity of organisations due to funding cuts and reorganisation (providers, partners, YOTs).

Considering the possibilities for different designs, level 5 on the Maryland Scales (random allocation) was ruled out:

- Allocation had already taken place, and random allocation could not be considered.
- Levels 2, 3 and 4 all required comparison groups to be constructed: this proved impractical. Comparison groups could have been considered from two sources: either a different area, or an earlier point in time. It was felt impractical to consider other areas (outside of London): this would have required a buy-in and co-operation from agencies across areas outside of the programme area, and considerable staff hours would have had to be devoted to the construction of datasets from which a comparison group could have been drawn. As there was little incentive for other areas to participate in the evaluation, it was deemed impractical to approach them. The alternative would have been to access data from an earlier time point: a similar cohort from, perhaps, a time point 12 months prior to the allocation to LRRP. In a similar way to the alternative area comparison group, this would also have involved other agencies (probably YOTs) who similarly were not contractually obliged to collaborate with the evaluation.

<sup>57</sup> Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J. Reuter, P. and Bushway, S. (1998) *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising* <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171676.PDF>

Therefore the evaluation undertook a before-and-after analysis. This is less robust than alternative designs: the confidence with which the evaluation can assign cause to the programme is limited. Whilst reductions in re-offending (as measured by reconvictions) might be observed, alternative explanations for any reductions do exist: most importantly the maturation effect – that as young people mature their offending reduces. An attempt was made to place the observed changes in reconvictions in the context of other reconviction studies carried out recently in the UK, but this is an imperfect exercise, due to systematic differences in the cohorts being observed, and the interventions received.

## Sources of data

The evaluation team received programme management data from the LDA – Diesel data – as described in the report. The team then sought to obtain data for the proven re-offending study in the following way:

- Providers were asked for the names, date of birth, date of registration, and date of exit for all participants to the end of October 2010.
- Providers were also asked to supply details for up to five periods of custody for each participant.
- This was time consuming for providers. Although they could provide all participant details, the custody data was extremely weak. Of 518 participants, there was: no custody data for 178 (34.5%); incomplete custody date for 245 (47.5%) – a start date but no end date or vice versa; partial custody data for 93 (18%) – start and end date but as month only, or indication of previous spells in custody but an estimated date.
- The evaluation team sought the information from YJB, who could not provide it due to capacity issues.
- The evaluation team gathered ASSET information for the members of the cohort from YOTs. This took five months due to capacity issues and reorganisation. There was persistent email and telephone contact from the evaluation team, supported by YJB and LCJP. The data was partial. YOTs were under no obligation to support the evaluation. As a result, it was agreed that it would not be feasible to request custody data from them.
- OASys data came from the London Probation Trust, who have ready and easy access to it through their delivery of probation services.

The Diesel database did not collect data about the sentence served by participants – custody or community. This is because in design, different specifications were intended to focus on particular custodial or community settings.

## The final design

Because there was partial custody data for just 93 participants, spread across the four providers (Specification 3 was not included in the analysis because of extremely low numbers of registered participants by October 2010), it was not incorporated in the final design. The evaluation cohort was designed to allow statistically significant results to be produced, incorporating the partial custody data would significantly reduce this number, in this way the analysis will not produce a statistically significant result.

The lack of custody data is a weakness of the design and it was discussed with peer reviewers including MoJ. It was agreed that the final design was the strongest possible with the available data.

## Annex 3 Multivariate Analysis

In order to incorporate the various influences on the possibility of re-conviction, a multivariate analysis allows the unique contribution of each variable to be assessed. The theoretical model underlying the assessment of LRRP in reducing re-convictions needs to consider:

- the demographic characteristics of the offender;
- their prior offending and sentencing history; and
- the intermediate outcomes achieved whilst engaging with the provider;

The complexity of the analysis understanding the patterns of re-conviction stems from the important inter-relationships between the variables used to explain re-conviction. This analysis takes account of the different demographic information held for the reconviction cohort through the DIESEL database. The multivariate logistic regression results, presented in Table 5.1, which model the likelihood of being re-convicted following allocation to LRPP, enable an assessment to be made of the unique contribution of different variables to the reduction of re-conviction.

Table 5.1 below presents two types of information: an odds ratio, and an associated level of statistical significance. Odds ratios identify the increased risk of reconviction associated with that particular variable: where the variable is categorical (any variable with an identified reference category (“refcat”)), the odds ratio demonstrates the notional impact of ‘moving’ from the reference category to the category in question. For example, with the variable “Gender”, the category ‘Male’ is 2.108 times more likely to be re-convicted than the reference category ‘Female’. With interval level variables, such as age and the number of convictions prior to allocation, the odds ratio shows the effect of an additional unit of that variable (e.g. being one year older, or having one more conviction). Odds ratios above 1 represent an increased risk of reconviction compared to the reference category, whilst a figure below 1 represents a reduction. The statistical significance relates to the confidence we can assign to the odds ratio finding. By convention, anything with a statistical significance of .05 or below can be considered reliable, and not likely to be the product of chance to with the selection of the cohort.

This analysis looks at the whole cohort as well as by provider so as to present the findings in full. Nonetheless, no conclusions are drawn by the evaluation team from this. Only LPT and St Giles show a significant result. Of more interest is the analysis of different outcomes and their influence across the cohort. The full model is presented below. The same model was used for each provider due to the low numbers if the total was broken down.

The analysis shows a statistically significant relationship between the achievement of:

- A positive activities output ( $p < 0.74$ )
- A skills development output ( $p < 0.77$ )
- An employment start ( $p < 0.43$ )
- A sustained employment outcome ( $p < 0.98$ )

**Table 5.1 Multivariate analysis comparing different characteristics and outcomes with reconviction**

Variable	Odds ratio	Statistical significance
Provider (Refcat=Catch-22)		
LPT		
Nacro	3.011	.020
St Giles	.751	.835
	3.711	.003
Gender = Male (Refcat = Female)	2.108	.168
Ethnicity		

Variable	Odds ratio	Statistical significance
(Refcat=Asian)		
Black	1.006	.989
Mixed Heritage	1.208	.676
White	.965	.934
Age	.787	.111
No. of Convictions before Allocation	1.132	.011
Highest Educational Qualification at Allocation (Refcat=None)		
Below NVQ1		
NVQ1	.666	.396
NVQ2	.821	.617
NVQ3	.579	.100
NVQ4	.817	.667
Other / Not Known	.989	.995
	1.118	.827
Number of Equality Groups <sup>58</sup>	1.400	.156
Custody before = Yes (Refcat = No)	.873	.627
Personal Crime = Yes (Refcat=No)	2.520	.001
Property Crime = Yes (Refcat=No)	5.641	.001
Drugs Crime = Yes (Refcat=No)	2.135	.001
Other Crime = Yes (Refcat=No)	1.829	.009
Skills Training = Yes (Refcat=No)	.609	.077
Positive Activities = Yes (Refcat=No)	1.602	.074
Employment Outcome (Refcat=No)		
Started Job	.501	.043
Sustained Employment	.455	.098

*DIESEL data and PNC data*

<sup>58</sup> The data provided by the different agency records whether the individual is a member of any of 6 "equality groups", namely whether they are leaving care, whether they are a lone parent, whether they are homeless, whether they have a history of substance abuse, whether they have care responsibilities, and whether they have a history of offending. With the exception of the final category, which is assumed to be constant, the "Number of Equality groups" variable is a simple tally of the number of other categories which an individual falls in.



## Annex 4 Economic Analysis

The overall economic impact of the LRRP is presented in this chapter. The assumptions around the additionality of the programme, and around monetising the outcomes, are set out, before the findings are presented.

### Assumptions

The assumptions that have been made to underpin the calculations are presented here. These are drawn from qualitative interviews with staff, partners and beneficiaries of the projects, and from literature and HM Treasury guidance.

### Additionality

Additionality shows the difference between the outcomes achieved by participants on the programme and what outcomes would have been achieved anyway. There is no counterfactual data. The assumptions on additionality come from qualitative interviews. These are:

#### *Deadweight – participants who would have achieved sustained job / education without the programme*

Beneficiaries and project staff were asked about the likelihood of the young person achieving a job without the intervention of the LRRP providers. Although beneficiaries and project staff suggested that there were some young people who would have been able to access a job or an educational course without the intervention, they were in the minority for all providers. **The deadweight – the proportion of young people who achieved a sustained outcome but would have been able to achieve that same sustained outcome without the help of the LRRP – has been estimated at 10%.<sup>59</sup>**

#### *Leakage – participants achieving a sustained outcome outside London*

Beneficiaries were asked where they had managed to find employment. All beneficiaries stated that their employment was within London. Therefore, **the leakage – the proportion of young people who achieved a sustained outcome outside London – has been estimated at 0%.**

#### *Substitution – participants achieving a sustained outcome from LRRP projects who would have achieved the sustained outcome on a different project*

The beneficiaries and project staff were asked about any other similar programmes that were running to help to prevent young people reoffending, and support them into education or employment within London. Other than LRRP's sister programme Daedalus, no other programmes of this type were highlighted. It is assumed that no participants moved from Daedalus to the LRRP projects. Therefore, **substitution – the proportion of young people who achieved a sustained outcome who would have achieved this on a different programme – has been estimated at 0%.**

#### *Displacement – participants who achieved sustained employment that were existing vacancies*

Employers and project staff were asked about the jobs that participants of the LRRP had taken. Specifically, they were asked about whether the jobs being taken were by LRRP participants were jobs that had been created for or by the project or the young person (new vacancies), or if the roles were jobs that someone else had previously held and left (existing vacancies). Almost all of the jobs were existing vacancies - Only two examples of jobs that had been created for LRRP participants were discovered. Therefore, **the displacement – the proportion of sustained employment that were existing vacancies – has been estimated at 90%.**

<sup>59</sup> This is comparable with data from NOMS data for males coming out of Young Offenders Institutes and getting a job (7.5%) and females from local prisons (8.1%). However, these are job entry statistics, and for not sustained employment. No information on sustained outcomes for the wider group of young offenders was found. Source: MoJ Information Release July 2012. *National Offender Management Service Annual Report 2011/12: Management Information Addendum* <http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/prison-probation/prison-probation-performance-stats/noms-annual-report-2011-12-addendum.pdf>

It has been assumed that a young person accessing education or training does not have a displacement effect (one person receiving training or learning does not deprive anyone else from receiving the training or education), therefore the displacement for sustained education or training outcomes has been estimated at 0%.

### Multiplier

Multipliers measure the degree to which government intervention ‘ripples’ out into the economy, through the spending of beneficiaries who have achieved sustained employment as a result of the programme.<sup>60</sup> A standard multiplier effect for regional people and skills interventions of 1.36 has been used.<sup>61</sup>

### Other assumptions

The other assumptions that have been used in the calculations come from literature, official statistics and HM Treasury. These are:

- Only sustained outcomes are used to estimate the economic impact,<sup>62</sup>
- GDP deflators from HM Treasury are used to inflate all figures to 2011 values (where appropriate);<sup>63</sup>
- The beneficiaries entering sustained employment are likely to have relatively low wages. It is assumed that, on average, their earnings are the equivalent of the national minimum wage working for 35 hours per week (£6.08). This has been multiplied this by a factor of 1.8 in order to estimate the Gross Value Added (GVA) per job (the value of goods and services produced in an area minus the costs of the inputs used to produce them, divided by the number of jobs in the region). It shows the impact a job has on the local economy. This provides an estimate of the GVA per job as £19,918 per year;<sup>64</sup>
- It is assumed that the impact of each sustained job on GVA persists for three years;<sup>65</sup>
- A lifetime cost of being NEET is assumed to be £109,793;<sup>66</sup>
- It is assumed that qualifications below level 1 have a negligible effect on income;
- It is assumed that qualifications at level 1 have the Net Present Value (NPV) equivalent to an NVQ at level 1, £14,253;<sup>67</sup>
- It is assumed that qualifications at level 2 have the Net Present Value (NPV) equivalent to an NVQ at level 2, £17,728;<sup>68</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009) *Guidance for using Additionality Benchmarks in Appraisal* <http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file54063.pdf>

<sup>61</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009a) *RDA Evaluation: Practical Guidance on Implementing the Impact Evaluation Framework* <http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISCore/economics-and-statistics/docs/09-1559-rda-evaluation-practical-guidance-main-report.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> The definition of sustained outcomes comes from the Payment by Results contract issued to the providers. Sustained employment - beneficiaries stay in employment for at least 6 months, a minimum of sixteen hours per week; and Sustained education / training - beneficiaries stay in education / training for at least 6 months, a minimum of sixteen hours per week.

<sup>63</sup> [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data\\_gdp\\_fig.htm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_gdp_fig.htm)

<sup>64</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates>. We have used the rate for those aged 21 or over. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009a) *op.cit.*

<sup>65</sup> The value of GVA in the second and third years has been discounted at a rate of 3.5%, following guidance from The Treasury Green Book (<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/greenbook>). Source of persistence: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009a) *op.cit.*

<sup>66</sup> From Godfrey et al. (2010) Estimating the life-time cost of NEET: 16-18 year olds not in Education, Employment or Training [http://www.york.ac.uk/media/spsw/documents/research-and-publications/NEET\\_Final\\_Report\\_July\\_2010\\_York.pdf](http://www.york.ac.uk/media/spsw/documents/research-and-publications/NEET_Final_Report_July_2010_York.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2011) Returns to Intermediate and Low Level Vocational Qualifications. The NPV is the total value over a lifetime of achieving the qualification, including higher wages and a higher probability of being employed, with the values for future years being discounted. The lower end of the NPV scale have been used in these estimates, in order to be conservative.

- The individual NPV of qualifications have been multiplied by a factor of 1.8 to estimate the increase in GVA caused by the increase in skills level;<sup>69</sup>
- The difference in the number of young offenders expected to offend without the programmes intervention and the number of young people expected to offend with the programmes intervention has been used to calculate the reduction in the number of young people reoffending. It is assumed the whole difference is attributable to the programme;<sup>70</sup>
- The reconviction rates (from the reconviction analysis chapter) have been applied to the whole cohorts for Specifications 2 and 4; and
- The criminal justice system cost per reoffender is assumed to be £71,739.<sup>71</sup>

The gross sustained jobs created impact is presented as a value for three years, after which it is assumed that there is no impact on GVA, whereas all other values are presented as lifetime values.

### Economic impact

Table 5.2 shows the additional value of the LRRP programme. The additional benefits from the reduction in reoffending, from improving the skills of beneficiaries and from the additional GVA generated from the jobs created have been summed, to give an estimated economic impact of £58.7 million. However, this is an uncertain estimate of the true economic value of the programme, as it has not been possible to sum all of the impacts of the programme. The savings from a reduction in the number of young people who are NEET is also presented, although it is not included in the total summation, to avoid any double counting. (TABLE ADDED, including a new column to show total and additional)

**Table 5.2 Economic impact of LRRP**

Impact evidenced by LRRP	Total number of young people benefitting	Additional number of young people benefitting	Impact (£m)
Reduction in reoffending (criminal justice saving)	772	772	55.4
Skills uplift level 1 <sup>72</sup>	82	74	1.9
Skills uplift level 2 <sup>73</sup>	17	15	0.5
Increase in GVA from jobs created	134	16	0.9
<b>Total</b>			<b>58.7</b>
<i>Saving from reduction in NEETs<sup>74</sup></i>	264	238	26.1

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009a) *op.cit.*

<sup>70</sup> The calculation that was used for the change in the number of young people reoffending was to multiply the percentage of the cohort that was expected to offend without engagement by the total number in the cohort. The percentage of the cohort that was expected to offend after engagement was then multiplied by the total number in the cohort. This second figure was subtracted from the first figure, to provide an estimate for the number of beneficiaries who would not reoffend due to the programmes intervention. This was done separately for each specification and provider, and the totals summed.

<sup>71</sup> From the 2007 DfES evaluation of the Full Service Extended Schools Initiative, and inflated to 2011 values. This cost includes prosecution, incarceration and supervision, family intervention and care costs. This estimate is based on NACRO (1998) Wasted Lives: Counting the cost of juvenile offending.

<sup>72</sup> This is 90% of the total number of beneficiaries achieving a qualification at this level – as deadweight is assumed to be 10%, so 10% of beneficiaries would have achieved the qualification without the programme.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> This is 90% of the total number of beneficiaries entering a sustained outcome – as deadweight is assumed to be 10%, so 10% of beneficiaries would have found ETE outcomes without the programme.

## Sensitivity

The estimates described above are made using conservative estimates for values of skills uplifts, cost savings from a reduction in the number of young people who are NEET and the estimate of GVA per job. If the assumptions around these costs are changed, an upper bound estimate for the impact of the LRRP can be estimated. The assumptions that have been altered are:

- a lifetime cost of being NEET is assumed to be £388,999;<sup>75</sup>
- it is assumed that qualifications at level 1 have the Net Present Value (NPV) equivalent to an NVQ at level 1, £32,139;<sup>76</sup>
- it is assumed that qualifications at level 2 have the Net Present Value (NPV) equivalent to an NVQ at level 2, £42,441;<sup>77</sup> and
- Gross Value Added (GVA) per job is the value of goods and services produced in an area minus the costs of the inputs used to produce them, divided by the number of jobs in the region. It shows the impact a job has on the local economy. The impact that a job in London has on the economy, the GVA per job, is estimated to be £58,521 per year;<sup>78</sup>
- All other assumptions remain the same. By altering these assumptions, the upper bound estimate of the total impact of the LRRP is shown in Table 5.3. The estimates for impacts from skills uplift and GVA from jobs created are much higher than in the previous estimate – however, they are still much smaller than the impact from the reduction in reoffending. Unfortunately the research which has been used as a proxy for the impact of reducing reoffending does not provide a range of values, so it is not possible to vary this impact.

**Table 5.3 High end estimate of economic impact of LRRP**

Impact evidenced by LRRP	Total number of young people benefitting	Additional number of young people benefitting	Impact (£m)
Reduction in reoffending (criminal justice saving)	772	772	55.4
Skills uplift level 1 <sup>79</sup>	82	74	4.3
Skills uplift level 2 <sup>80</sup>	17	15	1.1
Increase in GVA from jobs created	134	16	2.7
<b>Total</b>			<b>60.5</b>
<i>Saving from reduction in NEETs<sup>81</sup></i>	264	238	92.6

<sup>75</sup> From Godfrey et al. (2010) Estimating the life-time cost of NEET: 16-18 year olds not in Education, Employment or Training

<sup>76</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2011) *Returns to Intermediate and Low Level Vocational Qualifications* [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/32354/11-1282-returns-intermediate-and-low-level-vocational-qualifications.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32354/11-1282-returns-intermediate-and-low-level-vocational-qualifications.pdf). The NPV is the total value over a lifetime of achieving the qualification, including higher wages and a higher probability of being employed, with the values for future years being discounted.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Gross Value Added per Workforce Job by Broad Industry Sector, The Regional Economic Performance Indicators (REPI), <http://www.bis.gov.uk/analysis/statistics/sub-national-statistics/regional-economic-performance-indicators>, and inflated to 2011 values.

<sup>79</sup> This is 90% of the total number of beneficiaries achieving a qualification at this level – as deadweight is assumed to be 10%, so 10% of beneficiaries would have achieved the qualification without the programme.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> This is 90% of the total number of beneficiaries entering a sustained outcome – as deadweight is assumed to be 10%, so 10% of beneficiaries would have found ETE outcomes without the programme.

## Limitations

There are some limitations to the calculations that have been made, which make the estimation of the economic impact of the programme more uncertain. These limitations are likely to mean that the estimated economic impacts are under-estimates for some impacts and over-estimates for other impacts compared to the true impact of the programme:

- A lifetime saving for a reduction in reoffending has been applied to the reduction in reoffending. This assumes that the young people who have not offended within the year will continue to avoid offending in the future. This means that the reduction in reoffending impact is likely to overestimate the true economic value of the programme.
- However, given that the money spent on the programmes was £5.2 million (the budget was £9m), it would only require a reduction in reoffending of 73 or more beneficiaries for the programme to be considered cost-effective (for the Net Present Value for the reduction in reoffending only to be higher than the cost of the programme), under the assumption that the criminal justice system cost per reoffender is £71,739. This is under 10% of the 772 beneficiaries who did not reoffend within one year due to the intervention of the programme.
- Issues surrounding double counting – the savings from the reduction in the number of people who are NEET includes some crime, employment and skills related benefits. These benefits are likely to be similar to the benefits presented in the other categories, which are already included in the total impacts of the programme. Therefore, the savings from the reduction in the number of people who are NEET is excluded from the total economic impact of the programme. However, this means that some of the other benefits from reducing the number of young people who are NEET (including health impacts and costs associated with substance misuse) are excluded from the total impact of the programme. This means that the total economic impact is likely to underestimate the true economic value of the programme.
- There are likely to be benefits associated with a reduction in benefits claimed from the Government. However, it is unclear how many of the beneficiaries claimed benefits before gaining employment, and what impact their employment would have on other individuals claiming benefits (who could potentially have taken jobs that LRRP beneficiaries are working in). Therefore, it is assumed that the impact on benefit payments is neutral, although this is likely to underestimate the impact of the programme.
- The GVA per job figure that is assumed will probably underestimate the GVA impact of jobs created for young people as a result of the programme. This is because the national minimum wage has been used as a proxy for the earnings of the beneficiaries, whereas in reality this is likely to be the minimum amount that they are earning. However, the alternative to this measure is using an average GVA per job for London, which is estimated as around £59,000 (this is due to the number of high skilled jobs in London). As the majority of the jobs the young people from the programme enter are lower skilled jobs, and unlikely to generate nearly £59,000 in GVA, the minimum wage based estimate has been used.
- Due to a lack of data, it was not possible to estimate the reduction in reoffending for Specification three. This is likely to lead to an underestimate of the impact on reoffending.

The cost of reoffending is estimated as £71,739 per reoffender, and is taken from the 2007 DfES evaluation of the Full Service Extended Schools Initiative, and is inflated to 2011 values. This cost includes prosecution, incarceration and supervision, family intervention and care costs. However, this does not cover all the costs relating to reoffending, as it does not include any impact for victims (for example protection against crime, and health impacts from being a victim of crime). These costs are included in the estimated costs of crime by Dubourg et al. (2005). Unfortunately, the costs of crime presented by Dubourg et al. (2005) are presented by type of crime (for example burglary, assault and robbery); the data surrounding the offences committed by the LRRP cohort, and the reconviction analysis, is not broken down into the same categories. Therefore, it has not been possible to use the estimates from Dubourg et al. (2005) in this analysis.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Dubourg, W., Hamed, J., & Thorns, J., (2005) *The Social and Economic Costs of Crime against Individuals and Households 2003/04*, Home Office Online Report 30/05.

